Edwards v. Piedmont Pub. Co.

• Decision Date: 05 March 1947
• Docket Number: 738
• Parties: EDWARDS v. PIEDMONT PUB. CO. et al.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

41 S.E.2d 592

227 N.C. 184

EDWARDS v. PIEDMONT PUB. CO. et al.

No. 738

Supreme Court of North Carolina

March 5, 1947

This was a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act, G.S. s 97-1 et seq., for compensation for an injury sustained by the plaintiff while in the employ of defendant Publishing Company. The Industrial Commission found, under the evidence offered, that the plaintiff had sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by the defendant, and awarded compensation under the Act. On appeal to the Superior Court the defendants' exceptions were overruled and the findings and conclusions of the Industrial Commission were affirmed.

Defendants appealed to this Court, assigning error in the ruling of the trial judge.

No counsel for claimant.

W C. Ginter, of Charlotte, for defendants, appellants.

DEVIN Justice.

The defendants challenge the correctness of the ruling below on the ground that there was no competent evidence to sustain the finding that the injury complained of was 'by accident' within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. G.S. s 97-2(f). They do not controvert the fact that the injury, if properly determined to have been by accident, arose out of and in the course of plaintiff's employment by defendant Publishing Company.

The pertinent facts, as found by the hearing commissioner and affirmed by the full commission, were as follows: 'The commissioner finds that on February 3, 1945, the claimant in this case was employed as a learner and on said date and in the course of his regular employment, he was required to lift a plate from the floor and hand it to the pressman; and in doing so, the claimant handed the plate to the pressman to his right and at the time his body was in a twist from the position in which he was standing; and at that time he felt an excruciating pain in his low back and hip and turned very white and pale and had to lie down. He was seen in a day or two by Dr. Vernon Lassiter who strapped his back and treated him for strained muscle. The claimant worked with difficulty for several days up until about the 17th of February. He was seen by Dr. R. A. Moore on March 7th, and Dr. Moore diagnosed his condition as a ruptured intervertebral disc and operated on him on the 14th of March. The claimant was disabled as a result of said injury and operation until the 10th of June upon which date his disability following the operation was terminated.'

These findings seem to be in accord with the evidence offered. Plaintiff testified that in the course of his employment and in the performance of his work he picked up a plate off the floor, the plate weighing between 40 and 50 pounds, and made one step with his left foot and had to turn and hand the plate to the pressman over to his right, 'kind of twisting'; that he twisted around and handed it to the boy and felt a severe pain in the lower part of his back and hip. 'I never had a pain like that before.' He said he did not slip but 'twisted.' Dr. Moore testified the plaintiff described his injury as having been sustained while he was lifting a plate, and that he felt something give way in his back. He gave his opinion that the lifting of the plate in the manner described was sufficient to have produced the injury he found, and that in his opinion it was thus caused.

The defendants call attention to admission by the plaintiff that on two different occasions, several years before, when he arose from a sitting position he had a catch in his back, 'above the beltline.' They also point to evidence tending to show that plaintiff had been doing similar work for three months, and that on the occasion of his injury he picked up the plate and 'handed it over to the right in the normal, usual way. ' Defendants contend this evidence indicates a pre-existing injury, or physical weakness, and negatives the idea of unusual conditions or unexpected consequences, and hence that the finding that the injury resulted from an accident was unsupported. G.S. s 97-52.

However, in view of the finding by the statutory fact-finding body, the plaintiff is entitled to have the evidence considered in the light most favorable for the establishment of his claim, for, if there be any competent evidence to support the findings of the Industrial Commission, these findings must be held conclusive of the facts and of the permissible inferences to be drawn therefrom. Southern v. Morehead Cotton Mills Co., 200 N.C. 165, 156 S.E. 861; Carlton v. Bernhardt-Seagle Co., 210 N.C. 655, 188 S.E. 77; Barbour v. State Hospital, 213 N.C. 515, 196 S.E. 812; Dickey v. Springs Cotton Mills, S.C., 39 S.E.2d 501.

An accident, as the word is used in the Workmen's Compensation Act, has been defined as 'an unlooked for and untoward event which is not expected or designed by the [injured employee].' Love v. Town of Lumberton, 215 N.C. 28, 1 S.E.2d 121, 122; Smith v. Cabarrus Creamery Co., 217 N.C. 468, 8 S.E.2d 231. 'A result produced by a fortuitous cause. ' Slade v. Willis Hosiery Mills, 209 N.C. 823, 184 S.E. 844, 845. 'An unexpected or unforeseen event.' Webster. 'An unexpected, unusual or undesigned occurrence. ' Black.

The question here presented is whether, taking into consideration all the circumstances connected with plaintiff's claim, the rupture of his intervertebral disc occurred on February 3, 1945, and, if so, whether it was the result of such an unlooked for and untoward event, produced by lifting the plate and handing it to another in a 'twisted' position as described by the plaintiff, as to come within the definition of an injury by accident, and hence to furnish the basis for an award of compensation under the remedial provisions of the Act. The Industrial Commission has so found and the Superior Court has affirmed.

This ruling must be upheld. The evidence of the sudden and unexpected displacement of the plaintiff's intervertebral disc under the strain of lifting and turning as described lends support to the conclusion that the injury complained of should be regarded as falling within the category of accident, rather than as the result of inherent weakness, or as being one of the ordinary and expected incidents of the employment. Smith v. Cabarrus Creamery Co., 217 N.C. 468, 8 S.E.2d 231; MacRae v. Unemployment Compensation Comm., 217 N.C. 769, 9 S.E.2d 595; Moore v. Engineering & Sales Co., 214 N.C. 424, 199 S.E. 605; Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Hoage, 64 App.D.C. 158, 75 F.2d 677; Dixon v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Corporation 182 Va. 185, 28 S.E.2d 617; Giguere v. E. B. & A. C. Whiting Co. 107 Vt. 151, 177 A. 313, 98 A.L.R. 196. See also Rewis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 226 N.C. 325, 38 S.E.2d 97.

We find nothing in Neely v. City of Statesville, 212 N.C. 365, 193 S.E. 664; Slade v. Willis Hosiery Mills, 209 N.C. 823, 184 S.E. 844, or Buchanan v. State Highway & Public Works Commission, 217 N.C. 173, 7 S.E.2d 382, to militate against the conclusion reached on the facts here presented.

Judgment affirmed.

SEAWELL Justice (concurring in result).

I concur in the result reached in this case, but dissent from the principle on which it is based. The effect of the decision is to adopt the minority view that confines compensation to injuries wholly external--that is, injuries caused by external force, accidentally applied--and does not regard the unexpected breaking or giving way of the body tissues under the strain or load of the usual employment as 'injury by accident' within the meaning of Section 97-2(f) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, G.S., Chapter 97. The proper definition of this term has an important bearing on the coverage of the Act, and its administration by the Industrial Commission.

The claimant, without counsel in the court below, was not represented by counsel here, and filed no brief, and apparently had no counsel before the Industrial Commission where the claim originated. The defendant was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings. For that, among other reasons, not wholly out of regard for the claimant, who seems to be cast in the role of propositus, but in the interest of the many who may have just claims for compensation which should not be foreclosed by decision upon a question which may be more or less academically posed, I venture to state my reasons for disagreeing with the Court.

To understand the question raised by the appeal, I must add somewhat to the statement of fact in the main opinion. Claimant's evidence, as given by his coworker, discloses that the work being done by Edwards was in the usual way of lifting and handling the type plate and passing it to his companion, and that there was no unusual load lifted. The claimant himself so stated, and added that he did not slip, but handled the plate in the same manner he had been doing since his employment some 2 1/2 months ago. If there is any significance to be attached to the position of claimant's body when he passed the plate laterally to his coworker, it does not appear in the evidence. The plaintiff had been doing that for months. The evidence is clear of any pretense that the work was not being done in the ordinary way incident to the employment. And yet, in my opinion, the claimant is entitled to compensation: Because the displacement of the vertebral disc, an occurrence both unusual and unexpected by the worker--and in fact by anyone else--satisfies every essential definitional requirement of 'injury by accident' within the meaning of the Compensation law.

In Smith v. Cabarrus Creamery Co., 217 N.C. 468, 8 S.E.2d 231, 233, this question was presented to the Court and was decided in accordance with the well established rule in cases cited infra. The Court said:

'In Moore v. Engineering & Sales Co., 214 N.C....