Edwards v. Schoemehl, 70637
| Decision Date | 14 February 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 70637,70637 |
| Citation | 765 S.W.2d 607 |
| Parties | Bernard F. EDWARDS, Jr., Respondent, v. Vincent C. SCHOEMEHL, Jr., Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Julian L. Bush, Asst. City Counselor and James J. Wilson, City Counselor, St. Louis, for appellant.
Raymond Howard, St. Louis, for respondent.
The plaintiff-respondent was appointed City Court Judge of the City of Saint Louis for a term ending April 1, 1989. The appointment is evidenced by a document dated April 16, 1985, and signed by Mayor Vincent C. Schoemehl, Jr. On May 30, 1986, the respondent was notified by letter signed by Marie Jeffries, Deputy Chief of Staff, that he was suspended without pay pending investigation of charges as to whether he "timely complied with the residency requirements ..." of the city charter. The letter of notification commenced with the words, "On behalf of the Mayor of the City of St. Louis."
On June 4, 1986, the respondent filed suit challenging the propriety of his suspension. On June 9 and 11, 1986, Jeffries communicated with him, offering him a hearing relating to charges of misconduct not involving his residency. The trial judge held that these later communications were not material because they involved charges other than those on which the suspension was based. We agree.
Following a bench trial of the issues raised by the respondent's first amended petition the court, on April 16, 1987, entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the suspension failed to meet constitutional standards for a variety of reasons. The judgment was accompanied by detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff was awarded back pay from May 30, 1987 to the date of the judgment. A claim for attorneys' fees was denied and the plaintiff has not appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment on the defendant mayor's appeal. We granted transfer because of the importance of the issues relating to the termination of city officials. We conclude that the judgment is correct and so affirm, for reasons which differ somewhat from those relied on by the trial court and the court of appeals. We do not need to consider all of the issues presented by the parties, but we do dispose of those which have been briefed and which would necessarily impact further litigation relating to the respondent's tenure as city court judge.
The plaintiff was appointed in accordance with Article VII, Section 1 of the Charter of the City of St. Louis, reading as follows:
[The mayor] shall appoint and may remove all nonelective officers and all employees, except as otherwise in this charter provided, but shall not remove any office, department or division head appointed by him, except for cause....
The position of City Court Judge is established by Article XII, Section 1 of the Charter. The Charter is silent as to the procedure for removal of an officer or employee who may be removed only for cause, and we are cited to no ordinance provision.
The plaintiff-respondent argues vigorously that the removal of a city court judge by the mayor violates the principle of separation of powers monumented by Article II, Section 1 of the Missouri Constitution. 1 We do not agree that there is such a violation. The mayor has the sole and unfettered authority to appoint city court judges, and the power to remove for cause is expressly conferred upon him. The city charter was in force, in substantially its present form, when the Constitution of 1945 was adopted, and Article II, Sec. 1 was taken bodily from the Constitution of 1875. That section was not designed to rule out all interrelation between the various branches of the government. The present controversy relates not to the exercise of the functions of the judicial department, but to the tenure of the judge.
The respondent also argues that the sole method of removal of judges is found in Article V, Section 24 of the Missouri Constitution, providing for the establishment of a Commission on Retirement, Removal and Discipline of judges. In re Fullwood, 518 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. banc 1975), holds that judges of the City Court of the City of St. Louis are subject to discipline in accordance with that article. Subsection 3 of Section 24, however, shows positively that the remedies provided by that subsection are not exclusive. See Fullwood, 518 S.W.2d at 29 (Bardgett, J., dissenting) for a discussion of other methods of removal.
Article V has been amended since Fullwood to make it clear that a municipal court is a part of the circuit court of the county or city in which it functions. Mo. Const. Art. V, § 27.2(d). We discern no purpose in this amendment of eliminating any removal procedure previously available. We therefore reject the respondent's challenge to the authority of the mayor. The long established charter provisions giving the mayor the power to remove appointees, subject only to the qualification that an "office, department or division head appointed by" the mayor may be removed only "for cause," do not transgress constitutional boundaries.
Inasmuch as the respondent could be removed only for cause he had a property interest in his job, of which he could be deprived only by procedures consistent with due process of law. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 148, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985); Belton v. Board of Police Commissioners, 708 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. banc 1986). The appellant argues that Edwards has no property right under state law and that the due process clause of our constitution should not be construed to incorporate any such right. We do not pursue this contention because the Supreme Court decisions construing the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment impose minimum procedural requirements with which the state and all governmental subdivisions must comply.
The evidence shows that Jeffries, on May 30, 1986, advised the respondent that she wanted to meet with him. 2 She gave him no prior indication of the occasion for the meeting. When he arrived she told him about complaints about his courtroom demeanor and about his failure to pay outstanding parking tickets. There is a conflict in the evidence about whether his place of residence was discussed at the meeting, but we accept the trial court's finding that Jeffries testified credibly that there was discussion of this subject. Jeffries offered the respondent the opportunity to resign and told him that she was "looking for another judge." The letter notifying him of his suspension without pay was sent following this meeting.
The respondent complains that he was given no notice of the subject matter of the meeting when he was called to attend and that Jeffries presented only "hearsay" information, depriving him of the opportunity to meet his accusers face to face. He argues that this meeting was lacking in the process due for a presuspension hearing of a city court judge. Both the trial judge and the court of appeals appear to have accepted this contention. We do not need to consider it at length but, inasmuch as the book is not completely closed on the incident, we consider it appropriate to call attention to the statement in Loudermill that a pretermination hearing, though necessary, "need not be elaborate." 470 U.S. at 545, 105 S.Ct. at 1495. The point is further analyzed in Belton, 708 S.W.2d at 138. 3
We conclude, nevertheless, that the suspension procedure here employed was fatally flawed. The power to suspend is derived from the power to remove for cause. The power to remove is entrusted to the mayor...
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...not be considered because it involves matters not raised or considered at trial, or at the post-conviction relief hearing. Edwards v. Schoemehl, 765 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Mo. banc 1989), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 906, 109 S.Ct. 3188, 105 L.Ed.2d 697 In addition, evidence of a post-trial competency ......
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Walton v. City of Berkeley
...not in equity." Id. at 89. In this case, the trial court found that Count I was sufficiently similar to the cause of action in Edwards v. Schoemehl, 765 S.W.2d 607 (Mo.banc 1989), in determining that plaintiff had an equitable cause of action under Count I. In Edwards, the plaintiff, a City......
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Walton v. City of Berkeley, No. ED 87078 (Mo. App. 8/29/2006)
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Edwards v. Schoemehl, 60322
...not so. Judge was accorded due process because § 536.150, RSMo 1986, provides for full post-termination judicial review. Edwards v. Schoemehl, 765 S.W.2d 607, 609 n. 3 (Mo.banc 1989); and Belton v. Board of Police Commissioners of Kansas City, 708 S.W.2d 131, 138 n. 5 (Mo.banc 1986). Furthe......