Edwards v. State, A19-1943

• Decision Date: 21 September 2020
• Docket Number: A19-1943
• Citation: 950 N.W.2d 309
• Parties: Matthew William EDWARDS, petitioner, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

950 N.W.2d 309

Matthew William EDWARDS, petitioner, Appellant,

v.STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.

A19-1943

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Filed September 21, 2020

Granted/Stayed December 15, 2020

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chelsie Willett, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Kathleen A. Heaney, Sherburne County Attorney, George R. Kennedy, Assistant County Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Bratvold, Judge.

BRATVOLD, Judge

In 2018, the Minnesota Supreme Court announced the Birchfield rule in Johnson , following three decisions by the United States and Minnesota Supreme Courts,¹ and described the rule as providing that the "[s]tate may not criminalize refusal of a blood or a urine test absent a search warrant or a showing that a valid exception to the warrant requirement applies." Johnson , 916 N.W.2d at 679. Johnson also decided that the Birchfield rule changes substantive law and applies retroactively. Id. at 684. But Johnson held that reversal is "not automatic" and, on remand, the district courts in postconviction proceedings must make case-by-case determinations and "will need to apply the Birchfield rule and determine if the test-refusal statute was unconstitutional" as applied. Id.

Appellant Matthew William Edwards sought postconviction relief vacating his 2011 conviction for third-degree test refusal under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2010). He appeals from an order denying all relief on his 2019 petition. Edwards argues the postconviction court erred when it determined that Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), did not apply retroactively to his case. Edwards also contends that, in denying relief, the postconviction court "incorrectly placed the burden on the State and found it established [the] single-factor exigency" that McNeely disallowed.

Respondent State of Minnesota argues that Edwards's petition is untimely. The state also argues that the postconviction court did not err when it determined the McNeely rule is not retroactive. Edwards responds that his petition is timely because the two-year time limit for postconviction petitions includes a new-interpretation-of-law exception in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(3).

We conclude that Edwards's petition is timely under the exception he raises because he filed his petition within two years of Johnson . Next, we conclude that McNeely applies retroactively to Edwards's case and precludes the state's reliance on single-factor exigency as an exception to the warrant requirement based on our decision in Hagerman v. State , 945 N.W.2d 872 (Minn. App. 2020), review granted (Minn. Aug. 25, 2020). Lastly, we conclude that the postconviction court failed to apply the heightened pleading standard and burden-shifting procedure articulated for Birchfield / Johnson postconviction proceedings in Fagin v. State , 933 N.W.2d 774 (Minn. 2019). Thus, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS

On May 7, 2011, a police officer initiated a traffic stop after the officer observed Edwards's van roll through a stop sign and cross into the oncoming lane of traffic. While speaking with Edwards, the officer noticed a strong smell of alcohol and a faint smell of marijuana coming from the van. The officer observed Edwards was slurring his speech and had glassy eyes.

Edwards exited his van and dropped a marijuana pipe. He told the officer he had two-and-a-half beers about an hour before driving, smoked marijuana the previous day, and had marijuana in the van. Edwards then failed a field sobriety test and took a preliminary breath test, which revealed an alcohol concentration of 0.05. The officer arrested Edwards, read the implied-consent advisory, and Edwards spoke with an attorney. A drug recognition expert performed tests and concluded that Edwards was under the influence of cannabis and unable to safely operate a motor vehicle. Police asked Edwards to take a blood or urine test

, but he refused.

The state charged Edwards with third-degree test refusal under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2. On October 27, 2011, Edwards entered into an agreement with the state and pleaded guilty to the charge. On December 15, 2011, the district court convicted Edwards and sentenced him to 365 days with 335 days stayed for four years. Edwards was discharged from probation in 2014.

On July 26, 2019, Edwards petitioned for postconviction relief asking the court to vacate his conviction because the test-refusal statute was unconstitutional as applied to him based on the supreme court's decision that the Birchfield rule is retroactive, as stated in Johnson . Edwards argued that, because law enforcement did not have a warrant to search his blood or urine and no exception to the warrant requirement applied, his refusal to submit to a warrantless test could not be criminalized. Edwards also argued that McNeely is "expressly incorporated" into the Birchfield rule. Edwards asked the postconviction court, if it was "not inclined to summarily grant the petition," to grant him an evidentiary hearing "where the state would be required to carry its burden to show the presence of a warrant or warrant exception." Edwards relied on this court's opinion in Fagin v. State , No. A17-1705, 2018 WL 6034962 (Minn. App. Nov. 19, 2018), which was under supreme court review when he filed his postconviction petition.²

The state argued that Edwards's petition is time-barred because he did not file it within two years of Birchfield , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 195 L.Ed.2d 560. The state also argued that Edwards's conviction was lawful because the McNeely rule is not retroactive. The state also noted that the supreme court had not yet decided Fagin , so "the question of which party bears the burden of proof is not yet before the Court." Edwards maintained that his petition is timely under the new-interpretation-of-law exception in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(3), because he petitioned within two years of Johnson , which deemed the Birchfield rule retroactive.

The postconviction court implicitly determined that Edwards's petition is timely—citing the new-interpretation-of-law exception and addressing the merits of Edwards's petition—but denied all relief. The postconviction court also determined that "[the] case law is clear that McNeely is not to be applied retroactively." The postconviction court then concluded that the state had "shown that an exigent circumstance, as it was understood at the time, existed to justify the warrantless search" of Edwards, making his "refusal to submit to a chemical test a crime."

This appeal follows.

ISSUES

I. Did Edwards timely file his postconviction petition?

II. Did the postconviction court err by declining to apply the McNeely rule retroactively to Edwards's case?

III. Did the postconviction court err by requiring the state to show that exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search under Birchfield/Johnson ?

ANALYSIS

We review a district court's denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Brown v. State , 895 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn. 2017). "A postconviction court abuses its discretion when it has exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings." Pearson v. State , 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts review a postconviction court's legal determinations de novo. Greer v. State , 836 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Minn. 2013).

Before addressing the parties’ arguments, we consider the legal context of the issues on appeal because applying the Fourth Amendment to warrantless urine and blood tests

has evolved considerably since Edwards was convicted in 2011. The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. A warrantless search is unreasonable unless it falls into an exception to the warrant requirement. Riley v. California , 573 U.S. 373, 381-82, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482-83, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014). "In the suspected-impaired-driving context, administering a chemical test of breath, blood, or urine is a search." Hagerman , 945 N.W.2d at 876.

Before 2013, courts had determined that police officers could conduct warrantless chemical tests to determine whether a driver was under the influence of alcohol because "the rapid, natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood create[d] single-factor exigent circumstances." State v. Netland , 762 N.W.2d 202, 212 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted). Then, in 2013, the United States Supreme Court held that the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream is not a per se exigent circumstance. McNeely , 569 U.S. at 156, 133 S. Ct. at 1563. Instead, the Supreme Court held that exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood test "must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances." Id.

A few years later, in 2016, the Supreme Court held that a warrantless blood test of a suspected intoxicated driver was not permitted under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement. Birchfield , 136 S. Ct. at 2176, 2185-86. The Court also held, however, that warrantless breath tests are permitted incident to arrest. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court applied Birchfield and held that a test-refusal conviction was unconstitutional because the warrantless blood test was not justified by an exception to the warrant requirement. Trahan , 886 N.W.2d at 221-23. The supreme court extended the Birchfield rule to warrantless searches of urine. Thompson , 886 N.W.2d at 224, 226, 229 (affirming reversal of test-refusal conviction based on warrantless urine test).

The Minnesota Supreme Court later referred to this series of case...