Johnson v. State

• Decision Date: 22 August 2018
• Docket Number: A17-0842,A17-0883
• Citation: 916 N.W.2d 674
• Parties: Mark Jerome JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

916 N.W.2d 674

Mark Jerome JOHNSON, Appellant,

v.STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.

A17-0842

A17-0883

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: August 22, 2018

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Veronica May Surges, Assistant Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Assistant Ramsey County Attorney, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.

OPINION

GILDEA, Chief Justice.

In this case we are asked to determine whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota , 579 U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016), and our decisions in State v. Trahan , 886 N.W.2d 216 (Minn. 2016), and State v. Thompson , 886 N.W.2d 224 (Minn. 2016), announced a new rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. The district courts and the court of appeals concluded that the rule was procedural and not retroactive. Because we conclude that the rule is substantive and retroactive, we reverse.

FACTS

This consolidated appeal arises from two separate traffic stops. The first stop occurred in 2009, when St. Anthony police stopped appellant Mark Jerome Johnson on suspicion of driving while impaired (DWI). After Johnson admitted that he had been drinking and showed signs of impairment, police arrested him. Police read Johnson the Minnesota Implied Consent Advisory and asked him whether he would take a blood or a urine test. Johnson refused. Respondent the State of Minnesota charged Johnson with first-degree test refusal, Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 2 (2016), 169A.24 (2010).¹ Johnson pleaded guilty on April 29, 2010 and was sentenced to a 48-month prison term, stayed for 7 years. Johnson did not file a direct appeal.

The second stop occurred in 2014, while Johnson was on probation for his 2010 test-refusal conviction. Police stopped Johnson for using his turn signal improperly. Johnson admitted that he had been drinking, and he failed field sobriety tests. Police then arrested Johnson for DWI and read him the Minnesota Implied Consent Advisory. Johnson said that he wanted to contact an attorney. After affording Johnson time to call an attorney, police asked if he was willing to consent to a chemical test for the presence of alcohol. Johnson indicated that he had been advised by his attorney to refuse unless the officer had a warrant. Police interpreted this as a refusal, and the State charged Johnson with first-degree test refusal, Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 2 (2016), 169A.24 (2012). Johnson pleaded guilty on April 23, 2015 and was sentenced to a 51-month prison term and a mandatory 5-year period of conditional release. Johnson did not file a direct appeal.

In December 2016, Johnson filed a consolidated petition for postconviction relief challenging his 2010 and 2015 convictions for test refusal. He argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota , 579 U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016), and our decisions in State v. Trahan , 886 N.W.2d 216 (Minn. 2016), and State v. Thompson , 886 N.W.2d 224 (Minn. 2016), announced a new, substantive rule of federal constitutional criminal law that was retroactively applicable to his convictions on collateral review.² Under that rule, Johnson maintained that his convictions for refusing to submit to warrantless blood and urine tests

violated the constitution and must be vacated.

The district court considered the petition separately for each of Johnson’s prior two convictions, with one judge hearing the petition for the 2010 test-refusal conviction, and a different judge hearing the petition for the 2015 test-refusal conviction. Each district court concluded that the Birchfield rule was procedural and did not apply retroactively to Johnson’s conviction. Alternatively, each concluded that by pleading guilty, Johnson waived the right to challenge his conviction. Both courts summarily denied Johnson’s petition.

Johnson appealed both district court decisions, and the court of appeals consolidated the appeals. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the Birchfield rule did not apply retroactively to Johnson’s final convictions because the rule was procedural in nature, and accordingly, the district courts did not abuse their discretion by denying Johnson’s postconviction petitions. Johnson v. State , 906 N.W.2d 861, 867 (Minn. App. 2018). We granted Johnson’s petition for review.

ANALYSIS

This case comes to us on appeal from decisions on Johnson’s postconviction petition. We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Dikken v. State , 896 N.W.2d 873, 876 (Minn. 2017). We will reverse a postconviction court if the court " ‘exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.’ " Brown v. State , 863 N.W.2d 781, 786 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Reed v. State , 793 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 2010) ).

On appeal, Johnson argues that the Birchfield rule applies retroactively. The State contends that, because Johnson pleaded guilty, he waived his right to assert that the Birchfield rule applies retroactively. If we reach the question of whether the Birchfield rule applies retroactively, the State urges us to affirm. Specifically, the State contends that the rule is procedural and therefore inapplicable to cases on collateral review.

Before addressing the parties' arguments and to provide context for our analysis, we turn first to a discussion of the Birchfield rule. In Birchfield v. North Dakota , the Supreme Court consolidated three cases, each of which concerned whether criminal test-refusal laws violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches. 579 U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 2170–72, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016). Although the cases shared the same general issue, two of them were based on the refusal of a blood test, and the other on the refusal of a breath test. Id. The Court noted that in order to criminalize a suspected impaired driver’s refusal of a warrantless search, the warrantless search must "comport with the Fourth Amendment." Id. at ––––, 136 S.Ct. at 2172. It further held that a breath test was a permissible search incident to a lawful arrest, but that a blood test did not fall within this exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at ––––, 136 S.Ct. at 2185. Consequently, the State could make it a crime for a suspected impaired driver to refuse a blood test only if the police have a search warrant or a valid exception to the warrant requirement applies. Id. at ––––, 136 S.Ct. at 2185–86.

Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Birchfield , we decided State v. Trahan , 886 N.W.2d 216 (Minn. 2016), and State v. Thompson , 886 N.W.2d 224 (Minn. 2016). In Trahan , the defendant was arrested on suspicion of DWI and refused to submit to a blood test. 886 N.W.2d at 219. He was subsequently charged with and pleaded guilty to first-degree test refusal. Id. at 219–20. In a postconviction petition filed after Trahan’s direct appeal was stayed, he argued that the test-refusal statute was unconstitutional as applied to him. Id. at 220. We applied Birchfield , holding that "the Fourth Amendment prohibits convicting Trahan for refusing the blood test requested of him absent the existence of a warrant or exigent circumstances." Id. at 221. We concluded that, because no exigent circumstances existed, the test-refusal statute, Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2, was "unconstitutional as applied." Id. at 224.

In Thompson , the defendant was convicted of second-degree test refusal after he refused warrantless blood and urine tests

. 886 N.W.2d at 227. We concluded that " Birchfield is dispositive with respect to the blood test that Thompson refused" and that "[a] warrantless blood test may not be administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest of a suspected drunk driver." Id. at 229. We also held that a urine test was not a permissible search incident to a lawful arrest. Id. at 233. The State did not argue that exigent circumstances existed. Id. at 229 n.3. Accordingly, we determined that the test-refusal statute was unconstitutional as applied to Thompson, and that he could not be "prosecuted for refusing to submit to an unconstitutional warrantless blood or urine test." Id. at 234.

In sum, the Court’s decision in Birchfield and our application of Birchfield in Trahan and Thompson mean that, in the DWI context, the State may not criminalize refusal of a blood or a urine test absent a search warrant or a showing that a valid exception to the warrant requirement applies. With this description of the Birchfield rule in mind, we turn to the parties' arguments.

I.

We first consider whether, as the State argues, Johnson’s guilty plea precludes him from arguing that the Birchfield rule is retroactive. The State asserts that Johnson’s argument is based on his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search. And the State contends that by pleading guilty to test refusal, Johnson forfeited his right to collaterally attack his convictions on that basis. For his part, Johnson argues that because he was convicted under a statute that was deemed to be unconstitutional as applied, the district courts had no jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea. Accordingly, Johnson claims, his guilty pleas do not bar his argument that the Birchfield rule applies retroactively to his collateral attack on his convictions. We agree with Johnson.

A district court has subject-matter jurisdiction to convict a defendant of all crimes cognizable under the laws of the State of Minnesota. See Reed v. State , 793 N.W.2d 725, 731 (Minn. 2010) (citing United States v. Cotton , 535 U.S. 625, 630–31, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) ). But a court is without jurisdiction to convict a defendant of conduct that is not criminal. See Ex parte Siebold , 100 U.S. 371, 377, 25...