Edwards v. Steele
| Decision Date | 07 November 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. ED 105946,ED 105946 |
| Citation | 533 S.W.3d 238 |
| Parties | David EDWARDS, Petitioner, v. Troy STEELE, Superintendent. Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
FOR PETITIONER: Kent E. Gipson, 121 East Gregory Blvd., Kansas City, MO 64114.
FOR RESPONDENT: Michael J. Spillane, P.O. BOX 899, Jefferson City, MO 65102.
David Edwards ("Petitioner") has filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus" or "Petition") challenging the lawfulness of his confinement by Troy Steele, Superintendent of the Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center ("Respondent"). In the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Petitioner was convicted of capital murder for killing Sivarh Coleman ("Victim") when Petitioner was 17 years old. Petitioner was then sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for 50 years under a mandatory sentencing scheme in place at the time of his conviction that precluded consideration of Petitioner's youth and related circumstances.
In his Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner alleges he is being unlawfully restrained by Respondent because his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution pursuant to precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court and Missouri Supreme Court. For the reasons discussed below, we grant Petitioner habeas relief, and we direct the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis to resentence Petitioner in accordance with this opinion.
On January 16, 1980, Petitioner shot Victim after they had an argument, and Victim died as a result of his injuries. See State v. Edwards, 637 S.W.2d 27, 28 (Mo. 1982). At the time of the offense, Petitioner was 17 years old. Petitioner was charged with capital murder in violation of 565.001 RSMo 1978 (repealed effective October 1, 1984), which was a crime that could only be punished by death or a life sentence without the possibility of parole for 50 years.1 As recently found by the Missouri Supreme Court, this mandatory sentencing scheme precluded consideration of an offender's youth and related circumstances. See State ex rel. Carr v. Wallace, 527 S.W.3d 55, 57–59 n.2, 60–61 (Mo. banc 2017) (mandated on Oct. 5, 2017).
The case was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, and the jury found Petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner was then sentenced to "[l]ife [i]mprisonment without eligibility for probation or parole until [Petitioner] has served a minimum of [50] years of his sentence."
Petitioner filed a direct appeal, and the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Edwards, 637 S.W.2d at 30. Petitioner then unsuccessfully pursued collateral attacks on his conviction and sentence in state and federal court. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of St. Francois County ("the trial court"), the jurisdiction in which he was serving his sentence. The trial court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Subsequently, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court, along with Suggestions in Support and Exhibits. In his Petition, Petitioner alleges he is being unlawfully restrained by Respondent because his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment pursuant to precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court and Missouri Supreme Court. Our Court entered an Order to Show Cause to Respondent, directing him to file a return stating why the relief prayed for in Petitioner's Petition should not be granted. Respondent then filed his Response to Show Cause Order and Return to Writ. Subsequently, Petitioner timely filed a Reply and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings along with Exhibits. We dispense with further briefing as permitted by Rule 84.24(i).2
Pursuant to the Missouri Constitution, our Court has the authority to "issue and determine original remedial writs," including writs of habeas corpus. Mo. Const. art. V, section 4.1; see State ex rel. Fleming v. Missouri Board of Probation and Parole, 515 S.W.3d 224, 228 (Mo. banc 2017) (similarly finding with respect to the Missouri Supreme Court's authority to issue writs of habeas corpus); see generally State ex rel. Peete v. Moore, 283 S.W.3d 818, 819-22 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009) and State ex rel. Fowler v. Purkett, 156 S.W.3d 357, 358-62 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004) (). "[A]ny person restrained of liberty within this state may petition for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such restraint." Fowler, 156 S.W.3d at 359 (); see also section 532.010 RSMo 2000; Fleming, 515 S.W.3d at 228.
"A prisoner is entitled to habeas corpus relief where he proves that he is restrained of his liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the state or federal government." Carr, 527 S.W.3d at 59 (quotations omitted). Furthermore, although a prisoner is generally required to raise a constitutional claim in a direct criminal appeal or in a post-conviction proceeding, he is considered to have cause for failing to raise such a claim under circumstances where it is permissible for a new constitutional rule to be applied retroactively on collateral review. Id.
In this case, Petitioner claims he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment pursuant to precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court and Missouri Supreme Court, including Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) and Carr, 527 S.W.3d 55. We agree, finding the Missouri Supreme Court's recent decision in Carr, and the U.S. Supreme Court precedent discussed therein, is instructive to our analysis of Petitioner's claim.
In Carr, the petitioner seeking habeas relief ("Carr" or "Mr. Carr" or "the petitioner in Carr") killed three victims when he was 16 years old, and he was certified to be tried as an adult for three counts of capital murder in violation of section 565.001 RSMo 1978. Carr, 527 S.W.3d at 56–57, 57–59 n.2. As previously stated, capital murder could only be punished by death or a life sentence without the possibility of parole for 50 years, and this mandatory sentencing scheme precluded consideration of an offender's youth and related circumstances. Id. at 57–59 n.2, 60–61, 60–61 n.6. Carr was sentenced to three terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 50 years, with the sentences to run concurrently. Id. at 56–57. In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus before the Missouri Supreme Court, Carr claimed his sentences violated the Eighth Amendment under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Miller. Carr, 527 S.W.3d at 56–57. The Missouri Supreme Court agreed and granted Carr habeas relief, reasoning the following. Id. at 56–63.
First, the Missouri Supreme Court noted Carr did not raise his Eighth Amendment claims in his direct appeal or in a post-conviction proceeding. Id. at 59–60. However, during the pendency of Carr's habeas petition, the U.S. Supreme Court held Miller established a new substantive rule of constitutional law that must be applied retroactively on collateral review of a juvenile offender's sentence of life without parole. Carr, 527 S.W.3d at 59–60 (citing Montgomery v. Louisiana, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 718, 736, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016) ). Because Carr was seeking retroactive application of Miller's substantive rule of constitutional law to the facts of his case, the Missouri Supreme Court found Carr had cause for failing to previously raise his claim that his sentences were imposed in violation of the Eighth Amendment pursuant to Miller, and therefore, he could seek habeas corpus relief on his claims. Carr, 527 S.W.3d at 59–60.
The Missouri Supreme Court then explained that in Miller, the U.S. Supreme Court held sentencing schemes mandating life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders, without any consideration of the offender's age, age-related characteristics, or nature of the underlying crimes, are unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and the amendment's related requirement that the punishment for an offense be proportional to both the offender and the crime. Carr, 527 S.W.3d at 59–60 (citing Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2463, 2475 ). The Missouri Supreme Court then found Carr was sentenced pursuant to a mandatory sentencing scheme that imposed the severe punishment of life in prison without the possibility of parole for 50 years, without allowing the sentencer to have any opportunity to consider factors discussed in Miller including Carr's age, the mitigating and attendant circumstances of his youth, his potential for rehabilitation, and the circumstances of the offenses. Carr, 527 S.W.3d at 59–63 (citing Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2464-69, 2475 ). Accordingly, the Missouri Supreme Court held that, under Miller, Carr's sentences violated the Eighth Amendment. Carr, 527 S.W.3d at 59–63 (citing Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2464-69, 2475 ). Our Supreme Court further held Carr was entitled to be resentenced in accordance with the following procedure previously outlined in State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232 (Mo. banc 2013) :
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