Edwards v. United States, Civil Action No. RDB-10-3100
| Decision Date | 29 January 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. RDB-10-3100,Criminal Action No. RDB-08-600 |
| Parties | SAMUEL EDWARDS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
On November 5, 2009 Petitioner Samuel Edwards ("Petitioner" or "Edwards") pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance under 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1), (b)(1)(C) and was sentenced by this Court to a term of imprisonment of one-hundred and twenty (120) months and five (5) years of supervised release. Following his incarceration, Petitioner filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (ECF No. 43) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and a Motion for Retroactive Application of Sentencing Guidelines (ECF No. 54) pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). On January 9, 2013, this Court issued an Order (ECF No. 64) granting Petitioner's latter motion and reducing his sentence to a term of imprisonment of one hundred (100) months. Petitioner's Section 2255 Motion remains pending before this Court along with Petitioner's Motions for Copy Work (ECF Nos. 47 & 51).
The parties' submissions have been reviewed and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2010). For the reasons that follow, Petitioner Samuel Edwards' Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (ECF No. 43) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 isDENIED. Additionally, Petitioner's Motions for Copy Work (ECF Nos. 47 & 51) are DENIED as MOOT with the exception that a copy of Petitioner's docket sheet shall be mailed to the Warden of his present place of confinement, so that access to the criminal docket sheet can be made available to Petitioner in accordance with prison policy and procedures.
On July 7, 2008, Sergeant Clayton observed Petitioner Samuel Edwards ("Petitioner" or "Edwards") enter the rear yard of 2802 Fox Street and remove a plastic bag from under a piece of plywood that was being used as a ramp to the rear door of the residence. Plea Agreement, Statement of Facts, Attach. 1, ECF No. 25. Seargant Clayton noted that a cinder block suported the plywood ramp. Id. Sergant Clayton then saw Petitioner remove a small object from a baggie that was on top of the cinder block and place it in the tongue of his shoe. Id. Based on his training and expertise, Seargeant Clayton believed this object to be drugs for use in a street-level transaction. Id. After removing the object, Petitioner was seen returning the plastic baggie to the cynder block and exiting the alley. Id. Sergeant Clayton and other officers working the area then lost sight of him. Id.
Following this event, Seargant Clayton headed toward the cinder block and discovered a platic bag containing what was later determined to be 1.49 grams of crack cocaine divided into fourteen smaller zip-lock baggies. Id. These were determined to be consistent in size, packaging and weight with narcotics packeged for street sale. Id. Seargant Clayton also discovered a black bag behind the cinder block from which a Squires Bingham .22 semi-automatic long rifle, Model 16 was protruding. Id. Upon inspecting the gun,Seargant Clayton determined that it was loaded and that the stock and barrel had been sawed off. Id. Later that day, police officers arrested Petitioner as he was walking on Fox Street. Id. The search of Petitioner's person led to the recovery of $186 in his pants pocket and of his cell phone. Id.
Petitioner was charged in a four-count indictment with one count of possession with intent to ditribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count I), one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count II), one count of possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count III), and one count of possession of an unregistered NFA Firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (Count IV). Indictment, ECF No. 1. On August 20, 2009, Petitioner appeared before this Court and pled guilty to Count I of the Indictment: possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Petitioner also agreed to the statement of facts prepared by the government. Re-Arraignment, ECF No. 24. The remaining counts were dismissed on the motion of the United States and reference to the discovery of a firearm was striken from the Statement of Facts. Judgment, ECF No. 31. On November 5, 2009, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one hundred and twenty (120) months and five (5) years of supervised release. On January 9, 2013, this Court granted Petitioner's Motion for Retroactive Application of Sentencing Guidelines (ECF No. 54) and reduced his sentence to a term of imprisonment of one hundred (100) months pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(2). Id.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a prisoner in custody may seek to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence where (1) "the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States," (b) the court lacked "jurisdiction to impose the sentence, . . . [(c)] the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or [(d) the sentence] is otherwise subject to a collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255. "[A]n error of law does not provide a basis for collateral attack unless the claimed error constituted 'a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.' " United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)).
To state a claim for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 based on a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a petitioner must satisfy the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 671 (1984). See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000). The first, or "performance" prong, of the test requires a showing that defense counsel's representation was deficient and fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. In making this determination, courts observe a strong presumption that counsel's actions fell within the "wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 688-89. The second, or "prejudice" prong, requires that defendant demonstrate that his counsel's errors deprived him of a fair trial. Id. at 687.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has previously noted that "[t]he defendant bears the burden of proving the first prong under the Strickland test," and unless this burden is met, "a reviewing court does not need to consider the second prong." Fields v. Attorney General, 956 F.2d 1290, 1297 (4th Cir. 1992). The Fourth Circuit has alsonoted that the mere possibility of a different trial result does not satisfy the burden placed on the defendant. See Hoots v. Allsbrook, 785 F.2d 1214, 1220 (4th Cir. 1986). Thus, ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be disposed of solely based on a deficiency in showing prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Additionally, "[i]neffective assistance claims are generally not cognizable on direct appeal, . . . 'unless [an attorney's ineffectiveness] conclusively appears from the record.' " United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 435 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 195 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1999)).
Petitioner Samuel Edwards ("Petitioner" or "Edwards") invokes several grounds in support of his motion to vacate his conviction and sentence. The bulk of his arguments focuses on his claim of inneffective assistance of counsel. However, Petitioner also contends that his sentence violates the Constitution and laws of the United States, that this Court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence; and that his sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law. This Court recognizes that Peitioner is pro se and has accorded his pleadings liberal construction. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove both elements of the test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 671 (1984). First, the defendant must establish that his counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an "objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. In assessing whether counsel's performance was deficient, courts adopt a "strong presumption" that counsel's actions fell within the "wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at689. Second, a defendant must show that counsel's performance was so prejudicial as to "deprive the defendant of a fair trial." Id. at 687. To establish this level of prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate that there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's [alleged] unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. "Ineffective assistance claims are generally not cognizable on direct appeal, however, 'unless it conclusively appears from the record that defense counsel did not provide effective representation.'" United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 435 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Richardson, 195 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1999)).
When a defendant alleges ineffective assistance after a guilty plea has been entered, the burden is even greater. In Hooper v. Garraghty, 845 F.2d 471, 475 (4th Cir. 1988), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained the logic behind Strickland as follows:
When a defendant challenges a conviction entered after a guilty plea, [the] "prejudice" prong of the [Strickland] test is slightly modified. Such a defendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."
Hooper, 845 F.2d at 475 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985))....
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