Eelbeck Mill. Co. v. Mayo

• Decision Date: 28 March 1956
• Parties: EELBECK MILLING COMPANY of Florida, a corporation, Appellant, v. Nathan T. MAYO, as Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 438

86 So.2d 438

EELBECK MILLING COMPANY of Florida, a corporation, Appellant, v. Nathan T. MAYO, as Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Florida, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida, En Banc.

March 28, 1956.

Edward McCarthy and McCarthy, Lane & Adams, Jacksonville, for appellant.

Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and John D. Moriarty, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

O'CONNELL, Justice.

The appellant, Eelbeck Milling Company, sought a decree declaring its rights under Chapter 28269, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1953, determining the validity of the Act, and restraining the enforcement of its terms in connection with sale of appellant's products in Florida.

The statute in question amended subparagraph (5) of Section 500.11, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., by adding this language:

'Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection, any corn product sold or distributed in Florida shall be deemed to be misbranded unless the package or container in which it is sold or marketed bears a label containing one of the phrases, 'Milled by' or 'Manufactured by,' whichever shall be applicable, immediately followed by the name and place of business of the miller or manufacturer.' Chapter 28269, Laws of Florida, 1953.

By its bill the appellant avers, in part, 'that the disclosure on the label of the name and address of the miller has and could have no connection with administration or enforcement of the Florida Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act * * * and said (requirement) does not serve the public good or contribute to the preservation or promotion of the public health, public safety, morals or the general welfare.' The bill also alleged that the enforcement of the new provision would result in heavy financial loss to plaintiff, the appellant, not only in the destruction of present packages and labels which do not conform with its requirements, but also in impairment of the value of plaintiff's good will and tradename as a packer and distributor of uniformly high quality corn products.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the bill on general grounds of insufficiency, that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and that 'it appears from the face of the said Bill of Complaint that the statute attacked * * * is valid and a constitutional exercise of the police powers of the State of Florida.' The final decree entered thereon contains findings that the bill 'fails to disclose a justiciable question * * * and that Chapter 28269 * * * is a valid exercise of the police power of the State of Florida and does not deprive plaintiff of any of its constitutional rights.' From this order that defendant's motion be granted and the cause dismissed (with leave to amend within fifteen days), plaintiff has taken its appeal.

The basic question presented by the parties concerns the propriety of the ruling of the lower court to the effect that the Legislature, in the exercise of its police power, could lawfully provide that vendors of corn products must place upon each label the name and place of business of the original miller handling the grain.

It is well settled, of course, that to avoid infringement of constitutional rights and liberties, sections 1 and 12, Declaration of Rights, Fla.Const., F.S.A., and Fourteenth Amendment, U.S.Const., 'the exercise of police power (must be) confined to those acts which may reasonably be construed as expedient at least for the protection of public safety, public welfare, public morals, or public health.' Sweat v. Turpentine & Rosin Factors, Inc., 112 Fla. 428, 150 So. 617, 618.

'The legislative authority in this legitimate field of the police power, like as in other fields, is fenced about by constitutional limitations, and it cannot properly be exercised beyond such reasonable interferences with the liberty of action of individuals as are really necessary to preserve and protect the public health. It has been said that the test, when such regulations are called in question, is whether they have some actual and reasonable relation to the maintenance and promotion of the public health and welfare, and whether such is in fact the end sought to be attained. Not only must every reasonable presumption be indulged in favor of the...