Effler v. Purdue Pharma L.P.

Decision Date17 December 2020
Docket NumberNo. E2018-01994-SC-R11-CV,E2018-01994-SC-R11-CV
Citation614 S.W.3d 681
Parties Jared EFFLER et al. v. PURDUE PHARMA L.P. et al.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

Ronald S. Range, Jr. and Chad E. Wallace, Johnson City, Tennessee; Ingo W. Sprie, Jr., New York, New York; R. Stanton Jones, Washington, D.C.; Anthony J. Franze, Washington, D.C.; Tim Warnock and Stuart Burkhalter, Nashville, Tennessee; Megan R. Braden, Chicago, Illinois (on application for permission to appeal); Steven A. Reed, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (on application for permission to appeal); Wendy West Feinstein, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and Brian M. Ercole, Miami, Florida, for the appellants, Endo Health Solutions Inc., Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc., and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.

Michael J. Wall, James G. Stranch, III, J. Gerard Stranch, IV, Tricia Herzfeld, Benjamin A. Gastel, and Anthony Orlandi, Nashville, Tennessee; William C. Killian, Chattanooga, Tennessee; and L. Jeffrey Hagood, Bradley H. Hodge, and Timothy A. Householder, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Jared Effler, District Attorney General–Eighth Judicial District; Charme Allen, District Attorney General–Sixth Judicial District; Dave Clark, District Attorney General–Seventh Judicial District; Russell Johnson, District Attorney General–Ninth Judicial District; Stephen Crump, District Attorney General–Tenth Judicial District; Jimmy Dunn, District Attorney General–Fourth Judicial District; Mike Taylor, District Attorney General–Twelfth Judicial District; Baby Doe #1; and Baby Doe #2.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée Sophia Blumstein, Solicitor General; Brant Harrell, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Laura Kidwell, Assistant Solicitor General; and Miranda Jones, Assistant Attorney General, for the amicus curiae, State of Tennessee.

Jerry Estes, Nashville, Tennessee, for the amicus curiae, Tennessee District Attorneys General Conference.

Philip S. Goldberg, Washington, D.C., and Tara L. Swafford and Elizabeth G. Hart, Franklin, Tennessee, for the amici curiae, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America and American Tort Reform Association.

Richard L. Neumeier, Boston, Massachusetts, and Charles Michels, Nashville, Tennessee, for the amicus curiae, International Association of Defense Counsel.

Sharon G. Lee, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Jeffrey S. Bivins, C.J., and Cornelia A. Clark, Holly Kirby, and Roger A. Page, JJ., joined.

OPINION

Sharon G. Lee, J.

Declaring that the sale and distribution of illegal drugs affects every community in the country, the Tennessee Legislature enacted the Tennessee Drug Dealer Liability Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-38-101 to - 116. This Act provides a cause of action against a knowing participant in the illegal drug market for injuries caused by illegal drug use. In response to the opioid epidemic in East Tennessee, seven District Attorneys General and two Baby Doe plaintiffs sued several drug companies under the Act. The District Attorneys and the Baby Doe plaintiffs alleged that the drug companies knowingly participated in the illegal drug market by intentionally flooding East Tennessee communities with prescription opioid medications, leading to widespread addiction and diversion of the opioids into the black market. The District Attorneys claimed that the opioid epidemic had damaged the communities in their districts, and the Baby Doe plaintiffs alleged that they were harmed by exposure to opioids in utero. The drug companies moved to dismiss the lawsuit on the pleadings. Their two-fold challenge asserted that the Act did not authorize the District Attorneys to sue for damages and that the Act did not apply to the drug companies’ conduct. The trial court ruled that the Act did not apply and dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals reversed. The issues we decide are whether the District Attorneys had statutory standing to sue under the Act and whether the Act applies to the drug companies based on factual allegations in the complaint that the drug companies knowingly participated in the illegal drug market. We hold that the District Attorneys lack standing because the Act does not name them as parties who can sue under the Act. This leaves the Baby Doe plaintiffs, who alleged facts showing that the drug companies knowingly participated in the illegal drug market by facilitating the marketing or distribution of opioids. Taking these factual allegations as true, as required at this stage of the case, we hold that the Baby Doe plaintiffs have stated a claim against the drug companies under the Act.

I.

The Drug Dealer Liability Act2 provides a civil remedy for damages to persons and entities injured by illegal drug use. The United States Virgin Islands and at least eighteen states, including Tennessee, have adopted a form of the Model Drug Dealer Liability Act.3 The Model Act has been described as "essentially a products liability act for illegal drugs." Overview , Model Drug Dealer Liability Act, www.modelddla.com/Overview_of_the_Model_Drug-Dealer_Liability_Act.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2020). The intent of the Model Act was to overcome evidentiary difficulties inherent in actions against drug dealers by creating a form of market liability to hold them liable for the injuries caused by their involvement in the illegal drug market. George L. Blum, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Drug Dealer Liability Acts , 12 A.L.R.7th Art. 2 § 2 (2016) (citing Schafer v. Shopko Stores, Inc. , 741 N.W.2d 758 (S.D. 2007) ); Joel W. Baar, Note, Let the Drug Dealer Beware: Market-Share Liability in Michigan for the Injuries Caused by the Illegal Drug Market , 32 Val. U. L. Rev. 139, 144 (1997). The standard of proof to establish causation was relaxed because the covert nature of the illegal drug market usually prevents injured parties from identifying the specific drug dealers who cause their injuries. Baar, supra , at 144. Under the Model Act, a plaintiff may either prove that the defendant sold illegal drugs to the user or that the defendant was a dealer of the same drugs in the community when the user consumed the drugs. Market Liability , Model Drug Dealer Liability Act, www.modelddla.com/Explanation_of_DDLA_Market_Liability.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2020). Although market liability has in some cases been shown to have a harmful effect on legitimate industries, the Model Act intends for its statutorily created market liability to have a damaging effect on the illegal drug market. Baar, supra , at 144–45 & n.32.

Tennessee's Act expressly creates market liability "for those who intentionally join the illegal drug market." Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-38-103(9) (2012). The Act begins with a statement of its purposes, including that the Act allows injured persons to recover damages from those who have joined the illegal drug market; shifts the costs of the illegal drug market to those who profit from the sale of illegal drugs; and deters others from entering the illegal drug market. See id. § 29-38-102 (2012). The Legislature found that the illegal drug market takes a substantial toll on society, including the families, employers, and insurers of illegal drug users, and consumes an enormous amount of state and local resources. Id. § 29-38-103(1). The Legislature recognized that the civil justice system is a viable way to compensate those who have suffered harm from the illegal drug market at the expense of those who have engaged in it. Id. § 29-38-103(2). The Act aims to shift the costs of injuries caused by illegal drug use to the dealers who benefit from the illegal drug market. Id.

Thus, the Legislature created a statutory cause of action for family members of drug users, including babies exposed to illegal drugs in utero; employers, insurers, medical facilities, governmental entities, and others that have expended resources on behalf of an illegal drug user; and anyone injured by the actions of an illegal drug user against those "who knowingly participate in the illegal drug market in Tennessee." Id. § 29-38-106(a) (2012); id. § 29-38-105(a) (2012); Dunaway v. Purdue Pharma, L.P. , 391 F. Supp. 3d 802, 810 (M.D. Tenn. 2019) (quoting Waters v. Farr , 291 S.W.3d 873, 915 (Tenn. 2009) ). A knowing participant in the illegal drug market includes distributors of illegal drugs or those in the chain of distribution. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-38-106(b)(1) ; see also, e.g. , Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 13-01, Liability for Infants Born with Narcotic Drug Dependency , at 2 (2013). A plaintiff must prove the defendant's participation in the illegal drug market by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-38-113(a) (2012). Successful plaintiffs may recover economic and non-economic damages, punitive damages, attorney fees, and the costs of the litigation, including expert witness fees. Id. § 29-38-106(c).

This case began in 2017 when Jared Effler, District Attorney General for the Eighth Judicial District; Charme Allen, District Attorney General for the Sixth Judicial District; Dave Clark, District Attorney General for the Seventh Judicial District; Russell Johnson, District Attorney General for the Ninth Judicial District; Stephen Crump, District Attorney General for the Tenth Judicial District; Jimmy Dunn, District Attorney General for the Fourth Judicial District; and Mike Taylor, District Attorney General for the Twelfth Judicial District ("the District Attorneys") sued under the Act in their official capacities as District Attorneys General on behalf of the political subdivisions in their districts.4 Also joining in the suit were Baby Doe #1 and Baby Doe #2, who alleged they were born in Knox County and Campbell County with neonatal abstinence syndrome5

because their mothers had taken opioids in Campbell County during pregnancy. The District Attorneys and the Baby Doe plaintiffs sued drug companies Endo Health Solutions Inc., Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc., and Teva...

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