Ultsch v. HTI Mem'l Hosp. Corp.
| Docket Number | M2020-00341-SC-R11-CV |
| Decision Date | 20 July 2023 |
| Parties | DENNIS HAROLD ULTSCH v. HTI MEMORIAL HOSPITAL CORPORATION |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Session April 6, 2022
Appeal by Permission from the Court of Appeals Circuit Court for Davidson County No. 19C1086 Joseph P. Binkley, Jr., Judge
"When there is a conflict between the common law and a statute, the provision of the statute must prevail." Graves v Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 148 S.W. 239, 242 (Tenn. 1912). That longstanding rule is the key to resolving this case which pits a common-law rule governing vicarious liability claims against certain procedural provisions of Tennessee's Health Care Liability Act. The defendant in this case moved to dismiss the plaintiff's claims under the common-law rule. The trial court granted that motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed after concluding that application of the common-law rule would conflict with the Act. We agree that the Act necessarily implies an intent to abrogate the common-law rule in the circumstances of this case and affirm the Court of Appeals' decision.
Tenn R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed; Judgment of the Trial Court Reversed; Remanded to the Trial Court
Bryan Essary and Madison Wait, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, HTI Memorial Hospital Corporation, d/b/a TriStar Skyline Medical Center.
Richard D. Piliponis, Benjamin J. Miller, and Sarah L. Martin, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Dennis Harold Ultsch.
SARAH K. CAMPBELL, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to parts I(B), II, and III(B)-(E), in which SHARON G. LEE and HOLLY KIRBY, JJ., join, and an opinion with respect to parts I(A) and III(A), in which HOLLY KIRBY, J., joins. JEFFREY S. BIVINS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to part II(A), in which ROGER A. PAGE, C.J., and SHARON G. LEE, J., join, and an opinion dissenting in part, in which ROGER A. PAGE, C.J., joins. SHARON G. LEE, J., delivered a separate opinion.
We begin by introducing the two laws at issue in this case: the common-law framework for vicarious liability claims and the Health Care Liability Act.
The common-law framework governing vicarious liability claims in Tennessee is "well-established." Abshure v. Methodist Healthcare-Memphis Hosps., 325 S.W.3d 98, 105-06 (Tenn. 2010). "[A] principal may be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its agent when the acts are within the actual or apparent scope of the agent's authority." Id. at 105. And in most situations, "a plaintiff may sue a principal based on its vicarious liability for the tortious conduct of its agents without suing the agent." Id. That general rule applies "[e]ven where the agent's conduct is the sole basis for the principal's liability." Id. Thus, it is ordinarily the plaintiff's choice whether "to sue the agent, the principal, or both." Id.
But this Court has identified four situations in which the general rule does not apply and a plaintiff is precluded from exclusively pursuing a vicarious liability claim against the principal. Id. at 106. The first is "when the agent has been exonerated by a finding of non-liability." Id. The second is "when the plaintiff has settled its claim against the agent." Id. The third is "when the agent is immune from suit, either by statute or by the common law." Id. And most relevant here, the fourth-known as the operation-of-law exception- is "when the plaintiff's claim against the agent is procedurally barred by operation of law before the plaintiff asserts a vicarious liability claim against the principal." Id.
This Court shaped the contours of the operation-of-law exception in Abshure. The plaintiffs in that case brought a medical malpractice suit against a hospital and two physicians, one of whom was an emergency room physician. Id. at 100. The plaintiffs asserted vicarious liability claims against the hospital based on the conduct of the emergency room physician. Id. After the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against the physicians, the hospital sought dismissal of the vicarious liability claims "on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims against its apparent agent, the emergency room physician, were barred" by a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure and a statute of repose. Id. at 100, 102.
Although this Court agreed that the plaintiffs' claims against the physician had been extinguished by operation of law, it nevertheless concluded that the operation-of-law exception did not preclude the plaintiffs from pursuing their vicarious liability claims against the hospital. Id. at 112. We clarified that this exception "is triggered only when a plaintiff belatedly attempts to amend its complaint to add a new vicarious liability claim against a principal after its claims against the agent have become barred by operation of law." Id. at 111. It does not apply, however, "where the plaintiff has initially filed a vicarious liability claim against [a] principal, and the plaintiff's claims against the principal's agents are later extinguished by operation of law." Id. To extend the exception to the latter situation, the Court explained, "would be contrary to the traditional principle that plaintiffs may elect to sue the principal, the agent, or both." Id.
The Abshure Court gleaned these principles from its earlier decision in Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363 (Tenn. 2009), and the Court of Appeals' decision in Huber v. Marlow, No. E2007-01879-COA-R9-CV, 2008 WL 2199827 . Abshure, 325 S.W.3d at 110-11. In both of those cases, the plaintiffs "initially sued the principals but did not assert vicarious liability claims against them." Id. at 110. Later, after their claims against the agents were extinguished by operation of law-in Creech by the doctrine of res judicata, 281 S.W.3d at 376-83, and in Huber by a statute of repose, 2008 WL 2199827, at *3-4-the plaintiffs attempted to amend their complaints to add vicarious liability claims against the principals. Abshure, 325 S.W.3d at 111. The operation-of-law exception applied in those cases because "the plaintiffs' belated efforts to amend their complaints against the principals to add a vicarious liability claim" implicated the "traditional policy reason[]" for the exception-that "plaintiffs should not be permitted to engage in an 'encircling movement' against the principal when they cannot pursue a 'frontal attack' on the agent." Id. at 110-11 ().
Abshure was a medical malpractice action, but the claims in that case arose before the General Assembly began overhauling Tennessee's medical malpractice laws in 2008. They were therefore governed by the earlier, pre-amendment statutory scheme. 325 S.W.3d at 101. The General Assembly's 2008 amendments and others that followed-now known collectively as the Health Care Liability Act-established a number of new procedural requirements specific to health care liability claims. See Act of May 15, 2008, ch. 919, 2008 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1-4 (codified at Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-26-121, -122 (Supp. 2008)).[1]
Of particular importance here is the Act's presuit notice requirement. As initially enacted in 2008, that provision required persons asserting a potential claim for medical malpractice to provide "written notice of the potential claim to each health care provider against whom the potential claim is being made at least sixty (60) days before the filing of a complaint." Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(1) (Supp. 2008) (emphasis added). The General Assembly amended the provision in 2009 to require that presuit notice be given only to "each health care provider that will be a named defendant." Id. § 29-26-121(a)(1) (Supp. 2009) (emphasis added).
At the same time it imposed the presuit notice requirement, the General Assembly also provided that, when a plaintiff complies with the presuit notice requirement, "the applicable statutes of limitations and repose shall be extended up to a period of ninety (90) days" with respect to "all parties and potential parties." Id. § 29-26-121(c) (Supp. 2008). The General Assembly tweaked that provision in 2009 by expanding the extension from 90 to 120 days and providing that the extension applies only to the provider that received presuit notice, not to all potential parties. Id. § 29-26-121(c) (Supp. 2009) .
In the absence of an extension, the applicable statute of limitations in a health care liability action is generally one year from the date the cause of action accrued. Id. § 29-26-116(a)(1) (2012 &Supp. 2013); see also id. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(A) (2017). If "the alleged injury is not discovered within" this one-year period, however, the limitations period is one year "from the date of such discovery." Id. § 29-26-116(a)(2). The statute of repose for health care liability actions is generally three years, except "where there is fraudulent concealment on the part of the defendant." Id. § 29-26-116(a)(3).
That brings us to the facts and procedural history of this case. Because we are reviewing the trial court's decision on a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint. See ...
To continue reading
Request your trial