Eginoire v. Union Cnty.
| Decision Date | 22 December 1900 |
| Parties | EGINOIRE v. UNION COUNTY. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from district court, Adams county; H. M. Towner, Judge.
Action to recover damages for the death of a girl 8 years of age. There was a trial to a jury, and verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals. Affirmed.James G. Bull, Co. Atty., and Maxwell & Winter, for appellant.
Sullivan & Sullivan, for appellee.
The accident upon which this action is founded occurred at a bridge which was built and maintained by Union county. At the time it was built it met the highway at both ends without approaches. About a year before the accident high water had washed away five or six feet in width and seven or eight feet deep of the roadway at the south end of the bridge. This washout was covered by the road supervisor of the township with stringers and plank, so that the bridge was again made accessible. There were railings on each side of the main bridge, but none on either end of this approach. At the time in question, the plaintiff, with her husband, and her daughter, the deceased, were riding along the highway on which this bridge was situated, in a single-seated buggy drawn by one horse. They drove onto the bridge at the south end, and when a part of the way across it the horse became frightened at some object not disclosed definitely by the evidence, and stopped, and backed off of the approach covering the washout, and fell, with the buggy and its occupants, to the ground below, and the plaintiff's daughter received injuries from which she soon died. Some time before this the county had let the contract for a stone culvert, to be put in in place of this bridge, to Mr. Noble. He had worked thereon at different intervals during the year before the accident happened, and had hauled and left stone near the bridge at different times, and hauled a load and left it at the north end of the bridge the day of the accident. He had also, for nearly a year, as the evidence tends to show, kept one or more white mortar boxes around there. The court permitted this to be shown by the plaintiff, and instructed the jury that, if the horse “took fright at said alleged obstructions while on the bridge, the same may be considered in connection with the issue as to the negligent construction or repair of said bridge.”
The admission of this evidence and the instruction are complained of. There was evidence tending, at least, to show that the county had actual knowledge of the manner in which Mr. Noble was doing his work there, and of the material and mortar boxes he permitted to remain near the ends of the bridge. It was conclusively shown that Mr. Noble was an independent contractor, and the court so instructed the jury; and further instructed as follows: “If the jury find that said injury and death of which plaintiff complains was caused alone by reason of said acts of said Noble in the negligent performance of his work, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover as against Union county, and you should find for the defendant.” These two paragraphs of the charge, read together, leave no doubt as to the meaning of the one complained of. It simply authorized the jury to consider the condition of things at the bridge in determining the question of whether the defendant was negligent in not putting railings on the approach in question. It, in our judgment, will bear no other construction, and it was certainly competent to show all the conditions, present or past, for the information of the jury on the vital question in the case. The instruction is right, and the evidence was properly admitted.
Nor is the closing paragraph of instruction 4, which we have set out above, when taken alone, or in connection with No. 5, which we also quote, open to the criticism made. Concede that the horse did become frightened at the rock or mortar boxes, and that they were the cause of its backing, still the defendant would not be excused for its negligence in failing to protect the approach to the bridge. Gould v. Schermer, 101 Iowa, 582, 70 N. W. 697;Langhammer v. City of Manchester, 99 Iowa, 295, 68 N. W. 688;Walrod v. Webster County (Iowa) 81 N. W. 598, 47 L. R. A. 480.
The ninth and tenth paragraphs of the court's charge relate to the question as to whether the approach was a part of the bridge. Objection is made to the following language used therein: “If, however, you find it built of timber, plank, and other material, and that the same was essential to enable persons to reach the main structure, and thereby pass over the stream, and that without it the main structure would have been incomplete and useless as a bridge, then the jury would be justified in finding it a part of the bridge.” “And...
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