Eibest v. Planned Parenthood of Stark County

• Decision Date: 21 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 5:99-CV-2635.,5:99-CV-2635.
• Parties: Mary Anne EIBEST, et al., Plaintiffs, v. PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF STARK COUNTY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

94 F.Supp.2d 873

Mary Anne EIBEST, et al., Plaintiffs, v. PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF STARK COUNTY, Defendant.

No. 5:99-CV-2635.

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

April 21, 2000.

Jack R. Baker, Baker Dublikar Beck Wiley & Mathews, Canton, OH, for Mary Anne Eibest, John L Eibest, plaintiffs.

Tod T. Morrow, Black, McCuskey, Souers & Arbaugh, Canton, OH, Todd S. Bundy, Black, McCuskey, Souers & Arbaugh, Canton, OH, for Planned Parenthood of Stark County, defendant.

OPINION

GWIN, District Judge.

In this disability discrimination action, Defendant Planned Parenthood of Stark County ("Planned Parenthood") seeks summary judgment on the claims brought against it by Plaintiffs Mary Anne Eibest and John Eibest [Doc. 13]. With its motion, the defendant says the plaintiffs have failed to offer any material evidence in support of their federal disability discrimination and related state-law claims. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part the defendant's motion for summary judgment.

I.

Plaintiff Mary Anne Eibest is a former employee of Defendant Planned Parenthood. Eibest resigned her position as a staff nurse with Planned Parenthood because she suffers from a medical condition that prevents her from fulfilling the requirement that all staff nurses work Monday evenings. Eibest says that by failing to excuse her from this requirement, Planned Parenthood has violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and Ohio's analogous handicapped discrimination laws.

In 1985, Planned Parenthood hired Eibest, a licensed practical nurse, to serve as a staff nurse. Eibest's schedule called for her to work a total of thirty hours per week. Nearly half of these hours were scheduled for Mondays, when Eibest was scheduled to work from 8:00 a.m. until 8:00 p.m.

In 1994, Eibest was diagnosed with the Epstein-Barr virus. The virus causes, among other things, debilitating fatigue. Only drug treatment and rest will relieve this fatigue.

Eibest continued to serve as a staff nurse at Planned Parenthood following her diagnosis. By all accounts, Eibest performed her duties well despite her illness. However, in July 1998, Eibest consulted with her treating physician and determined that she could no longer work between 5:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. on Mondays. She sent a letter to Planned Parenthood asking that she be excused from working on Monday evenings on account of her medical condition. She included a letter from her physician in which he states that eliminating the Monday evening work hours would be "extremely beneficial" to Eibest's overall health status.

Planned Parenthood informed Eibest that it could not excuse her from working on Monday evenings. According to Planned Parenthood, the entire medical staff is required to work on Monday evenings because the medical clinic at Planned Parenthood is open in the evening only on Mondays and thus patient demand is heaviest at that time. Though it offered to allow Eibest to work until 7:00 p.m. or eliminate three hours from the beginning of her shift on Mondays, Planned Parenthood would not completely excuse Eibest from working on Monday evenings.

Eibest expressed dissatisfaction with Planned Parenthood's proposed scheduling adjustments. Eibest informed Planned Parenthood that although she could possibly work until 6:00 p.m. on Mondays, her medical condition would not allow her work until 7:00 p.m. Further, because the fatigue associated with her medical condition is greatest in the afternoons and evenings, Eibest refused Planned Parenthood's offer to eliminate three hours from the beginning of her Monday shift. Nevertheless, Planned Parenthood continued to schedule Eibest to work on Monday evenings.

Eibest continued working despite Planned Parenthood's refusal to meet her demand for schedule change. However, in September 1998, Eibest again requested that she not be required to work on Monday evenings. After Planned Parenthood refused this second request, Eibest resigned her position in October 1998.

Eibest filed the present action in October 1999. In this action, Eibest says Planned Parenthood violated the ADA and Ohio handicapped discrimination laws by refusing to offer her the reasonable accommodation of eliminating three hours from the end of her Monday shift. She also says Planned Parenthood's actions caused her emotional distress. In addition, Eibest's husband, Plaintiff John Eibest, asserts a loss of consortium claim against Planned Parenthood.

As explained more fully below, the Court finds that Eibest fails to establish that she suffers from a "disability" as that term is defined for purposes of the ADA. Consequently, the Court grants summary judgment to the defendant on Eibest's ADA claim. In the absence of a federal claim, the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' remaining state-law claims.

II.

A court may grant summary judgment only if the materials properly before the court "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). The moving party has the burden of showing conclusively that no genuine issue of material fact exists. See 60 Ivy Street Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir. 1987). In deciding whether the moving party has met this burden, a court must view the facts and all inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970).

A factual dispute precludes summary judgment only if it is material, that is, if it relates to a matter essential to adjudication. The dispute must concern facts that, under the substantive law governing the issue, might affect the outcome of the suit. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The factual dispute must also be genuine. The facts must be such that if they were proven at trial a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The disputed issue does not have to be resolved conclusively in favor of the nonmoving party, but that party is required to present significant probative evidence that makes it necessary to resolve the parties' differing versions of the dispute at trial. See 60 Ivy Street, 822 F.2d at 1435 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968)); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Thus, the judge's function at the point of summary judgment is limited to determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented to make the issue a proper jury question. "[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." 60 Ivy Street, 822 F.2d at 1436 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505). Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court should determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III.

To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show (1) that she suffered from a "disability" within the meaning of the ADA, (2) that she was able to perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) that she suffered an adverse employment action in whole or in part because of that disability. See Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 866 (6th Cir.1997). Here, Defendant Planned Parenthood says that Plaintiff Mary Anne Eibest has failed to offer evidence sufficient to establish the first element of a prima facie case of disability discrimination, i.e., that Eibest suffers from a disability.

The ADA defines "disability" as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Although the ADA does not define the terms "substantially limits" or "major life activities," the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has issued regulations that provide "significant guidance" as to the meaning of these terms. Talk v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d 1021, 1024 (5th Cir.1999); McKay v. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369, 371 (6th Cir.1997) (looking to EEOC regulations for guidance in determining meaning of "major life activities" and "substantially limits").

The EEOC's regulations provide that "major life activities" include "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). The regulations further provide that, when pertaining to the major life activity of working, the term "substantially limits" means "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).

Here, Eibest asserts that she is disabled because she suffers from the Epstein-Barr virus. According to Eibest, the Epstein-Barr virus substantially limits her performance of the major life activity of working. By preventing her from working in the evenings, Eibest says the virus severely restricts her ability to perform jobs in the nursing field.

The EEOC regulations set forth factors to guide the determination of whether a condition significantly restricts an individual from performing a particular...