Eickman's Estate, In re

• Decision Date: 23 April 1980
• Docket Number: No. 63473,63473
• Citation: 291 N.W.2d 308
• Parties: In re Floyd P. EICKMAN ESTATE, Marita A. Eickman, Executor. Marita A. EICKMAN, Appellee, v. Max TUEL and Darlene Tuel, Appellants.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 308

291 N.W.2d 308

In re Floyd P. EICKMAN ESTATE, Marita A. Eickman, Executor.

Marita A. EICKMAN, Appellee, v. Max TUEL and Darlene Tuel, Appellants.

No. 63473.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 23, 1980.

G. A. Minnich of Minnich & Neu, Carroll, and Ronald H. Schechtman, Carroll, for appellants.

Robert M. Sweere, Springfield, Mo., and John A. Beltz, Snook Law Office, Glidden, for appellee.

Considered by REYNOLDSON, C. J., and REES, McCORMICK, McGIVERIN and LARSON, JJ.

REES, Justice.

This appeal stems from the district court's sustention of plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment in their action to quiet title, and summary judgment for plaintiffs on defendants' counterclaim for specific performance of an alleged contract for the sale of the same land. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.

The plaintiffs, Floyd P. and Marita A. Eickman, ¹ initiated this litigation on January 23, 1978, by filing an action for declaratory judgment seeking to establish the legal rights and obligations of the parties concerning farmland purchased by plaintiffs from the defendants in 1974. In May of 1978 plaintiffs filed an amended and substituted petition asking the court to reform a written assignment of contract by which the transfer of land between the parties had been accomplished to include a certain tract and to quiet title to the contested land in the plaintiffs. The defendants, Max and Darlene Tuel, responded with a counterclaim seeking specific performance of a settlement agreement, allegedly prepared by plaintiffs' counsel, and signed only by the defendants.

Plaintiffs requested several admissions of the defendants pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 127. They sought admissions that the omission of the eighteen-acre tract at issue from the conveyance of interest document was the result of scrivener's error or mutual mistake of the parties. The defendants objected to the requests for admissions and denied them for lack of information since the instrument had been prepared by the plaintiffs' financial institution. Plaintiffs moved to determine the sufficiency of defendants' responses. Their motion was initially overruled by Judge Paul E. Hellwege, whose order overruling the same provided that the motion could be raised again at the time of the pretrial conference. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 127.

At that time, in October of 1978, plaintiffs renewed their motion which was sustained by Judge James C. Smith on the ground that lack of knowledge cannot afford a sufficient answer to a requested admission absent a statement that a reasonable inquiry had been made regarding the subject matter of the admission. The court therefore ordered defendants to file an amended answer within twenty days or, in the event proper responses were not so filed, the requests would be deemed admitted. Defendants made an application to this court for an interlocutory appeal which was denied on November 14, 1978. At no time did the defendants seek to stay the order of the district court. Defendants filed responses on December 12, some fifty days after the court's order, which were stricken by the district court upon plaintiffs' motion.

On November 20, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, both on their petition and the defendants' counterclaim, based on the matters deemed admitted and the record existing at that time. Defendants did not file any written response to plaintiffs' motion, their sole resistance being made at an unreported hearing on the matter on January 8, 1979. Plaintiffs' motions were sustained in a judgment and decree dated April 26, 1979, which reformed the assignment of interest document, quieted title to the contested acreage in the plaintiffs and ordered the defendants to vacate the premises. This court stayed enforcement of the district court's judgment pending resolution of this appeal.

The following issues are presented for our consideration:

(1) Did the trial court err in determining that defendants' response to plaintiffs' requests for admissions were insufficient and in later ordering the matters admitted after the defendants made no additional response?

(2) Did the trial court err in granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in their action to reform the assignment of interest document and in quieting title to the land in question?

(3) Did the trial court err in sustaining plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on defendants' counterclaim for specific performance of an unsigned settlement agreement?

As this action sounds in equity, our review is de novo. Iowa R.App.P. 4. Normally we would give nonbinding weight to the trial court's findings of fact. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f )(7). Since the issues presented involve only questions of law and not the determination of factual matters, we find it unnecessary to apply the rule.

I. The Tuels first contend the trial court erred in finding their response to plaintiffs' requests for admissions insufficient and in requiring an amended response in the alternative to finding the requests admitted. Tuels further contend that the rulings on the requested admissions were "mooted" by the deposition of Max Tuel, taken shortly before the requests were filed, in which Tuel stated that the disputed tract was not to have been included in the Eickman transfer and that he did not know why the tract was not included in the assignment of interest document because he was not involved in the drafting of the instrument. We do not find merit in these contentions.

We have not had previous occasion to comment upon or construe rules 127 and 128 of our Rules of Civil Procedure in the context presented by this case. Due to the fact that our rules on admissions are patterned on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36, we find federal interpretation of the analogous rule persuasive in construing our rule. E. g., Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902, 904 (Iowa 1978); Sherwood v. Nissen, 179 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 1970).

The Tuels contend that their initial responses were adequate in that they should not have been required to inquire of the scrivener of the assignment instrument, allegedly an agent of the plaintiffs, before answering. The responses to the requested admissions regarding scrivener's error and mutual mistake involved assertions of lack of knowledge, but did not state that reasonable inquiry had been made and that the information known or readily obtainable was insufficient to either admit or deny as is required by rule 127. ² The trial court was thus correct in finding defendants' responses inadequate. That inquiry may be required of a third person is not an excuse. See Anderson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 144, 149 (S.D.N.Y.1969) ("It has been established that responses under Fed.R.Civ.P. 36 must be made based upon evidence within the parties' knowledge or capable of ascertainment by reasonable inquiry from third persons."); 4A Moore's Federal Practice § 36.04(6) (2d ed. 1978). A similar standard is applicable under our rule and was properly applied by the district court.

Defendants next allege that the order of the trial court in which it afforded them twenty days in which to answer or the matters would be deemed admitted was in excess of the authority granted the court under rule 127. Rule 127 provides: "If the court determines that an answer does not comply with the requirements of this rule, it may order either that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be served." We find nothing wrong with the order of the court. It merely states the legal effect of a failure to file an amended answer within the appropriate time period. See, e. g., Pleasant Hill Bank v. United States, 60 F.R.D. 1, 2 (W.D.Mo.1973). Additionally we can find nothing objectionable in the order when it was within the discretion of the trial court to immediately order the matters in question admitted.

We now reach defendants' alternative allegation of error. The defendants contend that the requested admissions were objectionable in that they were filed three days after the deposition of Max Tuel, in which he basically denied the substance of the requests, was taken. Although there may be merit in this contention, see Burns v. Phillips, 50 F.R.D. 187, 189 (N.D.Ga.1970), the defendants did not present this argument to the district court. Error was therefore not preserved. See In re Staros, 280 N.W.2d 409, 411 (Iowa 1979).

Defendants have not chosen to challenge the ruling of the district court when it struck their late responses to the requested admissions. We take this opportunity to note that federal courts, acknowledging the similarity of the procedures, apply the same test in deciding whether to accept a late response that they apply in determining whether to permit withdrawal or amendment of an admission. Such a determination lies in the discretion of the trial court and involves the following considerations: "The court may permit withdrawal or amendment when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the party who obtained the admission(s) fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits." Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(b ). See, e. g., Warren v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 544 F.2d 334, 339-40 (8th Cir. 1976); Westmoreland v. Triumph Motorcycle Corp., 71 F.R.D. 192, 193 (D.Conn.1976); Pleasant Hill Bank v. United States, 60 F.R.D. at 3-4; Finman, The Request for Admissions in Federal Civil Procedure, 71 Yale L.J. 371, 432-33 (1962). The same language appears in our rule 128 and would make a like standard appropriate.

We hold the trial court did not err in finding that defendants' initial responses were not in compliance with rule 127, nor did it abuse its discretion in ordering that amended answers be filed. When these responses were not made, the matters were deemed admitted by operation of law.

II. The Tuels next object to the entry of summary...