Eiker v. Astrue

• Decision Date: 15 May 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. CBD-11-3584
• Parties: NINA M. EIKER, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

NINA M. EIKER, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,¹

Commissioner, Social Security

Administration, Defendant.

Civil Action No. CBD-11-3584

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND Southern Division

May 15, 2013

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Nina M. Eiker, ("Plaintiff") brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner"), denying Plaintiff's claim for a period of Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, and Supplemental Social Security Income ("SSI") payments under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383f. Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Motion") (ECF No. 17) and Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Commissioner's Motion") (ECF No. 22). The Court has reviewed these motions and the applicable law. No hearing is deemed necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md.). For the reasons presented below, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff's Motion and DENIES Commissioner's Motion andREMANDS this matter to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed for disability benefits on June 5, 2009. R. 154-55. The Commissioner denied Plaintiff's claim on first review on December 2, 2009, R. 87-93, and on reconsideration on June 17, 2010. R. 96-99. A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on May 24, 2011. R 39-79. On July 25, 2011, the ALJ issued a written decision concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. R. 19-33.

The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's claim using the five-step sequential process set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2011), and further explained below. At the first step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has worked after the alleged onset date of January 1, 2003, but that it was unclear whether the work performed was substantial gainful activity. R. 21. However, the ALJ found it unnecessary to resolve this question due to the disposition of the case. Id. At the second step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbosacral spine, left shoulder arthropathy, right knee arthropathy, bipolar disorder, and polysubstance abuse. Id. The ALJ found that Plaintiff's right elbow pain is not a medically determinable impairment. R. 21-22. At the third step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff "does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals" a listing in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. R. 22-23. At the fourth step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work, except that she is further limited to "occasionally reaching overhead with her nondominant left arm; occasionally climbing ramps or stairs (never ladders, ropes or scaffolds), balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling; and carrying outsimple tasks in two hour increments (which can be accommodated by regularly scheduled breaks)." R. 23-31. The ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any of her past relevant work as a bartender, waitress, construction laborer, groundskeeper, and nursing assistant. R. 31. At the fifth step, the ALJ determined that considering Plaintiff's RFC, age, education, and work experience, "there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform," including routing clerk, checker, and collator. R. 32-33. As a result, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from the alleged onset date of January 1, 2003, through the date of the decision. R. 33.

Plaintiff subsequently requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council. R. 14. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request on October 17, 2011, making the ALJ's decision final and appealable. R. 1-3.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal, the Court has the power to affirm, modify, or reverse the decision of the ALJ "with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court must affirm the ALJ's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and the ALJ applied the correct law. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive."); see also Russell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 440 F. App'x 163, 164 (4th Cir. 2011); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990); Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Shively v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 368F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance. If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is substantial evidence.").

The Court does not review the evidence presented below de novo, nor does the Court "determine the weight of the evidence" or "substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary if his decision is supported by substantial evidence." Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456; Schweiker, 795 F.2d at 345. The ALJ, not the Court, has the responsibility to make findings of fact and resolve evidentiary conflicts. Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456. If the ALJ's factual finding, however, "was reached by means of an improper standard or misapplication of the law," then that finding is not binding on the Court. Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987).

A person is deemed legally disabled if she is unable "to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a) (2011). The Code of Federal Regulations outlines a five-step process that the Commissioner must follow to determine if a claimant meets this definition:

1) Determine whether the claimant is "doing substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If she is doing such activity, she is not disabled.

2) If she is not doing such activity, determine whether she has a "severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment that meets the duration requirement in § 404.1509, or a combination of impairments that is severe and meets the duration requirement." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If she does not have such impairment or combination of impairments, she is not disabled.

3) If she does have such impairment or combination of impairments, determine whether she has an impairment that "meets or equals one of [the C.F.R.'s] listings in appendix 1 of this subpart and meets the duration requirement." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If she does have such impairment, she is disabled.

4) If she does not, considering her residual functional capacity, determine whether she can do her "past relevant work." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If she can do such work, she is not disabled.

5) If she cannot do such work, considering her residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience, determine whether she can perform other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If she can perform other work, she is not disabled, and if she cannot, she is disabled.

Plaintiff has the burden to prove that she is disabled at steps one through four, and Defendant has the burden to prove that Plaintiff is not disabled at step five. Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 35 (4th Cir. 1992)).

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the Court should reverse the Commissioner's decision or remand the case for additional consideration and evaluation of Plaintiff's condition for the following six reasons:

1) The ALJ failed to properly interpret Plaintiff's credibility and activities of daily of living in determining her residual functional capacity, and showed bias against her;

2) The ALJ did not properly weigh the opinions of treating and consulting physicians;

3) The ALJ did not apply the appropriate regulations for evaluating Plaintiff's mental impairments;

4) The ALJ improperly assessed Plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain;

5) The ALJ erroneously found that Plaintiff was able to perform light work and therefore should have granted her benefits as ofsix months prior to her fiftieth birthday, pursuant to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Subpart P, Appendix 2 ("the Grids"); and

6) The ALJ did not include all of Plaintiff's limitations in formulating the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert.

Plaintiff notes that although she initially alleged a disability onset date of January 1, 2003, the arguments in her appeal concentrate on Plaintiff's claim beginning in early 2010. Pl.'s Br. 4. While it appears that Plaintiff waived any argument that she was disabled from January 1, 2003, to January 1, 2010, the Court will address the ALJ's decision as a whole.

I. The ALJ Properly Weighed Plaintiff's Activities Of Daily Living In Assessing Her Credibility And Her Physical Residual Functional Capacity.

When assessing the effect of claimants' activities of daily living on their physical RFC, ALJs must be careful not to place too much emphasis on simple tasks that are insufficiently indicative of a claimant's...