Ekpo v. Playa Mgmt. U.S.
| Decision Date | 07 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 1:21-CV-2089-TWT |
| Parties | INIOBONG EKPO, Plaintiff, v. PLAYA MANAGEMENT USA, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
This is a personal injury action. It is before the Court on Defendant Hyatt Corporation's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 22] Defendant Playa Management USA, LLC's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 23], Defendant Playa Hall Jamaican Resort Limited's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 24], and Hyatt Ziva's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 25]. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant Hyatt Corporation's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 22] is DENIED, Defendant Playa Management USA, LLC's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 23] is DENIED, Defendant Playa Hall Jamaican Resort Limited's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 24] is GRANTED and Hyatt Ziva's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 25] is GRANTED.
The Court accepts the facts alleged in the Complaint as true for purposes of the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. See Wilding v. DNC Servs. Corp., 941 F.3d 1116, 1122 (11th Cir. 2019). On May 21, 2019, the Plaintiff Iniobong Ekpo injured his great right toe while playing beach volleyball at the Hyatt Ziva Rose Hall Resort located in Montego Bay, Jamaica. (Compl. ¶¶ 18-20.) He was a guest at the resort on that date and joined the beach volleyball game “at the constant request and instigation” of the resort's employees. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.) The Plaintiff allegedly became aware of Rose Hall Resort through internet advertisements, emails, and postal mail from Defendant Hyatt Corporation and Defendant Playa Management USA, LLC. (Id. ¶ 16.)
At all times relevant to the Complaint, Hyatt Corporation owned and operated Defendant Hyatt Ziva; Playa Management owned and operated Defendant Playa Hall Jamaican Resort Limited; and Hyatt Corporation and Playa Management owned and operated Rose Hall Resort through their respective subsidiaries. (Id. ¶¶ 11-13.) Hyatt Corporation is a for-profit corporation organized under Delaware law, with its principal office in Illinois, that is authorized to conduct business in Georgia. (Id. ¶ 4.) Playa Management is a limited liability company organized under Delaware law, with its principal office in Florida, that is authorized to conduct business in Georgia. (Id. ¶ 2.) Hyatt Ziva and Playa Hall are both foreign, profit-generating companies organized under Jamaica law. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.) The Defendants now move to dismiss the single claim for negligence against them for lack of personal jurisdiction.
On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), “the plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case by presenting enough evidence to withstand a motion for directed verdict.” United States ex rel. Bibby v. Mortgage Invs. Corp., 987 F.3d 1340, 1356 (11th Cir. 2021). In evaluating a plaintiff's case, “[t]he district court must construe the allegations in the complaint as true, to the extent they are uncontroverted by defendant's affidavits or deposition testimony.” Morris v. SSE, Inc., 843 F.2d 489, 492 (11th Cir. 1988). Where the defendant contests the allegations in the complaint through affidavits, “the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence supporting personal jurisdiction, unless the defendant's affidavits contain only conclusory assertions that the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction.” Stubbs v. Wyndham Nassau Resort & Crystal Palace Casino, 447 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir. 2006). “And where the evidence presented by the parties' affidavits and deposition testimony conflicts, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Mortgage Invs., 987 F.3d at 1356 (quotation marks omitted).
A federal court sitting in diversity undertakes a two-step inquiry to determine whether it has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: the exercise of jurisdiction must (1) be appropriate under the forum state's long-arm statute and (2) not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int'l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1257-58 (11th Cir. 2010). “When a federal court uses a state long-arm statute, because the extent of the statute is governed by state law, the federal court is required to construe it as would the state's supreme court.” Id. at 1258 (quotation marks omitted). Thus, this Court must interpret and apply Georgia's long-arm statute in the same manner as the Georgia Supreme Court. The statute, codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, confers specific personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant if, among other things, he “[t]ransacts any business within [Georgia][.]” O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1); see also Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. McCall, 312 Ga. 422, 429 (2021).
If a state's long-arm statute is satisfied, the next step is to assess personal jurisdiction under constitutional due process principles. A court may exercise either general or specific jurisdiction over a foreign corporation: “[g]eneral jurisdiction arises from the defendant's contacts with the forum that are not directly related to the cause of action being litigated, while specific jurisdiction is founded on a party's activities in the forum that are related to the cause of action alleged in the complaint[.]” Stubbs, 447 F.3d at 1360 n. 3 (citation omitted). Under either scenario, a court must ensure that “the defendant has ‘certain minimum contacts with the state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'” Waite v. All Acquisition Corp., 901 F.3d 1307, 1312 (11th Cir. 2018) (alteration and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). The minimum-contacts inquiry “ensures that a defendant is haled into court in a forum state based on the defendant's own affiliation with the state, rather than the ‘random, fortuitous, or attenuated' contacts it makes by interacting with other persons affiliated with the state.” Waite, 901 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 n.14); see also Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 625 (2d Cir. 2016) (); Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1199 (8th Cir. 1990) (“Consent is the other traditional basis of jurisdiction, existing independently of long-arm statutes.”). For example, “parties frequently stipulate in advance to submit their controversies for resolution within a particular jurisdiction.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 n.14. “Where such forum-selection provisions have been obtained through freely negotiated agreements and are not unreasonable and unjust, their enforcement does not offend due process.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
First, the Plaintiff contends that Hyatt Corporation and Playa Management effectively consented to general personal jurisdiction in Georgia by registering to do business in the state. (Pl.'s Br. in Opp'n to Defs.' Mots. to Dismiss, at 7-10.) According to the Plaintiff, because these Defendants are authorized to transact business and have registered offices and agents in Georgia, they are residents for personal jurisdiction purposes and fall outside the scope of the long-arm statute. (Id. at 8-9.) In response, the Defendants argue that the “consent-by-registration” theory of general jurisdiction, as it is widely termed, has been overruled by the Supreme Court's modern jurisdiction decisions. (Reply Br. in Supp. of Hyatt Corp.'s, Playa Mgmt.'s, & Playa Hall's Mots. to Dismiss, at 2-4.)
In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klein, 262 Ga. 599, 601 (1992), the Georgia Supreme Court held that Georgia courts may exercise general jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations that are authorized to do or transact business in the state at the time a claim arises. The court observed that Georgia's long-arm statute applies solely to “nonresident” defendants, and that a nonresident is defined in the corporate context as “a corporation which is not organized or existing under the laws of this state and is not authorized to do or transact business in this state at the time a claim or cause of action arises.” Id. at 600-01 (alteration omitted) (emphasis in original) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90). By extension, the court reasoned that a foreign corporation is considered a resident and “may sue or be sued to the same extent as a domestic corporation” when it is registered in Georgia. Id. at 601. Under Klein, the state's long-arm statute does not restrict a plaintiff from suing a registered corporation in Georgia, even if his cause of action does not arise out of the defendant's activities within the state. See id.
Nearly three decades later, the Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to reconsider Klein's general jurisdiction holding in Cooper Tire, 312 Ga. 422. There, the defendant Cooper Tire was incorporated in Delaware, maintained its principal place of business in Ohio and was authorized to transact business in Georgia. Cooper Tire argued that, as a nonresident corporation with minimal contacts in Georgia, it was not subject to the personal jurisdiction of Georgia courts under today's due process limitations. See id. at...
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