Elam v. The Kan. City Southern Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 15 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 10-60227,10-60227 |
| Parties | BARBARA ELAM; BOBBY ELAM, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. THE KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY; RONALD L. MICHAEL, Defendants - Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
Before DAVIS, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Barbara Elam allegedly suffered injuries when she drove her automobile into the side of a train. Elam and her husband brought this state law tort action against the train's owner and its engineer in Mississippi state court. The Elams claim the defendants were negligent per se in violating Mississippi's antiblocking statute, which purports to regulate the amount of time a train may occupy a crossing. The Elams also claim the defendants negligently failed to maintain adequate warnings of the train's presence at the crossing. The case was removed to federal district court. The district court held the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) completely preempted the Elams' negligence per se claim and preempted their simple negligence claim. We hold the ICCTA completelypreempts the Elams' negligence per se claim but does not preempt their simple negligence claim.
On November 18, 2006, plaintiff Barbara Elam drove her automobile into the side of a train owned by defendant Kansas City Southern Railway Company (KCSR) and operated by defendant Ronald L. Michael, the train's engineer (together KCSR, unless otherwise indicated). The train was performing switching operations at the Pine Crest Road crossing in Corinth, Mississippi, and was stopped at the time of the accident. Elam allegedly suffered injuries, and she and her husband, Bobby Elam, brought this state law tort action against KCSR in Mississippi state court. The Elams assert KCSR was negligent per se in violating Mississippi's antiblocking statute, Mississippi Code § 77-9-235, which limits the amount of time a train may occupy a road crossing. The Elams also assert KCSR negligently failed to provide adequate warnings of the train's presence at the crossing.1 The Elams seek actual and punitive damages.
KCSR removed this action to the Northern District of Mississippi. Although both Michael and the Elams are residents of Mississippi, KCSR invoked the district court's diversity jurisdiction on the ground that Michael was not a proper party. KCSR also invoked federal question jurisdiction on the ground that the ICCTA completely preempted the Elams' state law claims.
The Elams moved to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court found it lacked diversity jurisdiction, but nonetheless exercised removal jurisdiction on the ground that the ICCTA completely preempted theElams' claims. The Elams moved for clarification as to whether the ICCTA preempted all their claims or only their negligence per se claim. The district court issued a second order specifying that the ICCTA expressly and completely preempted the Elams' negligence per se claim and impliedly preempted their simple negligence claim. The district court then sua sponte dismissed the action without prejudice so it could be refiled with the Surface Transportation Board, the federal agency that implements the ICCTA. The Elams appealed.
Federal subject matter jurisdiction is limited and must be conferred by Congress within the bounds of the Constitution. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236, 245 (1845); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176, 179 (1803). Litigants cannot bestow subject matter jurisdiction on federal courts by waiver or consent. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934). We may examine the district court's subject matter jurisdiction, sua sponte if necessary. See, e.g., United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435, 440 (1936); Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). Legal questions concerning federal jurisdiction are reviewed de novo. Ramirez-Molina v. Ziglar, 436 F.3d 508, 513 (5th Cir. 2006).
The preemptive effect of a federal statute is a question of law we review de novo. Franks Inv. Co. LLC v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 593 F.3d 404, 407 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Friberg v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 267 F.3d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 2001). The party asserting federal preemption has the burden of persuasion. AT&T Corp. v. Pub. Util. Commn of Tex., 373 F.3d 641, 645 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 255 (1984)).
We hold the district court had removal jurisdiction over this action because the ICCTA completely preempts the Elams' negligence per se claim. We next hold the ICCTA does not preempt the Elams' simple negligence claim, at least on the current record.
A federal district court has removal jurisdiction over an action if the district court could have exercised original jurisdiction over it. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). We hold the district court could have exercised original federal question (and supplemental) jurisdiction over this action because the ICCTA completely preempts the Elams' negligence per se claim.
A plaintiff is the master of his complaint and may allege only state law causes of action, even when federal remedies might also exist. Bernhard v. Whitney Nat'l Bank, 523 F.3d 546, 551 (5th Cir. 2008). Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a federal court does not have federal question jurisdiction unless a federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint. Id. Accordingly, "there is no federal [question] jurisdiction if the plaintiff properly pleads only a state law cause of action." Gutierrez v. Flores, 543 F.3d 248, 252 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bernhard, 523 F.3d at 551). That federal law might provide a defense to a state law cause of action does not create federal question jurisdiction. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986).
An exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule arises when Congress "so completely preempt[s] a particular area that any civil complaint raising thisselect group of claims is necessarily federal in character." Gutierrez, 543 F.3d at 252 (quoting Johnson v. Baylor Univ., 214 F.3d 630, 632 (5th Cir. 2000)). Under the "complete preemption" doctrine, "what otherwise appears as merely a state law claim is converted to a claim 'arising under' federal law for jurisdictional purposes because the federal statute so forcibly and completely displaces state law that the plaintiff's cause of action is either wholly federal or nothing at all." New Orleans & Gulf Coast Ry. Co. v. Barrois, 533 F.3d 321, 330 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also Franks, 593 F.3d at 407. "The question in complete preemption analysis is whether Congress intended the federal cause of action to be the exclusive cause of action for the particular claims asserted under state law." Barrois, 533 F.3d at 331; see also Beneficial Natl Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003).
Complete preemption must be distinguished from "defensive preemption" (i.e., "conflict preemption" or "ordinary preemption"). Barrois, 533 F.3d at 331. Defensive preemption does not create federal jurisdiction and simply "declares the primacy of federal law, regardless of the forum or the claim." Id. "As a general matter, complete preemption is less common and more extraordinary than defensive or ordinary preemption." Id. Indeed, complete preemption is a "narrow" exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Beneficial, 539 U.S. at 5.
In determining the nature and reach of federal preemption, Congress's intent is the "ultimate touchstone." Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). Congress can indicate its preemptive intent either expressly through a statute's plain language, or impliedly through a statute's "structure and purpose." Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008). Regardless ofhow Congress indicates its intent, we begin "with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States are not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Franks, 593 F.3d at 407. This assumption applies with "particular force" when Congress legislates in a field traditionally occupied by state law. Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 543. On the other hand, the assumption applies with less force when Congress legislates in a field with "a history of significant federal presence." United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000). "Historically, federal regulation of railroads has been extensive...." Fayard v. Ne. Vehicle Servs., LLC, 533 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 2008).
The Elams' well-pleaded complaint asserts only state law claims of negligence and negligence per se. Ordinarily, these state law claims would not support original federal question jurisdiction. The issue is whether any of these claims is completely preempted by federal law.
The Elams assert KCSR was negligent per se in violating Mississippi's antiblocking statute.2 The Elams specifically allege KCSR "failed to uncoupleits cars so as not to obstruct traffic on Pine Crest Road" and obstructed the Pine Crest Road crossing "for a period in excess of five minutes" at the time of the accident.
Effective January 1, 1996, the ICCTA abolished the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and created a new Surface Transportation Board (STB) to regulate, inter alia, rail transportation in the United States. 49 U.S.C. § 10501(a)(1); Friberg, 267 F.3d at 442. The purpose of the ICCTA is to "build[] on the deregulatory policies that have promoted growth and stability in the surface transportation sector." H.R. Rep. No. 104-311, at 93 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 793, 805....
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