Elbert Cnty. v. Sweet City Landfill, LLC

• Decision Date: 29 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. S15A0489.,S15A0489.
• Citation: 297 Ga. 429,774 S.E.2d 658
• Parties: ELBERT COUNTY, et al. v. SWEET CITY LANDFILL, LLC, et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

297 Ga. 429

774 S.E.2d 658

ELBERT COUNTY, et al.

v.SWEET CITY LANDFILL, LLC, et al.

No. S15A0489.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

June 29, 2015.

Ansel Franklin Beacham, III, Norman S. Fletcher, Lee Barrett Carter, Brinson, Askew, Berry, Seigler, Richardson & Davis, LLP, Rome, Brandon Lowell Bowen, Robert Lige Walker, Jenkins & Bowen, P.C., Cartersville, Billy Irvan Daughtry, Jr., Elberton, for appellants.

George E. Butler II, Dahlonega, Andrew Jackson Welch III, Lajuana Carmita Ransaw, Smith, Welch, Webb & White, LLC, McDonough, for appellees.

Opinion

HINES, Presiding Justice.

This Court granted the application for discretionary appeal of Elbert County, its Board of Commissioners, and the County Manager (collectively, “the County”) from an order of the Superior Court of Elbert County that, inter alia, granted a declaratory judgment to the effect that the Elbert County Solid Waste Disposal Ordinance was unconstitutional, denied the County's motion to dismiss, and issued a writ of mandamus requiring the County to reasonably consider the site proposed by Sweet City Landfill, LLC and its members (collectively, “Sweet City”) for a solid waste landfill. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

On November 2, 2009, Sweet City filed with the County a document styled “Application and Agreed Minimum Operating Conditions”; this document requested that “a Special Use Permit and a zoning estoppel letter and a certificate of solid waste plan consistency be simultaneously issued ... in accordance with Section 62–52 of the Elbert County Code of Ordinances [and relevant sections of the Georgia Comprehensive Solid Waste Management Act, OCGA § 12–8–20, et seq., and regulations of the Department of Natural Resources].” At the time of Sweet City's application, Elbert County ordinances required a Special Use Permit (“SUP”) be issued for operation of a solid waste landfill. However, also at the time of the application, the County was in the process of amending its ordinances pertaining to waste disposal landfills, having already given a proposed amendment a “first reading”; the effect of this 2009 amendment was to exempt a “waste to energy” solid waste facility, as defined by OCGA § 12–8–22(41),¹ from the requirement that a landfill SUP be obtained. Sweet City then sought to amend its application to qualify, in its view, as a “waste to energy” project and thus be exempted from the requirement to secure a SUP.

Without formal action on Sweet City's proposal, the County decided to go forward with a proposal for a waste disposal facility operated by Plant Granite, LLC, which in the County's view would be a “waste to energy” facility.² Sweet City twice filed suit in connection with this decision and on October 14, 2011, Sweet City and the County entered into a “tolling agreement” which put in abeyance the legal disputes between the County and Sweet City while they sought common ground on Sweet City's application for a SUP. On September 11, 2011, the County again amended its solid waste management ordinance to require that all solid waste facilities, including those that qualified as a “waste to energy” facility, would require a SUP.

On June 29, 2012, Sweet City requested to be placed on the agenda of the July 9, 2012 meeting of the Elbert County Board of Commissioners (“Board”) “for discussion and consideration [of] siting of a proposed solid waste facility and the associated proposed host agreement.”³ At that meeting, the Board voted 5–0 “not to enter into a ‘Host Agreement’ with Sweet City Landfill, LLC, and, furthermore, to terminate the tolling agreement.”

On March 13, 2013, Sweet City filed in the superior court a “Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, and Injunctive Relief,” requesting various relief, including declaratory judgments that the County's Solid Waste Ordinance was null and void as unconstitutional, and that Sweet City had a vested right to develop the subject property as a waste disposal facility; Sweet City also sought a mandatory injunction allowing it to proceed with the landfill. The County moved to dismiss Sweet City's complaint, and Sweet City moved for summary judgment. On September 11, 2014, the superior court issued an order: granting summary judgment to Sweet City on the grounds that the County's Solid Waste Ordinance violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, and that the July 9, 2012 Board action deprived Sweet City of equal protection under both the United States and Georgia Constitutions; declaring that Sweet City has a vested right to have the County issue “a letter of zoning and development compliance and consistency with the County's solid Waste Management Plan”; declaring that Sweet City has a vested right to develop the property as a landfill free of any zoning and land use restrictions; and, granting a temporary injunction against the County from enacting or enforcing ordinances so as to interfere with Sweet City's development. The superior court also denied the County's motion to dismiss, rejecting the County's argument that Sweet City had to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to filing suit.

1. The County contends that the trial court erred in granting Sweet City any relief, as the July 9, 2012 Board action was a final determination of Sweet City's application for a SUP and associated requests, and thus Sweet City was required to file a timely appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5–3–20⁴ from the July 9, 2012 decision of the Board, and that the failure to do so foreclosed any review from that decision, even by a collateral attack such as a declaratory judgment. Sweet City, however, asserts that the Board did not address the SUP on July 9, 2012, but merely declined to enter into a “host agreement,” and to end a tolling agreement, and that thus no appeal lay from the July 9, 2012 Board action.

The trial court found that the Board did not act upon Sweet City's application for a SUP. But, if the Board did render a final decision on Sweet City's application, and no appeal to the superior court was sought, the County's basis for the motion to dismiss would be well founded.

OCGA § 5–3–20 establishes a jurisdictional deadline for “all appeals to the superior court, any other law to the contrary notwithstanding.” OCGA § 5–3–20(c). [Cit.] All “[a]ppeals to the superior court shall be filed within 30 days of the date the judgment, order, or decision complained of was entered.” OCGA § 5–3–20(a) [...]. Final determinations by county authorities regarding the application of land use restrictions to a particular property constitute “decisions” within the meaning of OCGA § 5–3–20. [Cits.] The 30–day deadline applies even if the challenge to the county's land use decision is couched in terms of inverse condemnation. [Cit.]

Mortgage Alliance Corp. v. Pickens Co., 294 Ga. 212, 215–216(2), 751 S.E.2d 51 (2013) (emphasis in original). See also Chadwick v. Gwinnett Cnty., 257 Ga. 59, 354 S.E.2d 420 (1987).

However, the agenda of the Board meeting shows simply that the Board would address a “Request from Sweet City Landfill, LLC for discussion and consideration of a proposed host agreement associated with a solid waste facility.” And, there was no single document that had been prepared so as to comprise a proposed “host agreement.” Rather, documents in the record suggest that what was before the Board at the July 9, 2012 meeting was essentially a framework of how a host agreement would be prepared, with general statements as to what it might contain. Further, even this framework did not refer to a SUP. The Board's minutes show only that a motion was made and carried for the Board “not to enter into a ‘Host Agreement’ with Sweet City Landfill, LLC, and, furthermore, to terminate the tolling agreement.” The minutes do not show any other action taken at the July 9, 2012 meeting in regards to Sweet City, and the trial court did not err in ruling that the Board took no action on Sweet City's application for a SUP. See Mortgage Alliance, supra at 219, 751 S.E.2d 51.

Nonetheless, the trial court erred in addressing the County's motion to dismiss, finding that, under OCGA § 12–8–26(b), the July 9, 2012 Board action was a “siting decision,” was done without the public notice required by OCGA § 12–8–26(b) and Section 62–52 of the Elbert County Code of Ordinances, was “void ab initio and thus unappealable,” and Sweet City thus had no obligation to appeal. This was error. Assuming that the July 9, 2012 Board action was void, it would not be unappealable; to the contrary, an appeal of a void judgment will result in a reversal and provide redress from an illegal judgment. See Wetherington v. State, 295 Ga. 172, 173, 758 S.E.2d 299 (2014) ; Darden v. Ravan, 232 Ga. 756, 758(1), 208 S.E.2d 846 (1974).

The trial court also erred in rejecting the County's argument that, if the trial court decided that no final decision had been made by the Board regarding Sweet City's application for a SUP, the court must dismiss the matter due to Sweet City's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies, allowing Sweet City to return to the Board to secure a final decision on its application for a SUP. See Mortgage Alliance, supra at 218–220, 751 S.E.2d 51. Rather, the trial court held that for Sweet City to return to the Board for a final decision would be a futile act, and therefore Sweet City fell into an exception to the exhaustion requirement. However, that exception does not apply.

As the County notes, the general rule is that before a party seeks redress in the courts regarding the application of local regulation to property, it must apply to the local authorities for determination of matters such as the granting of a SUP, because “[r]equiring exhaustion of administrative remedies prevents unnecessary judicial intervention into local affairs and promotes judicial economy because local authorities, unlike the court, have the power to grant the ... relief sought.” City of Suwanee v. Settles Bridge...