Elchediak v. Heckler, 84-5415
| Decision Date | 15 January 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-5415,84-5415 |
| Citation | 750 F.2d 892 |
| Parties | , Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 15,764 Jose M. ELCHEDIAK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee. Non-Argument Calendar. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Adolfo J. Vila, Miami, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.
Marie T. Ransley, Asst. Regional Atty., Dept. of Health & Human Services, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
Before VANCE, HENDERSON and CLARK, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Jose Elchediak appeals the district court's granting of the Secretary's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. 405(g). Since we find that plaintiff's contention that his mental illness precluded him from litigating his claim for disability benefits because it prevented him from proceeding in a timely fashion from one administrative level to the next raises a colorable constitutional claim, we reverse and remand for further findings at the administrative hearing level.
On October 11, 1978, without assistance of counsel, Mr. Elchediak's mother filed an application for child's insurance benefits, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 402(d), on his behalf asserting that he was disabled and had been unable to work since March 1975 due to his paranoid schizophrenia. 1 The Social Security Administration (Administration) denied the application on December 28, 1978. This decision became final when neither Mr. Elchediak nor his mother pursued the application any further. Mr. Elchediak later filed a second application for disability benefits based on his own earnings record. 2 Again, he asserted that he had been disabled and unable to work since March 1975 due to his paranoid schizophrenia. The Administration denied this second application finding that Mr. Elchediak's alleged disability was not severe enough to entitle him to benefits. Mr. Elchediak again failed to pursue his application any further.
On July 24, 1981, Mr. Elchediak filed a third application for disability benefits, again alleging that he had been disabled since March 1975 due to his paranoid schizophrenia. 3 Once again the Administration denied his application finding that Mr. Elchediak's condition had already been found not disabling as of December 31, 1975, which was the last day he met the earnings requirement. The notice of denial also informed him that his application did not entitle him to any other type of benefits. This decision was affirmed on reconsideration. With the assistance of counsel, Mr. Elchediak requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). At that hearing, claimant's counsel requested that his original application be reopened. After considering all the available evidence, the ALJ found that Mr. Elchediak had failed to present any new and material evidence which would require reopening his original application and thus concluded that Mr. Elchediak's current application was barred by the doctrine of res judicata as set out in 20 C.F.R. 404.957(c)(1).
When the appeals council declined to review the ALJ's decision, plaintiff filed this suit. The Secretary immediately moved to dismiss asserting that the district court lacked jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. 405(g) because the Secretary's refusal to reopen a prior application is not a "final decision" within the meaning of the statute. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107-09, 97 S.Ct. 980, 985-86, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). A magistrate, relying on Califano v. Sanders, denied the Secretary's motion because he found that the plaintiff had raised a colorable constitutional due process claim. Later, in his report and recommendations, the magistrate concluded that the manifest weight of the evidence compelled a finding of disability in favor of Mr. Elchediak. In reaching this conclusion, he determined that a remand to the Secretary was pointless since all the relevant evidence was presently before the court and recommended that the court reverse the Secretary's previous decision and award benefits in Mr. Elchediak's favor retroactively from October 1977.
The district court rejected the magistrate's findings and recommendations as clearly erroneous and concluded that the magistrate erred in not granting the Secretary's motion to dismiss. The court then granted the Secretary's motion to dismiss holding that the Secretary's refusal to reopen a previous application is not a final order from which relief can be sought in federal court and that the plaintiff had failed to raise a colorable constitutional claim.
After Califano v. Sanders, it is clear that the federal courts are without jurisdiction to review the Secretary's refusal to reopen a prior application absent some constitutional challenge. 430 U.S. at 107-09, 97 S.Ct. at 985-86. The sole issue before this court therefore is whether Mr. Elchediak's assertion that his mental illness precluded him from effectively litigating his claim for benefits because it prevented him from proceeding in a timely fashion from one administrative level to the next raises a colorable constitutional claim.
While we have not addressed this precise issue, we have recognized that in appropriate cases mental illness may destroy the res judicata effect of a prior administrative determination. Green v. Weinberger, 500 F.2d 203, 205 (5th Cir.1974). 4 In this case, Mr. Elchediak specifically asserts that he is entitled to...
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