Elder v. Jones, 5160
Decision Date | 14 March 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 5160,5160 |
Citation | 608 P.2d 654 |
Parties | Rexford M. ELDER, Individually, d/b/a C & R Consultants, Appellant (Defendant and Cross-Defendant), v. Walter V. JONES, an Individual, owner and operator of Jones Development Company; and Jones Development Company, Appellees (Defendants and Cross- Complainants). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
K. W. Keldsen, Rawlins, for appellant.
Gerald K. Russell, Rawlins, for appellees.
Before RAPER, C. J., and McCLINTOCK, THOMAS, ROSE and ROONEY, JJ.
The appellant, Rexford M. Elder, appeals from a judgment of the district court which found that he and his business associate, A. M. "Cy" Harris, 1 breached their contract with the appellee, Walter V. Jones. The judgment awarded appellee damages of $14,993.15. The appellant asserts a number of errors which we shall summarize as follows:
1. The district court erred in permitting the appellee to amend his pleadings to include a theory of breach of contract at the opening of the trial. Rule 15(b), W.R.C.P. 2 Further, the district court erred in failing to grant a continuance in face of the amendment.
2. The doctrine of subrogation could not be applied in this case because there were no contractual obligations running between the appellant and the appellee's subrogors.
3. The arrangements between the parties were too indefinite to constitute an enforceable contract. Moreover, if there was a contract, it was abandoned.
4. The appellee did not sustain his burden of proving that he had demanded performance from the appellant, a condition precedent to this suit.
5. The district court erred in refusing to grant a continuance to appellant for the purpose of deposing A. M. Harris (See fn. 1, supra).
6. Appellee failed to prove any damages under a breach-of-contract theory.
7. The district court committed reversible error in admitting certain items of evidence.
It was difficult to determine from the briefs the facts and true issues of this case. Although there were a number of persons and business organizations involved in the circumstances which led to this litigation, the legal principles which governed the outcome of the lawsuit were simple, once the debris was cleared away.
This case got underway when, on January 28, 1977, Colorado Lumber & Supply Co., Inc. (Colorado Lumber), filed suit to foreclose a materialman's lien 3 on a house owned by the appellee. 4 Appellee had made an agreement with the appellant 5 which provided that appellant would build for appellee a home in a housing development in Hanna, Wyoming which was being developed by the appellee. Appellant in turn hired J. L. Wilson (Wilson) to do the actual building of the house. Wilson purchased the materials to build the home from Colorado Lumber. In its lien foreclosure complaint, Colorado Lumber named the appellant, the appellee, and Wilson as defendants. The complaint alleged that appellant, as a contractor, had entered into a contract to build a house for appellee. Appellant then subcontracted with Wilson who was to do the actual construction work. Wilson purchased, and agreed to pay for, the building materials which were supplied by Colorado Lumber and incorporated into the house at Hanna. Colorado Lumber claimed it had not been paid for materials which were valued at $5,046.93. Appellee filed a cross complaint against the appellant asking that any sums that had to be paid by appellee to Colorado Lumber be reimbursed to him by appellant and Wilson. Further, appellee wanted the appellant to defend the lawsuit; and, if appellant failed to do so, that he be required to pay all attorney fees incurred by appellee.
Wilson also got into the action, filing a third-party complaint against both the appellant and appellee. Wilson claimed he had not been paid for materials and labor he provided to the project of building the home. His suit was also to foreclose a lien on the same home which Colorado Lumber had filed on. (See fn. 3, supra). His claim was for over $17,000. Appellee then filed another cross complaint against the appellant asking to be reimbursed by the appellant for any sums he might have to pay Wilson.
In a document dated December 22, 1977, Wilson released his lien against the appellee for a consideration of $15,000 plus $2,000 in supplies that were owned by appellee but retained by Wilson. This, in effect, removed Wilson from this litigation. On February 8, 1978, Colorado Lumber released its lien against appellee and Wilson and assigned and subrogated its rights in the lawsuit to them. This, then, also removed Colorado Lumber from this litigation.
For convenience, the district court referred to the appellee as plaintiff and the appellant as defendant in the pretrial order which was filed on July 6, 1978. Once all the deadwood is cleared away, those are exactly the positions in which they stood. Nonetheless, the parties persisted in using the more complex titles of cross-complainant and cross-defendant. That pretrial order listed the issues for trial to be:
The pretrial order also permitted appellee to file an amended complaint within ten days. An amended complaint was filed on July 17, 1978. That complaint asked for a judgment against the appellant for $15,000.
On August 11, 1978, the appellant filed an answer to the amended complaint which, among other things, stated:
At the trial, in the opening proceedings, appellee moved for permission to amend his pleadings to conform to the evidence. A couple of excerpts from the record help to clarify the situation:
The court then ruled:
Appellant asserts the district court erred in allowing an amendment to the pleadings. Appellant's brief and oral arguments failed to take into account the well-developed body of case authority construing Rule 15, W.R.C.P.:
Rose v. Rose, Wyo.1978, 576 P.2d 458, 459.
Here, the appellant merely states his conclusion that the district court abused its discretion, nothing more. We cannot find abuse because appellant has failed his burden. We digress to point out that it is apparent that no one was looking to the pretrial order 7 for any guidance. That document stated rather plainly that breach of contract was an issue. The upshot of that is, of course, that had appellant recognized what his burden was in this court it would have been virtually impossible to demonstrate an abuse. Appellant likewise failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion with regard to the district court not allowing a continuance. Craver v. Craver, Wyo.1979, 601 P.2d 999. Indeed, as a part of his answer, appellant had claimed appellee had breached the contract.
Appellant asserts that the doctrine of subrogation could not be applied in this case. This issue apparently rests on the appellant's success in convincing this court that the amendment discussed above should not have been allowed. The judgment of the district court is, quite properly, based on the theory of breach of contract and...
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