Elias v. Unisys Corp.

• Decision Date: 08 May 1991
• Citation: 410 Mass. 479,573 N.E.2d 946
• Parties: Maria ELIAS, et al. 1 v. UNISYS CORPORATION.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 946

573 N.E.2d 946

410 Mass. 479

Maria ELIAS, et al. ¹ v. UNISYS CORPORATION.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Hampden.

May 8, 1991.

Decided June 25, 1991.

Katherine L. Lamondia, Springfield, for plaintiffs.

Patricia A. Bobba, Springfield, for defendant.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.

GREANEY, Justice.

On December 13, 1984, the plaintiff, Maria Elias, was involved in an automobile accident with a vehicle driven by an employee of the defendant, Unisys Corporation (Unisys). The plaintiffs, Maria and her husband, Joseph Elias, commenced an action in the Superior Court against the employee alleging that he had operated the vehicle negligently. Maria sought damages for her personal injuries, and Joseph sought damages for the loss of his wife's consortium. The complaint was amended to add Unisys as a defendant on the theory of respondeat superior. The plaintiffs then settled their claims with the employee, executing a general release of the employee and dismissing their action against him.

Subsequently, Unisys moved for summary judgment under Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(b), 365 Mass. 824 (1974), on the ground that the general and unqualified release given by the plaintiffs to its employee precluded any further action against Unisys based on the theory of respondeat superior. A judge of the Superior Court agreed with Unisys and allowed its motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs appealed, and we transferred the case to this court on our own motion. We affirm the judgment.

The plaintiffs argue that we should apply the provisions of G.L. c. 231B (1988 ed.), the contribution among joint tortfeasors statute, to this case. In particular, they urge that we apply § 4 of the statute, which provides that the release of one joint tortfeasor from liability does not release other joint tortfeasors. ² Even if the statute does not apply by its terms, the plaintiffs also argue that the policies and principles behind G.L. c. 231B militate in favor of allowing them to maintain their action against Unisys in order to arrive at a more equitable result. We reject both arguments.

The statute relied on by the plaintiffs applies only to joint tortfeasors, those "jointly liable in tort" for an injury. See G.L. c. 231B, § 1(a ), (b ). We have defined joint tortfeasors as "two or more wrongdoers [who] negligently contribute to the personal injury of another by their several acts." O'Connor v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 401 Mass. 586, 591, 518 N.E.2d 510 (1988), quoting Chase v. Roy, 363 Mass. 402, 408, 294 N.E.2d 336 (1973). The plaintiffs acknowledge that Unisys, whose liability is based solely on the theory of respondeat superior, is not a joint tortfeasor with its employee. ³ See Kabatchnick v. Hanover-Elm Bldg. Corp., 331 Mass. 366, 369, 119 N.E.2d 169 (1954). It follows that the statute, by its express terms, does not apply to the case.

The plaintiffs urge, however, that we invoke common law decision-making to apply the principles stated in the statute to their situation. They claim essentially that Unisys and its negligent employee should be treated like joint tortfeasors, thus permitting the plaintiffs, under a rule like that stated in § 4, to maintain an action against Unisys after having released its employee from liability. Because the principles of joint liability which underlie the statute are distinct from the principles of vicarious liability, we decline to extend the statute in the manner requested by the plaintiffs.

Underlying the concept of joint liability is the principle that all joint (or concurrent) tortfeasors are independently at fault for their wrongful acts. For this reason § 4 of G.L. c. 231B permits a plaintiff to bring an action against one joint tortfeasor after having released another joint tortfeasor from liability. By contrast, the principles of vicarious liability apply where only the agent has committed a wrongful act. The principal is without fault. The liability of the principal arises simply by the operation of law and is only derivative of the wrongful act of the agent. See Karcher v. Burbank, 303 Mass. 303, 305, 21 N.E.2d 542 (1939); W.L. Prosser & W.P. Keeton, Torts § 82, at 593 (5th ed.1984). Because of this, established case law holds that a general release given to an agent will preclude a subsequent action against his principal. See Karcher v. Burbank, supra at 308, 21 N.E.2d 542; Richmond v. Schuster Express, Inc., 16 Mass.App.Ct. 989, 454 N.E.2d 494 (1983). See also J. Nolan & L. Sartorio, Tort Law § 438 (2d ed.1989). In asking us to change this rule of law, the plaintiffs would have us ignore the basic and significant distinctions between vicarious and joint liability and hold Unisys directly responsible for acts for which it is blameless.

The principles of contribution and indemnity are designed to give effect to these differences between joint and vicarious liability. Under G.L. c. 231B, contribution is allowed between joint tortfeasors who cause another, by reason of their wrongdoing, to incur injury or damage. In addition, as has been mentioned above, the statute permits a plaintiff to settle with one joint tortfeasor and still have recourse against remaining tortfeasors (subject to the limitations stated in the statute). The right to contribution, unlike the right to indemnity, is based on the shared fault of the joint tortfeasors. Indemnity, on the other hand, allows someone who is without fault, compelled by operation of law to defend himself against the wrongful act of another, to recover from the wrongdoer the entire amount of his loss, including reasonable attorney's fees. This rule has long been part of our common law, see Kabatchnick v. Hanover-Elm Bldg. Corp., supra, 331 Mass. at 369, 119 N.E.2d 169; Westfield v. Mayo, 122 Mass. 100, 105 (1877); Gray v. Boston Gaslight Co., 114 Mass. 149, 154 (1873), and permits someone like Unisys, who is blameless, to be reimbursed for damages caused by the wrongful act of its employee. The fact that the doctrines of contribution and indemnity are separate for both conceptual and practical reasons is carefully preserved by G.L. c. 231B, § 1 (e ), which provides that "[t]his chapter shall not impair any right of indemnity under existing law."

Consistent with the distinctions discussed above, the doctrines of contribution and indemnity also address different needs. Those needs have been expressed by the court in Mamalis v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 364 Pa.Super. 360, 365-366, 528 A.2d 198 (1987), aff'd, 522 Pa. 214, 560 A.2d 1380 (1989), as follows: "The rules of vicarious liability respond to a specific need...