Elias v. Youngken, 82-292-A
Decision Date | 24 May 1985 |
Docket Number | No. 82-292-A,82-292-A |
Parties | 25 Ed. Law Rep. 386 James A. ELIAS v. Heber W. YOUNGKEN et al. ppeal. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This is an action wherein the plaintiff seeks recovery for libel, breach of contract, negligent supervision, and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of his departure from employment at the University of Rhode Island. 1 The case was tried in the Superior Court before a jury over a period commencing March 9, 1982, and ending on March 18, 1982. At the conclusion of all of the evidence, the defendants made a motion for a directed verdict, which was subsequently granted by the trial justice. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm the judgment below. The facts of the case from which the controversy arose are as follows.
From 1972 to 1978 James A. Elias (Elias) was employed by the University of Rhode Island (URI) as director of Pharmacy Services and clinical instructor at URI's College of Pharmacy. His job essentially entailed serving as pharmacist at URI's Health Center Pharmacy and giving instruction to pharmacy students whose course curriculum included being assigned to observe and participate in the pharmacy's activities. Ultimate responsibility for the pharmacy resided in Heber W. Youngken, Jr. (Youngken), who was the pharmacy's licensee. Youngken concurrently had overall responsibility for the university's Student Health Services and also served as dean of the College of Pharmacy.
During the first three months of 1978, a series of events led to the discharge of James Elias by the university. In order best to detail the chronology, we refer to a set of correspondence between Youngken and Elias during this period. In a letter dated January 30, 1978, which followed up a meeting of January 26 with Elias, Youngken expressed concern about management problems in the pharmacy and about the need for better communication between Elias and his supervisors. Elias responded to these and other criticisms by returning a memo of his own to Youngken on February 14.
At approximately this same period of January through March 1978, Elias took a series of sick leaves in order to be with his daughter, who had been hospitalized with an undiagnosed ailment. Elias took three and one-half days off at the end of January, the last two weeks of February, and the first two weeks of March to attend to his sick daughter. When called at the hospital on a number of occasions by Youngken and asked when he could be expected to return to his work, Elias told Youngken that he would return as soon as he knew what was ailing his daughter.
Meantime, Youngken sent a letter dated February 15 to Elias both acknowledging Elias's sick-leave absences and expressing concern that Elias had failed to answer questions about the management of the pharmacy that were raised in Youngken's initial letter of January 30. Youngken also noted the difficulties of operating the pharmacy full time with Elias's irregular absences. Elias then responded to Youngken in a memo dated March 6, 1978, castigating Youngken for his "harassments." The next day, Youngken sent Elias another letter indicating that in view of Elias's uncertainty about when he would be returning to work, a full-time replacement for Elias would have to be found. 2
Elias then returned to work at the pharmacy on March 15. A week later, however, he contracted influenza and was forced to stay home for approximately four days. In the interim on March 17, 1978, Youngken sent him a letter indicating that Elias's employment was being terminated because of his lack of communication with his supervisors, his mismanagement of drugs and supplies in the pharmacy, his failure to instill confidence in his management style on the part of his coworkers, and his failure adequately to apprise his coworkers and supervisors of his absences in order that the pharmacy might be made to run smoothly and without interruption.
By this point Elias had gotten in touch with his attorney, who subsequently contacted the university and negotiated with its personnel department an agreement providing, inter alia, that Elias would relinquish any claims against the university in return for the university's removing any derogatory material from Elias's personnel file. 3
In September of 1978, Youngken's office prepared a booklet signed by Youngken as dean and provost for Health Science Affairs entitled "Annual Report 1977-1978, College of Pharmacy, University of Rhode Island," which was delivered to the Office of the President of URI in November 1978. At the top of page seven of the report was the heading "Faculty and Staff Changes 1977-78." Listed below were appointments to and resignations from the College of Pharmacy staff. The last of such announcements stated, 4 Elias first saw the annual report in January of 1979. After his departure from URI, he had obtained employment as a staff pharmacist at Rhode Island Hospital. In applying for that job he had told hospital officials that he had resigned from the university. During the course of the trial, Elias sought to show that the announcement in the college's annual report libeled him and that it breached the agreement between Elias and the university. Further, counsel indicated that the announcement caused Elias shock and embarrassment because Elias's new boss at Rhode Island Hospital, who had somehow obtained a copy of the report, 5 confronted Elias about the discrepancy between the accounts of the circumstances under which Elias departed from the College of Pharmacy. Counsel also argued that URI had been negligent in its supervision of Youngken, one of whose duties it was to oversee Elias's activities. Finally, Elias claimed that Youngken, motivated by personal animosity against Elias, had taken actions to cause Elias intentionally to suffer extreme emotional distress.
We shall deal separately with the issues of libel, breach of contract, negligent supervision, and intentional infliction of emotional distress as they pertain to this case.
The first matter for resolution is whether the trial justice erred in directing a verdict for defendants on the ground that the alleged libelous statement was not defamatory. We believe that the trial justice was without error in so ruling. The question of whether or not the meaning of a particular communication is defamatory is one of law for the court. Andoscia v. Coady, 99 R.I. 731, 735, 210 A.2d 581, 584 (1965); Prosser and Keeton, Torts § 111 at 774 (5th ed. 1984); 3 Restatement (Second) Torts § 614 at 311 (1977). Guided by this principle, we examine the standards enunciated in Reid v. Providence Journal Co., 20 R.I. 120, 37 A. 637 (1897), as they relate to this issue. In Reid this court said:
"[A]ny words, if false and malicious, imputing conduct which injuriously affects a man's reputation, or which tends to degrade him in society or bring him into public hatred and contempt, are in their nature defamatory * * *." Id. at 124-25, 37 A. at 638. (Emphasis added.)
Having defined what is defamatory language in Reid, we later said that a "plaintiff * * * in order to recover, [must show] that the publication was defamatory either per se or by reason of its susceptibility of the defamatory meaning attributed to it by way of innuendo." Andoscia, 99 R.I. at 735, 210 A.2d at 584. Although plaintiff has never specified whether the words complained of were defamatory per se or by way of innuendo (per quod), it has been plaintiff's contention throughout that the statement "James Elias was terminated" when read in the context of other announcements concerning URI staff who either resigned or were appointed was indeed defamatory. We disagree.
In Reid this court stated that 20 R.I. at 122, 37 A. at 637. In its ordinary sense, an announcement of the termination of an employee, whether printed among other announcements or printed alone, is neither defamatory per se nor defamatory per quod. The American Heritage Dictionary 1254 (2d Col. ed. 1982), defines "terminate" as follows: Similarly, Black's Law Dictionary defines "terminate" thus: "[t]o put an end to; to make to cease; to end." Black's Law Dictionary 1319 (5th ed. 1979). No injury to reputation can accrue merely by the bare statement that an employee has been terminated. This observation comports with the weight of authority as expressed in various jurisdictions that have considered cases of this nature. See Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 1008, 1041 (1949) (); Annot., 138 A.L.R. 671, 671 (1942) ().
We observe that in the context of the numerous reported opinions dealing with an action for libel arising out of an announcement of an employee's discharge, use of the word "terminate," in comparison with the language construed elsewhere, is indeed mild and is as euphemistic and bland a description of the method of severance of Mr. Elias from URI as could be devised. In the cases that we have...
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