Elias–clavet v. Bd. of Review

• Decision Date: 22 March 2011
• Docket Number: No. 2009–152–M.P.,2009–152–M.P.
• Citation: 15 A.3d 1008,265 Ed. Law Rep. 1107
• Parties: Karen ELIAS–CLAVETv.BOARD OF REVIEW, Rhode Island Department of Employment and Training et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

15 A.3d 1008

265 Ed. Law Rep. 1107

Karen ELIAS–CLAVET

v.BOARD OF REVIEW, Rhode Island Department of Employment and Training et al.

No. 2009–152–M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 22, 2011.

Stephen E. Breggia, Esq., Providence, for Petitioner.Donald G. Elbert, Jr., Esq., Department of Employment and Training, Melissa A. Thomson, Esq., Pawtucket School Department, for Respondent.Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice FLAHERTY, for the Court.

Karen Elias–Clavet was employed as a substitute teacher by the Pawtucket School Department during the 2007–2008 school year. On June 24, 2008—shortly after the school summer recess began—Ms. Elias–Clavet filed a claim for unemployment benefits. That claim was denied by the Department of Labor and Training (DLT), based upon the between-terms disqualification provision of G.L.1956 § 28–44–68(2). Subsequent appeals before a referee, a DLT Board of Review, and ultimately the District Court, upheld the denial of benefits for the petitioner. Ms. Elias–Clavet filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court seeking appellate review of the decision denying her claim for unemployment benefits, which we granted. On January 31, 2011, the parties appeared before us to show cause why the issues raised by this appeal should not be decided without further briefing and argument. After hearing the arguments of counsel and reviewing the memoranda submitted on behalf of the parties, we are satisfied that cause has not been shown. We affirm the judgment of the District Court.

Facts and Travel

The petitioner, Karen Elias–Clavet, was hired as a per-diem substitute teacher by the Pawtucket School Department during the 2007–2008 school year. From March 4, 2008, until the end of the school year, she was placed in a long-term assignment, taking the place of a teacher who was on military leave. In all, she worked eighty-nine and one-half days during the academic year. When the school year ended, Ms. Elias–Clavet received a letter from the school department informing her that “you have ‘reasonable assurance’ to return in the same capacity as a substitute teacher for the 2008–2009 academic year * * *.” The bottom of that letter set forth the definition of “reasonable assurance” as provided by the Legislature in a 1998 amendment. In that amendment, the General Assembly defined the term “reasonable assurance” to mean:

“ ‘Reasonable assurance’ means a written agreement by the employer that the employee will perform services in the same or similar capacity during the ensuing academic year, term or remainder of a term.” Section 28–44–68(a), as amended by P.L.1998, ch. 113, § 1.

Also, the June 9 mailing was accompanied by a form that was referred to in the letter; the letter directed, “if you wish to be re-employed by the Pawtucket School Department in September 2008, please fill out the enclosed form no later than July 31, 2008.” The opening sentence of that form itself communicated, “[i]f you desire to continue your employment as a substitute teacher during the 2008–2009 school year, please sign this form and return it * * *.” ¹

On June 24, 2008, Ms. Elias–Clavet filed a claim for unemployment security benefits with the DLT. That claim was denied because it was determined that the claimant was ineligible for benefits under the provisions of § 28–44–68(2) of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act, which says:

“With respect to services in any other capacity for an educational institution, including elementary and secondary schools and institutions of higher education, compensation payable for weeks of unemployment beginning on or after April 1, 1984, on the basis of the services shall be denied to any individual for any week which commences during a period between two (2) successive academic years or terms if that individual performs those services in the first of those academic years or terms and there is a reasonable assurance that the individual will perform those services in the second of those academic years or terms, except that if compensation is denied to any individual for any week under this subdivision and the individual was not offered an opportunity to perform the services for the educational institution for the second of the academic years or terms, the individual shall be entitled to a retroactive payment of the compensation for each week for which the individual filed a timely claim for compensation and for which compensation was denied solely by reason of this subdivision.”

In denying the claim based upon the statutory between-terms disqualification provision, the Director of DLT wrote: “As you performed services in the most recent academic year and have a contract or written assurance of rehire in the next academic year/term, your educational wages may not be used in your claim for the period * * * between the two academic years/terms.”

Contending that she did not have a reasonable assurance of returning the following school year under substantially the same employment circumstances, Ms. Elias–Clavet filed a timely appeal from the director's decision on July 23, 2008. A hearing on that appeal was held on September 17, 2008, before a referee of the board of review for the DLT. At that hearing, the claimant and an employer representative of the Pawtucket School Department both testified. ² Various exhibits were introduced into the record, and the referee questioned both the claimant and the employer representative. The testimony established: (1) that Ms. Elias–Clavet was at first a day-to-day substitute teacher during the 2007–2008 term, and that she ended the year in a long-term substitute position; (2) that she worked eighty-nine and one-half days during the 2007–2008 school year, short of the 135 days of work required to alter a substitute's per-diem status; and (3), that she returned to the same substitute position at the beginning of the 2008–2009 school year on terms and conditions substantially the same as those in the previous year. The testimony also established that the letter received by Ms. Elias–Clavet was a “generic” letter sent to all substitutes, and that the very nature of substitute status is such that school officials have no way of knowing exactly what substitute positions might be available during an upcoming term.

The referee's decision of September 23, 2008, affirmed the decision of the director. The referee concluded that the claimant was subject to the above quoted between-terms benefits disqualification of § 28–44–68(2). Specifically, the referee said:

“The evidence and testimony presented at the hearing establish that the claimant had reasonable assurance by written agreement from the employer that she would perform services in the same capacity and under the same terms and economic conditions in the ensuing academic year as she had in the prior academic year.”

Undeterred, Ms. Elias–Clavet timely appealed the decision of the referee to the board of review, which reviewed the decision of the referee pursuant to § 28–44–47 of the Rhode Island Employment Security Act. Section 28–44–47 provides that the board of review “may affirm, modify, or reverse the findings or conclusions of the [referee] solely on the basis of evidence previously submitted or upon the basis of any additional evidence that it may direct to be taken.” On October 20, 2008, the board of review issued a one-page decision, which affirmed the finding and conclusions of the referee and denied the appeal. This denial was in accordance with § 28–44–51, which says, “[f]or the purposes of judicial review, an appeal tribunal's decision from which an application for appeal has been denied by the board of review shall be deemed to be the decision of the board of review * * *.”

Ms. Elias–Clavet then filed a complaint in District Court, seeking judicial review of the administrative decision of the board of review under G.L.1956 § 42–35–15 of the Administrative Procedures Act. Jurisdiction for such review resides in the Sixth Division of the District Court pursuant to § 28–44–52, and the standard of review in complaints so postured is provided by § 42–35–15(g).³

On April 28, 2009, the District Court issued a written decision affirming the board of review. In determining that the agency's decision was supported by legally competent evidence on the record, the District Court ruled:

“The issue before the Court is whether the Board's determination that the Referee's decision was a proper adjudication of the facts and that the decision was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record and whether or not it was clearly erroneous.

“The evidence and testimony presented at the hearing establish that the claimant had reasonable assurance by written agreement from the employer that she would perform services in the same capacity and under the same terms and economic conditions in the ensuing academic year as she had in the prior academic year.”

Final judgment was entered, and Ms. Elias–Clavet filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking appellate review of the decision of the District Court based on § 42–35–16 of the Administrative Procedures Act. We granted that petition on September 14, 2009.

Standard of Review

“When this Court examines the judgment of the [District Court] in administrative proceedings, we are restricted by § 42–35–16 * * *.” Johnston Ambulatory Surgical Associates, Ltd. v. Nolan, 755 A.2d 799, 805 (R.I.2000) (quoting Rhode Island Public Telecommunications Authority v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, 650 A.2d 479, 485 (R.I.1994)). “Pursuant to * * * § 42–35–16, this court employs a limited standard of review when reviewing appeals from a decision of an administrative agency pursuant to a writ of certiorari.” DePetrillo v. Department of Employment Security, Board of Review, 623 A.2d 31, 34 (R.I.1993). “On certiorari, this Court will not weigh the evidence.” Foster–Glocester...