Elkins v. Elkins

• Decision Date: 04 June 1993
• Docket Number: No. 91-CA-000265-MR,91-CA-000265-MR
• Parties: James C. ELKINS, Appellant, v. Lena Faye ELKINS, Appellee.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

Page 787

854 S.W.2d 787

James C. ELKINS, Appellant, v. Lena Faye ELKINS, Appellee.

No. 91-CA-000265-MR.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

June 4, 1993.

Lawrence R. Webster, Pikeville, for appellant.

Elizabeth Shaw, Richmond, for appellee.

Before JOHNSON, McDONALD and WILHOIT, JJ.

JOHNSON, Judge.

This is an appeal by the husband, James C. Elkins, from a Decree of Dissolution entered in Madison Circuit Court. James raises three issues on his appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to enforce a post-nuptial agreement; (2) whether the trial court erred in assigning the interest in $1,200.00 in coins to James; and (3) whether the trial court erred in determining that Railroad Retirement disability benefits were marital property. We affirm the trial court as to issues 1 and 2; and reverse in part as to issue 3.

Appellee/wife, Lena Faye Elkins, is correct in asserting that the issue of the enforceability of the post-nuptial agreement was not properly preserved for appellate review. James clearly brought the issue to the attention of the Domestic Relations Commissioner by addressing same in his Pre-Trial Memorandum. However, the Commissioner did not address the issue in his Report; James did not raise the issue in his Exceptions; the trial court did not address the issue in the Decree; and James did not file a motion for an amendment to the findings of fact pursuant to CR 52.04. The authenticity of the alleged agreement was contested by Lena. It is impossible for this court to give meaningful review to the issue in the absence of findings of fact. Angel v. Angel, Ky.App., 562 S.W.2d 661 (1978).

James' second issue concerns whether there was substantial evidence upon which the trial court could award against James' interest in the marital estate $1,200.00 in coins that Lena contends were removed from a safe deposit box by James. The finder of fact obviously chose to believe Lena as to this issue. Her testimony is sufficient evidence to support this finding; and accordingly, it cannot be said that this finding is clearly erroneous. CR 52.01

James' third issue, concerning whether the trial court erred in determining that the Railroad Retirement disability benefits were marital property, is one of first impression in our appellate courts. James received lump sum payments, in 1972 for $32,000 and in 1987 for $15,000, the proceeds of which he now seeks to have declared non-marital property. The 1987 payment was made under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 (RRA), 45 U.S.C.S. Sec. 231a(a)(1)(v), and appears to have been in satisfaction of past due annuity payments. This is important because 45 U.S.C.S. Sec. 231m(a) provides that such annuity payments shall not "be assignable or be subject to any tax or to garnishment, attachment, or other legal process under any circumstances whatsoever...." It has been held that this language prohibits the states from considering a spouse's prospective right to such benefits when dividing the marital estate. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 99 S.Ct. 802, 59 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979); McGraw v. McGraw, 186 W.Va. 113, 411 S.E.2d 256 (1991); ¹ Belt v. Belt, 398 N.W.2d 737 (N.D.1987); Padezanin v. Padezanin, 341 Pa.Super. 26, 491 A.2d 130 (1985).

That is, under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, the federal statute pre-empts any contrary state law.

Congress has fixed an amount thought appropriate to support an employee's old age and to encourage the employee to retire. Any automatic diminution of that amount frustrates the congressional objective. By reducing benefits received, it discourages the divorced employee from retiring. And it provides the employee with an incentive to keep working, because the former spouse has no community property claim to salary earned after the marital community is dissolved. Section 231m shields the distribution of benefits from state decisions that would actually reverse the flow of incentives Congress originally intended.

Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 585, 99 S.Ct. at 810.

In short, the states are not free to force a railroad worker to share his retirement benefits where Congress has mandated to the contrary.

In this case, the question is whether the annuity payments may be treated as marital property after receipt. W...