Elledge v. Hotchkiss

• Decision Date: 26 June 1930
• Docket Number: 8 Div. 152.
• Citation: 130 So. 893,222 Ala. 129
• Parties: ELLEDGE v. HOTCHKISS.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

130 So. 893

222 Ala. 129

ELLEDGE v. HOTCHKISS.

8 Div. 152.

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 26, 1930

Rehearing Denied Nov. 28, 1930.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Colbert County; J. Fred. Johnson, Jr. Judge.

Bill in equity by W. E. Hotchkiss against Tom Elledge, for injunction and accounting. From a decree for complainant, defendant appeals. Affirmed in part, and in part reversed, rendered and remanded.

C. E Carmichael and A. H. Carmichael, both of Tuscumbia, for appellant.

Andrews, Peach & Almon, of Sheffield, for appellee.

BROWN J.

The appellee is the owner of two race horses, and equipment used in training and racing said horses. In July 1928, he entered into a contract with appellant, according to appellee's contention, whereby said horses were delivered to appellant to be entered in the races for the season, appellee agreeing to furnish his caretaker, Jim Norwood, to go with the horses, and pay the expenses of Jim and the horses while being trained at Athens, and for their transportation to the first place of entry. Thereafter the expenses incident to the keeping of the horses were to be deducted from their earnings, and what remained to be divided equally between appellee and appellant. in respect to the expenses and earnings, the appellant was to account periodically to the appellee, and keep him fully advised. It is shown without dispute that appellee paid all expenses up to the first entry.

Appellant's contention is that the agreement was that appellee was to advance the expenses of the keeping and care of the horses and the caretaker, which were to be first deducted from the earnings, and the net amount to be equally divided. That the earnings of the races were not sufficient to pay the expenses of the joint adventure, and appellant paid the amount over and above the earnings. At the end of the season appellant refused to surrender possession of the horses and equipment, unless appellee would reimburse him for the amount advanced by him in excess of the earnings, and, asserting that he had a lien for keeping and training the horses under the provisions of section 8892 of the Code of 1923, advertised them for sale, and the appellee filed the original bill for an accounting and to enjoin the sale of the horses and compel their surrender to appellee.

While it is well settled that a party to a joint adventure may sue his coadventurer in an action at law for breach of the contract or to recover from him his proportion of the expenses, or his share of the profits, yet, where a single action will not suffice to terminate the entire controversy, such joint adventurer may invoke the jurisdiction of a court of equity for an accounting. Saunders v. McDonough et al., 191 Ala. 119, 67 So. 591; Lunsford v. Shannon (Ala. Sup.) 128 So. 215; Id., 208 Ala. 409, 94 So. 571; Williams v. Henshaw, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 79, 22 Am. Dec. 366; Penn v. Stone, 10 Ala. 209; 15 R. C. L. 507, § 11; Hall v. McKeller, 155 Ala. 508, 46 So. 460.

The allegations of the bill bring the case clearly within the stated principles.

If, as asserted by the appellant, he has a lien on the horses for their feed and training, they cannot be recovered at law. Finney v. Dryden, 214 Ala. 370, 108 So. 13; Payne v. Ellis, 216 Ala. 603, 114 So. 192.

Still, if it should be determined that the appellant has no lien, and therefore that the horses might have been recovered in an action of detinue, the rights and liabilities of the parties as to the expenses and profits could not be litigated in such action.

Whether or not the appellant's assertion that he has a lien, and therefore the right to retain possession of the horses as a security for his alleged charges, is well grounded, it is, nevertheless, important in determining whether or not his withholding possession from appellee is rightful or wrongful. If wrongful, he would not be entitled to be reimbursed for expenses for keeping the horses after the joint adventure had come to an end.

The provisions of the statute are that: "Any keeper, owner, or proprietor, of any pasture kept for grazing stock, or any keeper, owner, or proprietor of any stable for the development or training of horses, or any person who keeps, feeds, trains, or develops any horse or horses for another, shall have a lien on all such horses or stock, so kept, fed, pastured, trained, or developed by him, or under his control, for the payment of his charges for keeping, feeding, pasturing, training, or developing the same, and he shall have the right to retain such horse, or horses, or stock, or so much thereof as may be necessary for the payment of such charges." Section 8892, Code of 1923. (Italics supplied.)

The common law left stable keepers and agisters without a lien to secure their compensation for services in attending, keeping, and feeding stock bailed to them for that purpose, and the clear purpose of the statute was to remedy this defect in the common law. Pearce v. Jennings, 94 Ala. 524, 10 So. 511; Scott v. Mercer (Iowa) 63 N.W. 325; 17 R. C. L. 1048.

The statutory lien runs to a bailee for hire to secure his charges for keeping, feeding, pasturing, training,...