Ellington v. Remmel, 5-968

• Decision Date: 18 June 1956
• Docket Number: No. 5-968,5-968
• Citation: 293 S.W.2d 452,226 Ark. 569
• Parties: Wendell J. ELLINGTON, Appellant, v. Mayor Pratt REMMEL and The City of Little Rock, et al., Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 452

293 S.W.2d 452

226 Ark. 569

Wendell J. ELLINGTON, Appellant, v. Mayor Pratt REMMEL and The City of Little Rock, et al., Appellee.

No. 5-968.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

June 18, 1956.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 1, 1956.

Tommy H. Russell, North Little Rock, for appellant.

Townsend & Townsend and O. D. Longstreth, Jr., Little Rock, for appellee.

HOLT, Justice.

Appellant W. J. Ellington, filed a petition alleging, 'That on June 13, 1955, the City Council of the City of Little Rock, Arkansas, passed Ordinance No. 9841, which Ordinance abandoned the City's right, title and interest to the following described street: West 31st Street from the east property line of Taylor Street east for approximately 140 feet to the west property line of an alley platted through Block 14 and the Replat of a part of Block 9, C. O. Brack's Addition to the City of Little Rock, Arkansas.

That the aforementioned action by the Little Rock City Council stands to cause great harm to the plaintiff and others situated similarly to him in that the valuation of their property will be greatly decreased and their enjoyment of their respective properties will be greatly curtailed.

That a large group of property owners in this area have objected and continue to object to this action by the City Council. That numerous property owners in this area have not consented to the abandonment of this street nor have they any desire to do so.' He further alleged that the council acted without authority and prayed that said ordinance be declared void and that the street in question be reopened, etc. Appellees, interveners, answered alleging that they were the only abutting property owners on said street, that the City Council acted within its authority in enacting the ordinance in question and that said street was properly closed in compliance with § 19-3825 to 19-3830 incl. Ark.Stats.1947. On December 13, 1955, a hearing was had and on evidence presented by both parties the court found that the ordinance in question 'was duly passed by the City Council of Little Rock, Arkansas, and that all the provisions set out in Sections 19-3825 to 19-3830, Ark.Stats.1947, have been fully complied with; that said street as shown on the plat has not been actually used as a street by the public for the last five years; and that the City Council has the power to vacate and abandon said street by proceeding in the manner followed in this instance,' and from the decree is this appeal.

For reversal appellant relies on two points: 'I. The Chancellor's finding of fact is not supported by the evidence. II. That the Court committed error in finding that all of the provisions of Sections 19-3825 to 193- 3830, Ark.Stats.1947, had been fully complied with, and thereby dismissing the Plaintiff's complaint.'

At the outset we are confronted with an insufficient abstract by appellant, and we have concluded that the decree must be affirmed for this reason. Rule 9(d) of this court provides: 'Abstract.--The appellant's abstract or abridgement of the record should consist of an impartial condensation, without comment or emphasis, of only such material parts of the pleadings, proceedings, facts, documents, and other matters in the record as are necessary to an understanding of all questions presented...