Ellini v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc.

• Decision Date: 25 July 2012
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 4:11–cv–01655.
• Citation: 881 F.Supp.2d 813
• Parties: Kamran M. ELLINI, Plaintiff, v. AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

881 F.Supp.2d 813

Kamran M. ELLINI, Plaintiff,
v.
AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL, INC., et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 4:11–cv–01655.

United States District Court,
S.D. Texas,
Houston Division.

July 25, 2012.

[881 F.Supp.2d 816]

Ellen Sprovach, Rosenberg Sprovach, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff.

Julie Anne Fleming-Wolfe, Attorney at Law, St. Paul, MN, Pamela Banks Linberg, Jackson Lewis LLP, Houston, TX, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
KEITH P. ELLISON, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendants Ameriprise Financial, Inc.'s and RiverSource Distributors, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”). (Doc. No. 14.) After considering the Motion, all responses and replies thereto, and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the Motion should be GRANTED.

I. FACTS

Kamran Ellini (“Plaintiff” or “Ellini”) is a 43–year–old Iranian–American male. (Doc. No. 1–1, Pl.'s Orig. Compl. ¶ 4.1; Mot. Summ. Jgmt at 3.) In 1998, Plaintiff

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began working for Ameriprise Financial (“Ameriprise”) as a financial advisor. (Pl.'s Orig. Compl. ¶ 4.2; Ex. A to Mot. Summ. Jgmt, Kamran Ellini Dep. 17:24–18:6.) In January 2008, Plaintiff was hired as RiverSource Regional Vice President (“RVP”) for the P1 ¹ Texas territory of Ameriprise's RiverSource Distributors, Inc. (“RiverSource”) insurance wholesaling business. (Pl.'s Orig. Compl. ¶ 4.2; Ellini Dep. 19:2–5, 72:12–13.) In early 2008, Todd Baker (“Baker”) replaced Plaintiff's supervisor. (Pl.'s Orig. Compl. ¶ 4.2; Mot. Summ. Jgmt at 3.) In September 2008, Plaintiff's territory was restructured, and he became responsible for both the P1s and P2s in his new territory. (Ellini Dep. 72:13–14.)

Plaintiff claims that, as soon as Baker replaced Plaintiff's prior supervisor, he asked Plaintiff what his nationality was and why his name “was spelled differently.” (Pl.'s Orig. Compl. ¶ 4.3.) Baker allegedly started requiring Plaintiff to record his appointments, activities, and expenses. ( Id.) According to Plaintiff, Baker did not make these demands of any other RVP. ( Id.) Plaintiff contends that, even though he met all expectations, “Baker focused on Plaintiff's weaknesses and constantly threatened Plaintiff's job.” ( Id. ¶ 4.2.) When Plaintiff's Regional Sales Director (“RSD”) ² left, Baker refused to replace her; furthermore, Baker did not permit Plaintiff to have a “scheduler” ³ until January 2009. ( Id. ¶ 4.5; Mot. Summ. Jgmt at 7–8.)

On June 29, 2009, Baker gave Plaintiff a verbal warning about his performance problems. (Pl.'s Orig. Comp. ¶ 4.6; Mot. Summ. Jgmt at 7; Ex. D–10 to Mot. Summ. Jgmt, Sept. 18, 2009 Written Warning from Todd Baker to Kamran Ellini (“Sept. 2009 Written Warning”) at 2.) Baker informed Plaintiff that Plaintiff had to increase the percentage of time he spent with P2s, a requirement that Plaintiff claims he was not previously aware of. (Pl.'s Orig. Compl. ¶ 4.6; Ellini Dep. 172:8–10.) On September 18, 2009, Baker issued a written warning to Plaintiff that stated that Plaintiff was not meeting expectations (“September 2009 Written Warning”). (Sept. 2009 Written Warning at 1–3.) On December 2, 2009, Baker issued a final written warning (“December Written Warning”). (Pl.'s Orig. Compl. ¶ 4.8; Ex. D–11 to Mot. Summ. Jgmt, Dec. 2, 2009 Final Written Warning from Todd Baker to Kamran Ellini (“Dec. 2009 Written Warning”) at 1–3.) Plaintiff contends that the performance issues outlined in the September 2009 Written Warning and the December 2009 Written Warning “were subjective and were not required measures for any other” RVP. (Pl.'s Orig. Compl. ¶ 4.9.) On January 27 ⁴, Plaintiff contacted Human Resources to complain that he was treated less favorably than the other RVPs. ( Id. ¶ 4.10; Ex. D–16 to Mot.

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Summ. Jgmt, Employee Relations Group Case Management System Notes of Kamran Ellini Call (“ERG Notes”) at 2.) Plaintiff was terminated within a few days. (Pl.'s Orig. Compl. ¶ 4.11; Mot. Summ. Jgmt at 11; Ex. 1 to Resp. to Mot. Summ. Jgmt, Kamran Ellini Aff. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff insists that he had met all of the expectations in the final December 2009 Written Warning, as well as in his year-end review. (Pl.'s Orig. Compl. ¶ 4.11.)

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in state court alleging that Ameriprise and RiverSource (collectively, “Defendants”) had violated the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”) by discriminating against him based on his age (over 40), religion (misperceived as Muslim), and national origin (Iranian American). (Pl.'s Orig. Compl. ¶ 4.13.) Plaintiff brought this lawsuit within sixty days from his receipt of the Texas Workforce Commission–Civil Rights Division's issuance of a Notice of Right to File a Civil Action, and completed all administrative conditions precedent to filing this lawsuit. ( Id. ¶¶ 5.1–6.2.) Defendants removed this case pursuant to this Court's diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 1.) Defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 14), to which Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. No. 19). Defendants filed a Reply (Doc. No. 22).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no actual dispute as to any material fact of the case. Willis v. Roche Biomed. Lab., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir.1995) (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). In order to survive summary judgment, Plaintiff “must raise a ‘genuine issue as to a[ ] material fact’ that [Defendant] discriminated against her.” Okoye v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 245 F.3d 507, 512 (5th Cir.2001) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Kee v. City of Rowlett, 247 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir.2001) (internal quotations omitted). This Court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Id. Furthermore, the summary judgment standard “provides that the mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat a motion for summary judgment; Rule 56 requires that the fact dispute be genuine and material.” Willis, 61 F.3d at 315. First, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law are material.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). Second, a dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505).

Conclusory allegations and unsubstantiated assertions do not satisfy the nonmovant's summary judgment burden. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (noting that a non-movant's burden is “not satisfied with ‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts' ” (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986))); Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir.1992) (“Mere conclusory allegations are not competent summary judgment evidence, and they are therefore insufficient to defeat or support a motion for summary judgment.”). “Nor may non-movants rest upon mere allegations made in their pleadings

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without setting forth specific facts establishing a genuine issue worthy of trial.” Topalian, 954 F.2d at 1131. To meet this burden, the nonmovant must “identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the precise manner in which that evidence support[s] [its] claim[s].” Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir.1994) (internal quotation omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

The TCHRA prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals based on race, color, disability, religion, sex, national origin, or age. The TCHRA provides:

An employer commits an unlawful employment practice if because of race, color, disability, religion, sex, national origin, or age the employer:

(1) fails or refuses to hire an individual, discharges an individual, or discriminates in any other manner against an individual in connection with compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment; or

(2) limits, segregates, or classifies an employee or applicant for employment in a manner that would deprive or tend to deprive an individual of any employment opportunity or adversely affect in any other manner the status of an employee.

Tex. Lab. Code § 21.051. Texas courts evaluate discrimination claims under the TCHRA using federal employment discrimination law, as the Texas Legislature, in adopting the act, “intended to correlate state law with federal law in employment discrimination cases.” AutoZone, Inc. v. Reyes, 272 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Tex.2008) (citing Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Monarrez, 177 S.W.3d 915, 917 (Tex.2005)). See also Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 404 n. 2 (5th Cir.1999) (“[T]he law governing claims under the TCHRA and Title VII is identical.” (citing Colbert v. Georgia–Pacific Corp., 995 F.Supp. 697 (N.D.Tex.1998))).

Under the burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims first developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), a plaintiff who seeks to prove discrimination through indirect or circumstantial evidence must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2106, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by showing that he “(1) is a member of a protected group; (2) was qualified for the position at issue; (3) was discharged or suffered some adverse employment action by the employer; and (4) was replaced by someone outside his protected group...