Ellis v. Witsell

• Decision Date: 05 February 2014
• Parties: David ELLIS, appellant, v. Sherma WITSELL, respondent, et al., defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

114 A.D.3d 636

979 N.Y.S.2d 826

2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 00630

David ELLIS, appellant,

v.Sherma WITSELL, respondent, et al., defendant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Feb. 5, 2014.

G. Wesley Simpson, P.C., Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant.

Martin, Fallon & Mullé, Huntington, N.Y. (Richard C. Mullé and Michael Jones of counsel), for respondent.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ruchelsman, J.), dated January 31, 2012, as granted the motion of the defendant Sherma Witsell for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the motion of the defendant Sherma Witsell for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her is denied.

The plaintiff allegedly sustained personal injuries when his vehicle collided with a vehicle owned by the defendant Sherma Witsell and operated by the defendant Raymond McDaniel at a Brooklyn intersection. The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants, alleging that the plaintiff's vehicle entered the intersection with the traffic light in his favor when the defendants' vehicle, which had been traveling on the intersecting road, entered the intersection against a red traffic light and collided with his vehicle. Witsell moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her, contending, inter alia, that she was not vicariously liable under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388(1) because she had given no one permission to drive her vehicle. The Supreme Court granted Witsell's motion.

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388(1) “makes every owner of a vehicle liable for injuries resulting from negligence ‘in the use or operation of such vehicle ... by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner’ ” (Murdza v. Zimmerman, 99 N.Y.2d 375, 379, 756 N.Y.S.2d 505, 786 N.E.2d 440, quoting Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388[1] ). Under this statute, there is a presumption that the operator of a vehicle operates it with the owner's permission ( see Murdza v. Zimmerman, 99 N.Y.2d at 380, 756 N.Y.S.2d 505, 786 N.E.2d 440; Vinueza v. Tarar, 100 A.D.3d 742, 743, 954 N.Y.S.2d 160; Bernard v. Mumuni, 22 A.D.3d 186, 802 N.Y.S.2d 1, affd. 6 N.Y.3d 881, 817 N.Y.S.2d 210, 850 N.E.2d 25; Murphy v. Carnesi, 30 A.D.3d 570, 571, 817 N.Y.S.2d 136; Sargeant v. Village Bindery, 296 A.D.2d 395, 396, 744 N.Y.S.2d 508). The presumption may be rebutted by substantial evidence that the owner did not give the operator consent ( see Murdza v. Zimmerman, 99 N.Y.2d at 380, 756 N.Y.S.2d 505, 786 N.E.2d 440; Vinueza v. Tarar, 100 A.D.3d at 743, 954 N.Y.S.2d 160; Murphy v. Carnesi, 30 A.D.3d at 571, 817 N.Y.S.2d 136; Sargeant v. Village Bindery, 296 A.D.2d at 396, 744 N.Y.S.2d 508).

Here, Witsell failed to establish her entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. In moving for summary judgment, Witsell submitted her deposition testimony and the deposition testimony of the plaintiff. The plaintiff did not provide any evidence on the issue of permissive...