Elmakiss v. Hughes
| Decision Date | 30 July 2010 |
| Docket Number | NO. 12-09-00269-CV,12-09-00269-CV |
| Parties | YAKOV ELMAKISS, APPELLANT v. KAREN G. HUGHES, ESQ., APPELLEE |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Yakov Elmakiss, pro se, appeals the trial court's summary judgment in a lawsuit he brought against Karen G. Hughes. In five issues, Elmakiss argues that the trial court should not have granted the summary judgment. We affirm.
Elmakiss brought a civil lawsuit against Hughes, complaining of her conduct during her representation of Elmakiss's ex-wife in their divorce action. Hughes moved for traditional summary judgment on the ground that no cause of action existed in relation to her conduct on behalf of the ex-wife, who had been adverse to Elmakiss in the divorce action. The trial court granted summary judgment. This appeal followed.
In five issues, Elmakiss asserts that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment against him.
Rule 166a(c) governs traditional motions for summary judgment and provides as follows:
Motion and Proceedings Thereon.
The motion for summary judgment shall state the specific grounds therefor.... The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if (i) the deposition transcripts, interrogatory answers, and other discovery responses referenced or set forth in the motion or response, and (ii) the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, stipulations of the parties, and authenticated or certified public records, if any, on file at the time of the hearing, or filed thereafter and before judgment with permission of the court, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issues expressly set out in the motion or in an answer or any other response.
We review a trial court's granting of summary judgment de novo. Mid-Century Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Ademaj, 243 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2007). When performing a de novo review, we exercise our own judgment and redetermine each issue of fact and law. See Schade v. Tex. Workers' Comp. Comm'n, 150 S.W.3d 542, 549 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, pet. denied) (citing Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. 1999)). In an appeal of a summary judgment proceeding, our review is a limited one. "Issues not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal." Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) (emphasis added). When reviewing a summary judgment, courts of appeals should consider all summary judgment grounds ruled on by the trial court and preserved for appellate review that are necessary for final disposition of the appeal. Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Tex. 1996). Further, an appellate court may, in the interest of judicial economy, consider other grounds that the movant preserved for review, despite the fact that the trial court did not rule on them. Id.
When reviewing a ruling on a traditional motion for summary judgment, we must examine the entire summary judgment record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the motion. Yancy v. United Surgical Partners Int'l, Inc., 236 S.W.3d 778, 782 (Tex. 2007) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824-25 (Tex. 2005)). For a party to prevail on a traditional motion for summary judgment, it must conclusively establish the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). A fact is "material" if it affects the ultimate outcome of the lawsuit under the governing law. Acad. of Skills & Knowledge, Inc. v. Charter Sch., USA, Inc., 260 S.W.3d 529, 535 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2008, pet. denied); Pierce v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 226 S.W.3d 711, 714 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2007, pet. denied). A material fact issue is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jurycould find the fact in favor of the nonmoving party. Acad. of Skills, 260 S.W.3d at 535; Pierce, 226 S.W.3d at 714. Evidence is conclusive only if reasonable and fair minded jurors could not differ in their conclusions. Acad. of Skills, 260 S.W.3d at 535 (citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755-56 (Tex. 2007)). Once the movant has established a right to summary judgment, the nonmovant has the burden to respond to the motion for summary judgment and present to the trial court any matters that would preclude summary judgment. Acad. of Skills, 260 S.W.3d at 535; Pierce, 226 S.W.3d at 714.
The trial court determines a motion for summary judgment based on the "pleadings [...] on file at the time of the hearing, or filed thereafter and before judgment with permission of the court." See Spin Doctor Golf, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 296 S.W.3d 354, 361 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied) (quoting Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c)). Ordinarily, a summary judgment cannot be based entirely upon the failure of a plaintiff to state a cause of action unless the defendant levels a special exception identifying the deficiency, thus affording the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his pleading to state a cause of action. Denson v. Tex. Dep't Crim Justice Institutional Div., No. 12-02-00099-CV, 2003 WL 21254862, at *3 (Tex. App.-Tyler May 30, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In reB.I.V., 870 S.W.2d 12, 13-14 (Tex. 1994)). However, an order granting summary judgment on the pleadings, when the defendants did not specially except before moving for judgment as a matter of law, is not reversible error in every instance. Denson, 2003 WL 21254862, at *3 (citing Hidalgo v. Sur. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 462 S.W.2d 540, 543 (Tex. 1971)).
"Pleadings may contain judicial admissions through which a party pleads himself out of court." Denson, 2003 WL 21254862, at *3. Summary judgment is proper when the plaintiff pleads facts that affirmatively negate his cause of action. Id. Similarly, if the pleading deficiency is of the type that cannot be cured by an amendment, a special exception is unnecessary and a summary judgment based on the pleading's failure to state a legal claim is appropriate. Id. When a party's pleadings contain statements admitting facts or conclusions directly contrary to the party's theory of recovery or defense, the pleadings may constitute summary judgment proof for the opposing party. Ball v. Neel, No. 12-03-00205-CV, 2004 WL 1475106, at *2 (Tex. App. Tyler June 30, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.). The pleadings are not evidence. Id Instead, the court assumes the facts in the nonmovant's pleadings are true. Id Applicable Law
Over 100 years ago, the Texas Supreme Court held that private "attorneys are authorized to practice their profession, to advise their clients and interpose any defense or supposed defense, without making themselves liable for damages." Kruegel v. Murphy, 126 S.W. 343, 345 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1910, writ refd); see McKnight v. Riddle & Brown, P.C., 877 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1994, writ denied). In the context of legal malpractice claims, the court has more recently explained that, at common law, an attorney owes a duty of care only to her client, not to third parties who may have been damaged by the attorney's negligent representation of the client. Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575, 577 (Tex. 1996). At common law, the rule of privity limits attorney liability to third parties. McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex. 1999). The general rule is that persons who are not in privity with the attorney cannot sue the attorney for legal malpractice. Id "Without this 'privity barrier, ' the rationale goes, clients would lose control over the attorney-client relationship, and attorneys would be subject to almost unlimited liability." Barcelo, 923 S.W.2d at 577; see Chu v. Hong, 249 S.W.3d 441, 446 n.18 (Tex. 2008).
White v. Bayless, 32 S.W.3d 271, 275-76 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied). In short, private attorneys owe no duty to adverse litigants. See id. at 276 (); Mitchell v. Chapman, 10 S.W.3d 810, 811 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, pet. denied) (same).
This rule is based upon sound policies and is vital to our adversary system of justice. See Toles v. Toles, 113 S.W.3d 899, 910 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). If an attorney could beheld liable for statements made, or actions taken, in the course of representing her client, she would be forced to balance her own potential exposure against her client's best interest. See id "Any other rule would act as a severe and crippling deterrent to the ends of justice for the reason that a litigant might be denied a full development of [her] case if [her] attorney were subject to the threat of liability for defending [her] client's position to the best and fullest extent allowed by law, and availing [her] client of all rights to...
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