Quick v. City of Austin
Decision Date | 08 May 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 96-1154.,96-1154. |
Citation | 7 S.W.3d 109 |
Parties | Jerry J. QUICK, Kaira G. Quick, John M. Bryant, Ruth E. Bryant, Joe Cox, Dolores Cox, Florence Turck and Circle C Land Corp., Petitioners, v. CITY OF AUSTIN, Save Our Springs Legal Defense Fund, Inc. and Al St. Louis, Respondents. |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Roy Q. Minton, John L. Foster, Bob E. Shannon, Joseph R. Knight, Robert I. Howell, Scott K. Field, Joe R. Greenhill, Austin, for Petitioners.
William G. Bunch, Thomas H. Watkins, Andrew F. Martin, Elizabeth G. Bloch, James K. McClendon, Frank C. Cooksey, Pamela Stanton Baron, Austin, Michael A. Hatchell, Tyler, Dick DeGuerin, Houston, Teresa L. Todd, Marfa, for Respondents.
We are confronted with a challenge to the City of Austin's Save Our Springs Ordinance, a water pollution control measure enacted in 1992. Petitioners, who own land within the City of Austin's extraterritorial jurisdiction, brought this action contesting the Ordinance. Petitioners claim that the Ordinance is arbitrary, unreasonable, and inefficient. Petitioners also assert that the Ordinance is void because it was enacted without a public hearing, it impermissibly regulates the number, use, and size of buildings in the City's extraterritorial jurisdiction, and it has not been approved by the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Petitioners, holding that the Ordinance was null and void. The court of appeals reversed in part and modified in part, rendering judgment that the Ordinance was valid. 930 S.W.2d 678. Although we do not agree with all of the court of appeals' analysis, we affirm its judgment upholding the Ordinance's validity.
Frustrated by their perception that the Austin City Council was failing to safeguard Barton Springs adequately, a group of Austin citizens interested in protecting the environment initiated the Save Our Springs Ordinance and placed it on the Austin municipal ballot for a local referendum election. In August 1992, the Austin citizens participating in the referendum election overwhelmingly approved the Ordinance. Two days after the voters approved the Ordinance, the Austin City Council enacted the Ordinance and incorporated it into the City Code.
The purpose of the Ordinance, according to its Declaration of Intent, is to insure water quality control in Barton Creek, Barton Springs, and the Barton Springs Edwards Aquifer.1 The provisions of the Ordinance apply to those areas within Austin and Austin's extraterritorial jurisdiction that contain watersheds contributing to Barton Springs. The Ordinance limits impervious or non-porous cover on land in the regulated areas to between 15% and 25% of the net site area. The Ordinance also requires that new developments be set back from streams and not contribute to an increase in the amount of pollution constituents commonly found in urban rainfall runoff water. Construction in the "critical water quality zone" of the Barton Creek watershed is prohibited by the Ordinance. The Ordinance provides for no waivers or exceptions unless necessary to avoid conflict with state and federal laws.
Petitioners Jerry J. Quick, Kaira G. Quick, John M. Bryant, Ruth E. Bryant, Joe Cox, Dolores Cox, Florence Turck, and Circle C Land Corporation all own land outside the city limits of Austin but within its extraterritorial jurisdiction. Because their land is within Austin's extraterritorial jurisdiction, any development of their property must comply with the Ordinance. The Petitioners sued the City in Hays County, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Ordinance was void because it was illegally enacted. Additionally, Petitioners challenged the Ordinance under section 26.177(d) of the Texas Water Code, which authorizes a party aggrieved by a water pollution control ordinance to appeal to district court to review whether the ordinance is invalid, arbitrary, unreasonable, inefficient, or ineffective.
Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc., an incorporated association of individuals led by the citizen initiators of the Ordinance, moved to intervene in the suit. The Alliance urged that the City was incapable of adequately advocating the Alliance's interest due to previous hostilities over the Ordinance. See, e.g., City Council of Austin v. Save Our Springs Coalition, 828 S.W.2d 340 (Tex.App.-Austin 1992, no writ)(citizens sued City to force election on the Ordinance). The trial court, however, struck the plea in intervention, leaving the City to defend the Ordinance.
The Petitioners and the City proceeded to try the case to a jury. The jury answered "yes" to all the questions in the charge inquiring whether the Ordinance and its impervious cover limitations, its prohibition against increases in pollution constituents, and its failure to contain variances were an unreasonable, arbitrary, and inefficient attempt to control water quality. The jury also found that the Ordinance was not a proper subject for the initiative and referendum process and that the Ordinance regulated the number, use, and size of buildings in the City's extraterritorial jurisdiction (a violation of section 212.003 of the Texas Local Government Code).
Based on the jury's answers, the trial court rendered judgment for the Petitioners declaring the Ordinance null and void. The trial court's final judgment also contained conclusions of law, including that the Ordinance was ineffective because the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission had not approved it and that the Ordinance was void because it was enacted without a public hearing in violation of section 212.002 of the Local Government Code. The trial court further decreed that any permit required by Petitioner Circle C Land Corporation to develop its property would be subject only to the law in effect when the original application for preliminary subdivision approval was filed, which, in some cases, pre-dated the enactment of the Ordinance.
The court of appeals reversed and rendered in part and modified in part the trial court's judgment. 930 S.W.2d 678. The appellate court first determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking the Alliance's plea in intervention. 930 S.W.2d at 683. The court of appeals then concluded that the trial court erred in rendering judgment that the Ordinance was unreasonable, arbitrary, and inefficient pursuant to section 26.177(d) of the Texas Water Code because section 26.177(d) was unconstitutional under article II, section 1 of the Texas Constitution, the separation of powers provision. Id. at 685. The court of appeals further held that the Ordinance was not illegally enacted because (1) it did not require approval by the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission before it could become effective, (2) it was not subject to sections 212.002 and 212 .003 of the Local Government Code, and (3) it was a proper subject of the initiative and referendum process. Id. at 686-91. The appellate court accordingly reversed the trial court's judgment in part and rendered judgment that the Ordinance was a valid legislative act. The court of appeals also modified the trial court's judgment in part, holding that any permit required by Circle C would be considered only under the regulations and ordinances in effect when the original application for preliminary subdivision approval was filed, as long as the permit application was filed after September 1, 1987. Id. at 693-94.
Petitioners challenged the court of appeals' judgment by filing an application for writ of error with this Court. Petitioners allege that the court of appeals erred by holding (1) that section 26.177(d) of the Water Code is unconstitutional as a violation of separation of powers, (2) that the Ordinance is not subject to sections 212.002 and 212.003 of the Local Government Code, (3) that the Ordinance is effective without the City first obtaining the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission's approval, (4) that the Ordinance was a proper subject of the initiative and referendum process, and (5) that only Circle C's permit applications filed after September 1, 1987 would be considered on the basis of the regulations and ordinances in effect at that time. The Alliance also filed its own application for writ of error, contending that the court of appeals erred in upholding the trial court's striking of its plea in intervention.
We first consider the constitutionality of section 26.177(d) of the Texas Water Code. Section 26.177(d) provides in pertinent part:
Any person affected by any ... ordinance... relating to water pollution control and abatement outside the corporate limits of such city adopted pursuant to this section or any other statutory authorization may appeal such action to the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission or district court.... The issue on appeal is whether the action or program is invalid, arbitrary, unreasonable, inefficient, or ineffective in its attempt to control water quality. The commission or district court may overturn or modify the action of the city.
Tex. Water Code § 26.177(d).
The trial court submitted several questions to the jury inquiring whether various provisions of the Ordinance were "unreasonable," "arbitrary," or "inefficient." Based on the jury's affirmative answers to these questions, the court then rendered judgment that the Ordinance was invalid under section 26.177(d).
The court of appeals, however, concluded that section 26.177(d) violates the separation of powers doctrine of the Texas Constitution because it requires a de novo review of a legislative act. The court of appeals reasoned that the trial court conducted a de novo review of the statute as evidenced by the court's charge asking the jury to determine, by a preponderance of the evidence,...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Troy Twp.
...286 N.W.2d 792, 797 (N.D. 1979) ; Weeks v. Personnel Bd. of Review, 118 R.I. 243, 373 A.2d 176, 177–78 (1977) ; Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 114–15 (Tex. 1998).8 For example, a drainage complaint filed with a county board against a neighboring landowner could instead be filed as a......
-
HNMC, Inc. v. Chan
...a de novo standard, we conduct an independent analysis of the record to arrive at our own legal conclusion. See Quick v. City of Austin , 7 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. 1998) ; Rieves v. Buc-ee's Ltd. , 532 S.W.3d 845, 850 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).2. APPLICABLE LAW To prove a......
-
Bates v. Tesar
...statute operates to deprive the party of all such rights that have not become vested or reduced to final judgment. Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 128 (Tex.1998). A savings clause, however, operates to preserve certain rights, remedies, or privileges that the general enactment would ......
-
Ppg Industries v. Jmb/Houston Centers
...to immediately deprive the party of all rights that have not become vested or been reduced to final judgment. Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 128 (Tex. 1999); see also Knight, 627 S.W.2d at 384; Nat'l Carloading Corp. v. Phoenix-El Paso Express, Inc., 142 Tex. 141, 176 S.W.2d 564, 56......
-
CHAPTER 2 Standards of Review and Scope of Review
...trial court rulings arising during the pre-trial, trial, and post-trial stages of litigation.--------Notes:[1] Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. 1998).[2] W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 38 St. Mary's L.J. 47, 58 (2006).[3] Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109......