Elozar v. State
Decision Date | 26 March 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 5D02-3732.,5D02-3732. |
Citation | 872 So.2d 934 |
Parties | Tony ELOZAR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Anne Moorman Reeves, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Robin A. Compton, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
Tony Elozar appeals the sentences imposed upon remand from this court in Elozar v. State, 825 So.2d 490 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (Elozar I). He raises two issues that have merit: 1) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive minimum mandatory sentences for two counts of robbery with a firearm; and 2) the sentences for both robbery with a firearm and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony violate the double jeopardy clause of the Florida and federal constitutions. See U.S. Const., amend. V; Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. Because the factual background is not important to the resolution of these issues, we will immediately proceed to address each issue in the order presented.
Resolution of the first issue revolves around the provisions of section 775.087(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1999),1 which states:
It is the intent of the Legislature that offenders who actually possess, carry, display, use, threaten to use, or attempt to use firearms or destructive devices be punished to the fullest extent of the law, and the minimum terms of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this subsection shall be imposed for each qualifying felony count for which the person is convicted. The court shall impose any term of imprisonment provided for in this subsection consecutively to any other term of imprisonment imposed for any other felony offense.
In order to determine whether this statute requires imposition of consecutive minimum mandatory sentences, even for crimes arising from the same criminal episode, the courts have struggled to discern the Legislature's intent in enacting this statute. "To determine legislative intent, [a court] must consider the act as a whole—'the evil to be corrected, the language of the act, including its title, the history of its enactment, and the state of the law already in existence bearing on the subject.'" State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820, 824 (Fla.1981) (emphasis deleted) (quoting Foley v. State ex rel. Gordon, 50 So.2d 179, 184 (Fla.1951) (quoting Curry v. Lehman, 55 Fla. 847, 47 So. 18, 19 (1908))); see also State v. Patterson, 694 So.2d 55, 58 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
It is rather obvious from the provisions of section 775.087(2)(d) that the evil to be corrected is the use of firearms by felons during the commission of certain crimes. Consideration of this factor would certainly lead to the conclusion that the Legislature intended that minimum mandatory sentences be imposed consecutively rather than concurrently so that the harshest penalty could be imposed on felons who use firearms. However, when the state of the law at the time the statute was enacted is considered along with the statutory language that intent becomes far less obvious.
§ 775.087(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1981). The court held that the minimum mandatory sentences under section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (1981), could not be imposed consecutively for offenses that arose out of the same criminal episode. The court arrived at this conclusion after it discovered that "[n]owhere in the language of section 775.087 do we find express authority by which a trial court may deny, under subsection 775.087(2), a defendant eligibility for parole for a period greater than three calendar years." Palmer, 438 So.2d at 3. The court also analyzed the provisions of section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (1981), and likewise found nothing indicating the Legislature's intent to allow consecutive minimum mandatory sentences for offenses that arose out of the same criminal episode.
In State v. Christian, 692 So.2d 889 (Fla.1997), the Florida Supreme Court addressed the issue of stacking minimum mandatory sentences in cases where one firearm is used in a continuous criminal episode. The court analyzed the provisions of sections 775.087 and 775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), but found nothing in either statute that would indicate the Legislature's intent that stacking of minimum mandatory sentences should be required. Therefore, the court looked to caselaw for the answer, including its prior decision in Palmer, and held:
As a general rule, for offenses arising from a single episode, stacking is permissible where the violations of the mandatory minimum statutes cause injury to multiple victims, or multiple injuries to one victim. The injuries bifurcate the crimes for stacking purposes. The stacking of firearm mandatory minimum terms thus is permissible where the defendant shoots at multiple victims, and impermissible where the defendant does not fire the weapon.
Christian, 692 So.2d at 890-91 (footnotes omitted). This was the state of the law prior to enactment of section 775.087(2)(d) in 1999.
What is significant about Palmer and Christian, besides the fact that they both pre-date section 775.087(2)(d), is the court's clear holding that it could not find any legislative authority in the statutes it analyzed for stacking minimum mandatory sentences arising out of the same episode. Recent decisions of the Florida courts that have specifically interpreted and applied section 775.087(2)(d) do not find such legislative authority in that statute either. See Arutyunyan v. State, 863 So.2d 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Perreault v. State, 853 So.2d 604 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Green v. State, 845 So.2d 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Wilchcombe v. State, 842 So.2d 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Cunningham v. State, 838 So.2d 627 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Stafford v. State, 818 So.2d 693 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); see also Williams v. State, 820 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).
These decisions, after considering all of the language of section 775.087(2)(d), focused on the language that expressly provides that "[t]he court shall impose any term of imprisonment provided for in this subsection consecutively to any other term of imprisonment imposed for any other felony offense." § 775.087(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2003) (emphasis added). In Mondesir v. State, 814 So.2d 1172, 1173 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), the court held that "[m]erely on the face of the statute, the reference to `any other` felony refers, as in this case, only to another separate crime, rather than those involved in a single prosecution." (Footnote omitted). The court indicated that this interpretation was especially appropriate in light of the doctrine of lenity that requires that any doubts about statutory interpretation be resolved in favor of the defendant. See § 775.021(a), Fla. Stat. (2001).2 In adopting the rationale in Mondesir, this court and others have held that consecutive minimum mandatory sentences for offenses arising out of the same criminal episode are forbidden; but if the offenses do not arise out of the same episode, then the trial court has discretion to impose concurrent of consecutive sentences. Perreault; Wilchcombe; Cunningham; Stafford; see also Smith v. State, 867 So.2d 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Hence, after analyzing the language of the statute and the state of the law at the time it was enacted, the courts are still unable to find legislative authority in section 775.087(2)(d) for consecutive minimum mandatory sentences for offenses arising out of the same criminal episode. Therefore, the rationale of the court in Christian and Palmer remains applicable when determining whether consecutive minimum mandatory sentences for firearm offenses are appropriate. See Perreault (citing Cook v. State, 775 So.2d 425 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)); State v. Parker, 812 So.2d 495 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
Here, the State does not contest Elozar's contention that the robbery offenses arose out of the same criminal episode and that there were no injuries to multiple victims or multiple injuries to a single victim.3 Therefore, Elozar's sentences for the two robbery convictions must be reversed and this case remanded so the trial court can impose concurrent minimum mandatory sentences for those two offenses.
As to the second issue, Elozar...
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