Elstrom v. Independent School Dist. No. 270

• Decision Date: 06 June 1995
• Docket Number: No. C3-94-2626,C3-94-2626
• Citation: 533 N.W.2d 51
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals
• Parties: 100 Ed. Law Rep. 733 Martha ELSTROM, Appellant, v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 270, Hopkins, Minnesota, Respondent.

Page 51

533 N.W.2d 51

100 Ed. Law Rep. 733

Martha ELSTROM, Appellant, v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 270, Hopkins, Minnesota, Respondent.

No. C3-94-2626.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

June 6, 1995.

Review Denied July 27, 1995.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A defamatory statement is protected by a qualified privilege if the communication was made upon a proper occasion, with proper motive, and on reasonable grounds, unless common law malice is shown.

2. A public school teacher is a public official and actual malice must be proved in order to recover damages.

3. Proof of severe emotional distress must be shown to establish an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

4. If a defamation claim that supports a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim fails, the distress claim also fails.

Paul A. Sortland, Sortland Law Office, Minneapolis, for appellant.

William J. Egan, Amy K. Adams, Rider, Bennett, Egan & Arundel, Minneapolis, for respondent.

Considered and decided by LANSING, P.J., and SCHUMACHER and PETERSON, JJ.

OPINION

SCHUMACHER, Judge.

Appellant Martha Elstrom challenges summary judgment on her claims for defamation and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court found that qualified privilege protected two of the allegedly defamatory documents, and that Elstrom was a public official and her failure to show actual malice precluded recovery on the remaining document. The court also found that Elstrom did not allege facts establishing an emotional distress claim. We affirm.

FACTS

Elstrom was a teacher with respondent Independent School District No. 270, Hopkins, Minnesota, from 1963 until 1992, at which time her teaching contract with the school district was terminated for reasons other than those which are the subject matter of this lawsuit. On February 13, 1991, her class at Hopkins High School digressed into a brief discussion of physical attributes associated with race, during which Elstrom commented on characteristics of Asian Americans, African Americans and Caucasians.

The next day, Elstrom was confronted by several students who apparently overheard her in the Language Arts office make critical comments about an African-American honor student's paper. They questioned her about commenting on the relative intelligence of African Americans. Elstrom denied making certain statements, but said she knew of intelligence studies ranking Asians above Caucasians and Caucasians above African Americans, although she questioned their validity. She later discussed this with other teachers, again citing studies. Before class that day, Elstrom asked the only African-American student in the English class if she had been upset by the prior day's discussion. Elstrom claims the student said it had not bothered her.

On February 19, 1991, two racial bias complaints were filed with the district, alleging that Elstrom had made racist remarks in the English class and to staff members while students were present and had forcibly grabbed two students by the arm. Complaints were also filed with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights.

Diane Cowdery, coordinator of affirmative action and human resources, investigated. Her notes from student interviews show that students said physical characteristics of all races were discussed in the classroom discussion, and several students did not believe Elstrom's comments were racist. A teacher recalled Elstrom saying she had discussed physical characteristics, then told the class about the intelligence studies.

Cowdery documented her findings in a memo to Arthur Bruning, the district superintendent. She found that Elstrom had presented "culturally insensitive" information that perpetuated negative stereotypes in the classroom discussion, which had been humiliating for the only African-American student in the class. She also found that Elstrom loudly discussed these incidents in the Language Arts office and defended her statements as documented fact. Cowdery stated that Elstrom's conduct violated district professional standards. Bruning then prepared a response to the human rights complaints, indicating the investigation revealed substantial evidence that Elstrom had made improper comments, perpetuating negative stereotypes.

Elstrom was suspended for 10 days. On April 30, 1991, Thomas Bauman, the principal, sent a letter to students and parents announcing Elstrom's return. The letter said Elstrom had been absent following a report that she had made "inappropriate comments" in class that were found to have "perpetuated negative racial stereotypes" and that Elstrom "expressed regret" over the incident.

The media reported the incidents. Elstrom claims that as a result she suffered from sleeplessness, a fear of answering her door and telephone, crying spells, and depression and, further, that it was difficult for her to be at school. She believed her reputation suffered as a result of the incidents.

Elstrom sued the district for defamation, based on the Cowdery memo, Bruning response, and Bauman letter, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment for the district on all of Elstrom's claims.

ISSUES

1. Did the district court err in finding, as a matter of law, that the Cowdery memo and Bruning response are protected by a qualified privilege and that there was no proof of actual malice?

2. Did the district court err in ruling that a public school teacher is a public official for defamation purposes and Elstrom therefore had to show actual malice to recover?

3. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on Elstrom's emotional distress claims?

ANALYSIS

When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we determine whether issues of material fact exist and whether the district court erred in applying the law. Wartnick v. Moss & Barnett, 490 N.W.2d 108, 112 (Minn.1992). We view facts in the light most favorable to the nonprevailing party; doubts and factual inferences are also resolved in that party's favor. Id.

1. Qualified Privilege. A defamatory statement is one communicated by a defendant to someone other than the plaintiff that is false and tends to harm the plaintiff's reputation. Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn.1980). A defamatory statement may be protected by a qualified privilege. Id. at 256-57.

To be privileged, a communication must be made on a proper occasion, with a proper motive, and be based upon reasonable grounds. Id. Whether a proper occasion and motive exist are questions of law. Brooks v. Doherty, Rumble & Butler, 481 N.W.2d 120, 125 (Minn.App.1992), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 29, 1992). Whether reasonable grounds exist also is a question of law unless different conclusions can be reached, thus raising a jury question. Id.

Elstrom claims reasonable grounds did not exist for the statements made in the Cowdery memo and Bruning response. We disagree. Reasonable grounds can exist if a person has valid reasons for believing a statement, even though the statement later proves to be false. Wirig v. Kinney Shoe, 461 N.W.2d 374, 380 (Minn.1990). Cowdery's statements were based on her investigation, as were Bruning's. Although some students did not find Elstrom's comments inappropriate, as Elstrom emphasizes, Cowdery considered other sources and was concerned with more than the February 13, 1991 discussion. Cowdery also was free to reach a different conclusion about the propriety of Elstrom's statements. No evidence suggests Bruning doubted the accuracy of Cowdery's memo and thus did not have reasonable grounds for his statements. The district court did not err in finding reasonable grounds existed as a matter of law.

A qualified privilege can be lost if abused. Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 257. To raise a jury question, Elstrom had to allege facts showing Cowdery and Bruning acted with ill will or for purposes of harming her. See id. (discussing actual malice). Elstrom, relying on the student interviews, has not done so.

2. Public Teacher as Public Official. ¹ A high standard of proof is imposed upon public officials seeking to recover in defamation for statements made about their official conduct. Britton v. Koep, 470 N.W.2d 518, 520 (Minn.1991). The district court ruled that a public school teacher is a public official, and Elstrom contends this was error. A plaintiff's status is a question of law. Id.

Minnesota follows Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966), in determining whether one is a public official. Britton, 470 N.W.2d at 521. At a minimum, "public official" includes government employees who have, or appear to have, significant government responsibility or control. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85, 86 S.Ct. at 676. In addition:

Where a position in government has such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and performance of all government employees * * * the New York Times malice standards apply.

Id. at 86, 86 S.Ct. at 676 (footnotes omitted).

Courts considering the status of public school teachers have split. Several have held teachers to be public officials, relying on the importance of education and the critical role teachers play in the lives of the children entrusted to their care. E.g., Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. 549, 606 A.2d 693, 710 (1992); Johnston v. Corinthian Tele. Corp., 583 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Okla.1978); see also Johnson v. Robbinsdale Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 281, 827 F.Supp. 1439, 1443 (D.Minn.1993) (concluding Minnesota would find public school principal to be public official). But see, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Lipscomb, 234 Va. 277, 362 S.E.2d 32, 37 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1023, 108 S.Ct. 1997, 100 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988) (teacher is not public official).

We conclude that a public school teacher...