Eminence R-1 School Dist. v. Hodge
| Decision Date | 08 June 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,R-III,No. 63042,R-1,63042,2 |
| Citation | 635 S.W.2d 10 |
| Parties | 5 Ed. Law Rep. 303 EMINENCESCHOOL DISTRICT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J. D. HODGE, et al., Defendants-Respondents, and BunkerSchool District, et al., Intervenors-Defendants-Respondents |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
John Gianoulakis, Miriam C. Rogers, St. Louis, Daniel L. Moody, Van Buren, for plaintiff-appellant.
Randy P. Schuller, L. Dwayne Hackworth, Piedmont, for defendants-respondents and intervenors-defendants-respondents.
This is a suit by Appellant Eminence R-1 School District for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Eminence seeks a determination that pursuant to § 12.070, RSMo 1978, 1 it is entitled to a mandatory distribution of forest reserve funds derived from the Mark Twain National Forest Reserve. Respondents, three Shannon County school districts that are situated wholly or partly within the national forest, contend that although Eminence is eligible to receive forest reserve funds under § 12.070, it is not necessarily entitled to a distribution of these funds. The trial court found that Eminence may be excluded from receiving forest reserve funds under § 12.070. The crucial issue is whether Eminence, a school district lying adjacent to the national forest, is entitled to a mandatory distribution of forest reserve funds under § 12.070. Because this appeal involves the construction of a state revenue statute, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Mo.Const.Art. V, § 3.
The facts are stipulated. Pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 500, 2 the State of Missouri receives twenty-five percent of all revenues derived by the federal government from the Mark Twain National Forest Reserve. The state is free to apply these forest reserve funds in any manner as long as the specified purposes of the federal statute are met, namely, to benefit public schools and roads of the counties in which the national forest reserve is situated. King County v. Seattle School District No. 1, 263 U.S. 361, 364, 44 S.Ct. 127, 128, 68 L.Ed. 339, 341 (1923). Pursuant to § 12.070, Shannon County receives a share of the forest reserve funds based upon the proportional number of acres of the national forest located within the county. Section 12.070 mandates that seventy-five percent of the funds shall be expended for the benefit of school districts located partly, or wholly within, or adjacent to the national forest, and twenty-five percent shall be expended for the benefit of county roads within these school districts.
There are seven school districts or portions of school districts located in Shannon County. Of these, only the three respondent school districts have land within the national forest. 3 Eminence has land adjacent to, but not within, the forest.
Prior to 1977, all forest reserve funds received for the benefit of those school districts situated partly or wholly within or adjacent to the national forest were distributed based upon the proportional area of forest reserve land located within each school district as compared to the total national forest acreage within the county. This distribution method will hereinafter be referred to as the "acreage formula." As mentioned, Eminence does not have any forest reserve land located within its boundaries, but does have forest land adjacent thereto. Consequently, Eminence received no forest reserve funds prior to 1977.
In 1977, ten percent of the funds received by Shannon County were apportioned by the acreage formula. Ninety percent of the funds were apportioned by a so-called "inverse assessed valuation formula." Pursuant to that formula, Eminence received a portion of the distribution. Needless to say, had the acreage formula been used exclusively, Eminence would have received no forest reserve funds in 1977.
The instant litigation arose when the Shannon County Court attempted to apply the acreage formula exclusively for funds received in 1978 and 1979. By stipulation of the parties, $23,000 of the funds received for the years 1978 and 1979 were paid to Eminence. It was further stipulated that $43,000, which is the object of the instant litigation, would be paid into the registry of the Circuit Court pending determination of the following issue: "Under Section 12.070 ... can National Forest Service monies be legally distributed by the Shannon County Court so as to exclude totally (Eminence), which boundaries lie adjacent to the Mark Twain National Forest?"
If the foregoing question is answered affirmatively, then the $43,000 plus accrued interest will be apportioned by the acreage formula and distributed to respondents. If the question is answered negatively, then the money will be distributed to Eminence.
The parties also requested the Circuit Court to decide the following stipulated issue for the purposes of declaratory relief only, and not being determinative of the distribution of the $43,000: "Under § 12.070 ... does the Shannon County Court have discretion to distribute money to (Eminence) ...?" The trial court answered both stipulated questions affirmatively.
On this appeal, Eminence contends that the county court must distribute forest reserve funds to a school district, such as Eminence, that lies adjacent to a national forest reserve; hence, the trial court erred in answering the first stipulated issue in the affirmative. We disagree.
Before construing the Missouri statute, we make some initial observations about the federal statute. The pertinent part of 16 U.S.C. § 500 provides as follows:
(T)wenty-five per centum of all moneys received during any fiscal year from each national forest shall be paid ... to the State ... in which such national forest is situated, to be expended as the State ... legislature may prescribe for the benefit of the public schools and public roads of the county or counties in which such national forest is situated ....
As mentioned previously, this provision clearly allows the states to distribute the forest reserve funds in any manner as long as the specified purposes of the statute are met, namely, to benefit public schools and roads of the counties in which the national forest is situated. King County v. Seattle School District No. 1, supra. It is also apparent that the funds distributed to the states are not based upon tax revenues lost due to government ownership of forest reserve lands. Thus, the federal statute cannot be viewed strictly as an in lieu of tax provision.
Although there is conflict as to whether the payments under 16 U.S.C. § 500 constitute a trust for the benefit of counties in recognition of the national interest in education and roadbuilding, Trinity Independent School District v. Walker County, 287 S.W.2d 717, 722 (Tex.Civ.App.1956), or an absolute grant or gift to the states, King County v. Seattle School District No. 1, supra, it would appear that Congress intended to aid schools and roads upon which the impact of the federal presence falls most heavily.
In light of these observations, we turn to the Missouri statute. Section 12.070 provides in pertinent part: "The funds shall be used to aid in maintaining the schools and roads of those school districts that lie or are situated partly or wholly within or adjacent to the national forest in the county." (Emphasis added.) Eminence would argue that the use of word "shall" mandatorily requires a distribution to all eligible school districts, i.e., those that are partly or wholly within or adjacent to the national forest.
The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider words used in the statute in their plain and ordinary meaning. State v. Kraus, 530 S.W.2d 684, 685 (Mo. banc 1975). Legislative intent and the meaning of words used in the statute can in many instances be found from the general purposes of the legislative enactment. Bank of Crestwood v. Gravois Bank, 616 S.W.2d 505, 510 (Mo. banc 1981). Another aid in ascertaining legislative intent is the rule that the entire act must be construed together and all provisions must be harmonized, if reasonably possible, and every word, clause, sentence, and section given some meaning. City of Willow Springs v. Missouri State Librarian, 596 S.W.2d 441, 446 (Mo. banc 1980).
At the outset we note that § 12.070 does not provide for a distribution of funds based upon the percentage of tax revenues lost by each school district. This fact coupled with the explicit inclusion of the word "adjacent" indicates to this Court a legislative intent not to provide in lieu of tax payments inasmuch as an adjacent school district does not contain forest reserve lands which could be subject to local taxation.
Thus, we find the preferable interpretation of legislative...
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