Employers' Liability Assur. Corporation v. Light

• Citation: 275 S.W. 685
• Decision Date: 24 June 1925
• Docket Number: (No. 6876.)
• Parties: EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSUR. CORPORATION, Limited, v. LIGHT et al.<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas

275 S.W. 685

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSUR. CORPORATION, Limited, v. LIGHT et al.^*

(No. 6876.)

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Austin.

June 24, 1925.

Rehearing Denied October 14, 1925.

Appeal from District Court, Llano County; J. H. McLean, Judge.

Suit by the Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Limited, against Mrs. Minnie Light and others to set aside an award, by the Industrial Accident Board, of compensation for the death of defendant's husband. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Vinson, Elkins, Wood & Sweeton, of Houston, for appellant.

King & York, of Austin, for appellees.

BAUGH, J.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the district court of Llano County, awarding appellees compensation against appellant, under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law. See Gen. Laws of 1917, c. 103; V. S. 1918 Supp. to Civ. Stats. arts. 5246 — 1 to 5246 — 91. The suit in the trial court was brought to set aside an award by the Industrial Accident Board of Compensation to Mrs. Minnie Light and her children for 360 weeks, at $13.85 per week, on account of the death of the husband and father while in the employ of the Dealers' Granite Corporation, which carried a policy under said Workmen's Compensation Law with appellant company.

The chief question raised on the appeal, as in the lower court, is whether or not the injury which caused the death of James D. Light was received by him in the "course of his employment."

The Dealers' Granite Corporation, at the time of the injury, operated a granite quarry on 8¼ acres of land about 12 miles southwest of the town of Llano in Llano county, leased by it for that purpose, and situated out in a pasture about 3 miles from the public road running into the town of Llano. The lease which gave the corporation the right to operate the quarry contained, among others, the following provisions:

"(5) The second party, for the purpose of operating and working said land and the quarry or quarries thereon now opened up or which may hereafter be opened up and taking of granite stone from said land hereunder, shall have the right of ingress and egress, on, upon, over, and across, said 8¼ acres of land and any other lands of the first party over the route and road now established and used in going to and from the granite quarry in and upon said 8¼ acres of land, known as the Kothe quarry, to the public road, known as the Llano and Six Mile road, leading to the town of Llano, and over the most direct and practicable route from any quarry or quarries which the second party may open up on said land hereby leased to the said road leading from said Kothe quarry to the said Llano and Six Mile public road."

"(13) The second party obligates and binds himself to see that all gates and gate posts of the first party are replaced if torn down by his employees, and further agrees to see that all gates used by him in passing to and from said land and quarries thereon are kept closed by his employees."

The testimony also conclusively showed that this road was a private road, a part of which had been built by the Dealers' Granite Corporation, and was the only way by which granite could be removed from the quarry to Llano, the nearest railroad point, and the only route by which employees of said corporation could reach the quarry from the town of Llano. Due to lack of facilities and accommodations at the quarry, most of the employees lived in Llano, went to their work in the morning, and returned home at night by traveling the public road about 9 miles out from Llano, entering a gate into the Stewart pasture, and then about 3 miles over the private road through the pasture to and from the quarry. The deceased, along with the other employees, had gone to the quarry on the day of the injury, and had worked there until about noon, when a rain prevented further work for that day. When the rain stopped the work, he, along with several other employees, started to return to their homes at Llano, riding on a light truck belonging to an employee, one Felix Hopson, under a private arrangement between them. Hopson habitually hauled employees back and forth over this route for hire, worked for the corporation himself, and also hauled granite for them from the quarry into the town of Llano. On the day in question, while en route to the public road over this private road through the pasture, and when about 1¼ miles from the quarry, James D. Light slipped from the truck on which he was riding, and was run over and was killed.

The Dealers' Granite Corporation furnished no transportation for its employees to or from the quarry. Their time began at the quarry and stopped when they quit work. They worked by the day, and the deceased was being paid $4 per day of 9 hours at the time of his death. Under these facts and circumstances it is the contention of the appellant that Light ceased to be an employee of the Dealers' Granite Corporation when he left the quarry, was not in the course of his employment at the time of his death, but was subject to risks incident to the public in general in traveling this road, and not therefore entitled to compensation.

We do not agree with this contention. Nor shall we enter into any extended discussion of the issue here presented. Both appellant and appellee have cited us to numerous cases from other states in support of their respective contentions, but, as stated in the case of American Indemnity Co. v. Dinkins (Tex. Civ. App.) 211 S. W. 952, which is the Texas case chiefly relied upon by appellant, the decisions of other states are not of great service in construing the Texas act as to what is meant by the phrase "injury sustained in the course of employment." When the Legislature undertook to define this language by express provisions of the act itself, it of necessity rejected the definitions and judicial constructions placed thereon by the courts of other states. After setting out injuries not included (none of which have any application to this case), the act provides that such injury —

"shall include all other injuries of every kind and character having to do with and originating in the work, business, trade or profession of the employer received by an employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer whether upon the employer's premises or elsewhere." Section 1 of part 4, c. 103, Gen. Laws 1917; 1918 Supp. to V. S. R. S. art. 5246 — 82.

We need not now go to the decisions of other states in the interpretation and application of our statute to the case before us. It has been the uniform practice of our courts to give to the terms of the act a most liberal application, to the end that it may most effectively fulfill and discharge the humanitarian purposes for which it was enacted. American Indemnity Co. v. Dinkins, supra; Millers' Mut. Casualty Co. v. Hoover (Tex. Com. App.) 235 S. W. 863, and cases there cited; Employers' Indemnity Corp. v. Felter (Tex. Civ. App.) 264 S. W. 137. Nor are there any now questions presented to us in the case before us. We think this case under the undisputed facts comes clearly within the principles enunciated and the rules laid down in the able and exhaustive opinion of Judge Greenwood in Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken et al., 112 Tex. 103, 246 S. W. 72, and in Kirby Lbr. Co. v. Scurlock, 112 Tex. 115, 246 S. W. 76.

The facts in the Behnken Case were very similar to those in the instant case, and practically the same condition and circumstances differentiate this case from the Dinkins Case, relied upon by appellant, as differentiated the Behnken Case therefrom. Dinkin was killed upon a public street entirely away from his place of employment, on which all the public had equal rights to travel and equal risks of injury separate and...