Employment Sec. Com'n of Wyoming v. Bryant

• Decision Date: 21 August 1985
• Docket Number: 84-209,Nos. 84-208,s. 84-208
• Citation: 704 P.2d 1311
• Parties: EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF WYOMING, Appellant (Respondent), v. In the Matter of Petition of Paul Kruger BRYANT, III, For Review of the Appeal Decision of Employment Security Commission of Wyoming Concerning the Claim of Paul Kruger Bryant, III, Claimant, and Cathedral Home For Children, Employer, Appellee (Petitioner). CATHEDRAL HOME FOR CHILDREN, Appellant (Employer), v. In the Matter of Petition of Paul Kruger BRYANT, III, For Review of the Appeal Decision of Employment Security Commission of Wyoming Concerning the Claim of Paul Kruger Bryant, III, Claimant, and Cathedral Home For Children, Employer, Appellee (Petitioner), v. EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF WYOMING (Respondent).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 1311

704 P.2d 1311

EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF WYOMING, Appellant (Respondent), v. In the Matter of Petition of Paul Kruger BRYANT, III, For Review of the Appeal Decision of Employment Security Commission of Wyoming Concerning the Claim of Paul Kruger Bryant, III, Claimant, and Cathedral Home For Children, Employer, Appellee (Petitioner).

CATHEDRAL HOME FOR CHILDREN, Appellant (Employer), v. In the Matter of Petition of Paul Kruger BRYANT, III, For Review of the Appeal Decision of Employment Security Commission of Wyoming Concerning the Claim of Paul Kruger Bryant, III, Claimant, and Cathedral Home For Children, Employer, Appellee (Petitioner), v. EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF WYOMING (Respondent).

Nos. 84-208, 84-209.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Aug. 21, 1985.

Philip Nicholas of Corthell and King, Laramie, for appellant Cathedral Home for Children.

Joe Scott, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Casper, for appellant Employment Security Commission of Wyoming.

Caroline A. Papa, Laramie, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, Justice.

The Employment Security Commission of Wyoming (ESC) disqualified appellee Paul Kruger Bryant from certain benefits. The district court reversed the decision of the ESC, restoring appellee to benefits. Both the ESC and the employer, Cathedral Home for Children (Cathedral Home) appeal the decision of the district court.

We will reverse.

According to the ESC the issues are:

"A. Whether the Employment Security Commission of Wyoming erred by basing its decision solely on the evidence introduced at the examiner hearing on this matter and not considering as evidence certain written statements of the parties that are part of the record in this matter, but not introduced into evidence at the examiner hearing, and not considering as evidence the fact that there was a lower level determination in favor of claimant Paul Kruger Bryant, III?

"B. Whether the Employment Security Commission of Wyoming's decision is supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record and is in conformity with law?"

According to the Cathedral Home the single issue is:

"Is the decision of the Employment Security Division supported by substantial evidence?"

The only issue we need address is the substantial evidence issue. ¹

Appellee Bryant was employed by appellant Cathedral Home from February, 1982 until July, 1982. On or about July 1, 1982, Bryant and a fellow employee, Bill Waines, were involved in an altercation. According to the "incident reports" prepared by Cathedral Home personnel, Waines lost his temper and "grabbed" Bryant. Bryant characterizes the encounter as an assault while an appeals examiner's characterization was "physical confrontation."

After Waines regained that which he had previously lost, to-wit, his temper, he apologized to Bryant for his behavior. Bryant filed a criminal complaint against Waines and the latter either pled guilty to, or was found guilty of, an assault and fined $5.

Immediately after the incident with Waines, Bryant left the work site. He returned in about 90 minutes with a handwritten letter of resignation. Bryant filed a claim for unemployment benefits following his separation from the Cathedral Home. On March 10, 1983, a deputy from ESC issued a determination which disqualified Bryant from benefits for eight weeks (July 4 through August 28, 1982) on the ground that he voluntarily quit his work with the Cathedral Home without good cause. On March 14, 1983, Bryant appealed, and the deputy issued a redetermination which held Bryant entitled to benefits without disqualification. At this point the Cathedral Home appealed.

The matter was referred to the ESC's appeals examiner who conducted a hearing on August 2, 1983. Bryant did not attend the hearing. The examiner issued a decision reversing the deputy's redetermination, disqualifying Bryant for eight weeks of benefits for voluntarily quitting without good cause. Bryant appealed this decision to the ESC, which affirmed the examiner's action.

On November 16, 1983, Bryant filed a petition for judicial review of the ESC's final decision with the District Court for Albany County. The district court found Bryant had good cause to quit, reversed the ESC's decision disqualifying Bryant for benefits, and awarded benefits to Bryant without disqualification.

On July 20, 1984, the ESC filed a notice of appeal of the district court's decision to the Wyoming Supreme Court. On the same day, the Cathedral Home filed a similar notice of appeal.

I

Both appellants, the Cathedral Home and the ESC, speculate that the district court may have been influenced by Bryant's written statements and/or letters appearing in the record, but not introduced into evidence nor noticed by the appeals examiner or the ESC. Appellee contends that the decisions of the appeals examiner and the ESC were based on incompetent evidence. ²

This is a poor case to discuss the rules of evidence before an administrative agency or the mechanics of noticing materials in the files or otherwise as part of the basis for a decision. Furthermore, this is not the case for this court to attempt to reconcile the mandate in § 16-3-107(r), W.S.1977 ("Findings of fact shall be based exclusively on the evidence and matter officially noticed"), with the mandate in § 16-3-109 ("The agency shall consider the whole record or any portion stipulated to by the parties"). We say that this case does not lend itself to a meaningful discussion of those matters because:

1. The hearing before the appeals examiner was informal and so far as we can tell, only one lawyer was involved.

2. The transcript of evidence is taken from a tape recording and is not letter-perfect.

3. Appellee did not testify nor introduce evidence.

4. We do not know whether the hearing examiner, the ESC or the district court considered matters other than the evidence produced at the administrative hearing.

More significantly, however, we need not discuss some legal matters suggested by counsel because they are unnecessary to our determination. Under the standard of review set out hereinafter, it does not make any difference if the trial court considered materials not offered or admitted into evidence or considered facts not noticed by the administrative agency. We therefore need not address the first issue raised by the ESC.

II

We believe that our review of this case should be limited to a determination of whether the ESC's decision disqualifying Bryant for benefits is supported by substantial evidence and is in conformity with law.

Review of this matter is governed by § 16-3-114(c), W.S.1977 (October 1982 Replacement), which reads:

"(c) To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

"(i) Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and

"(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:

"(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law;

"(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

"(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory right;

"(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; or

"(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute."

In an appeal from a decision of an administrative agency, we are obliged to review the appeal as though it came directly to this court from the agency. We are not bound to accept any of the conclusions reached in the district court. Wyoming State Department of Education v. Barber, Wyo., 649 P.2d 681 (1982).

In Matter of North Laramie Land Company, Wyo., 605 P.2d 367, 373 (1980), we said:

" * * * [T]he district court is sitting in a role similar to that of an intermediate court of appeals. On a subsequent appeal to this court, we give no special deference to the decision of the district court but rather independently review the matter using the same materials and the same standards used by the district court. [Citations.] * * * The questions posed to the district court in this intermediate appellate setting are purely questions of law. All fact questions have been decided and resolved by the hearing body. As a matter of appellate practice, an appellate court accords no special deference and is not bound by a district court's decision on a question of law. * * * "

In Board of Trustees of School District No. 4, Big Horn County v. Colwell, Wyo., 611 P.2d 427, 428 (1980), we said:

"For the purpose of reviewing the propriety of the district court's action, we will review the agency action as though the appeal were directly to this court from the agency. We are governed by the same rules of review as was the district court. [Citations.]

"Therefore, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the agency. * * * "

In McCulloch Gas Transmission Company v. Public Service Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 627 P.2d 173, 178 (1981), this court reviewed some basic rules about appeal from a decision of an administrative agency, and said

"[a]s an appellate court considering an appeal from an administrative agency, we must accept the agency's findings of fact when supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as supporting the agency's conclusion. [Citation.] * * * "

In an appeal from an administrative tribunal, we said:

" * * * [T]he rule adopted and followed by appellate courts here and elsewhere of deferring their...