Enchanted Estates Community Ass'n, Inc. v. Timberlake Imp. Dist., 01-91-00826-CV

• Decision Date: 25 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. 01-91-00826-CV,01-91-00826-CV
• Citation: 832 S.W.2d 800
• Parties: ENCHANTED ESTATES COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant, v. TIMBERLAKE IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, Appellee. (1st Dist.)
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 800

832 S.W.2d 800

ENCHANTED ESTATES COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant, v. TIMBERLAKE IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, Appellee.

No. 01-91-00826-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

June 25, 1992.

Rehearing Denied July 30, 1992.

Mark Burrell, Houston, for appellant.

Mark W. Brooks, Houston, for appellee.

Before OLIVER-PARROTT, C.J., and DUNN and WILSON, JJ.

OPINION

OLIVER-PARROTT, Chief Justice.

This Court is asked to determine whether the trial court properly granted a summary judgment in a suit for an alleged breach of contract in favor of appellee, Timberlake Improvement District. We find that it did not and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Background

Appellant, Enchanted Estates Community Association, Inc. (Enchanted Estates), brought suit against appellee, Timberlake Improvement District (Timberlake) to enforce a contract entered into by Timberlake and Enchanted Valley Development, a Texas joint venture (Enchanted Development). Timberlake is a governmental agency of the State of Texas that owns and operates a waste treatment plant. Enchanted Estates is a homeowners' association functioning in the form of a Texas nonprofit corporation whose members consists of homeowners in the Enchanted Valley Estates Subdivision (Enchanted Valley Subdivision) located in Harris County. The contract generally provides that Timberlake will receive and treat waste water produced by homes located within Enchanted Valley Subdivision.

Enchanted Estates brought suit for breach of contract asserting standing to enforce the contract between Timberlake and Enchanted Development as the legal successor to Enchanted Development, and as a third-party beneficiary to the contract. Enchanted Estates alleged that Timberlake breached its contract by overcharging for water and sewer services. ¹ Timberlake answered by filing a general denial and by filing a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that Enchanted Estates has no rights or status under the contract. Enchanted Estates answered Timberlake's counterclaim asserting that Timberlake, by accepting payment for disposal services rendered and in continuing to provide services as provided for in the contract, was estopped from challenging its standing to sue under the contract.

Timberlake then filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that, as a matter of law, Enchanted Estates has no right or status under the written contract and that there are no issues of material fact with respect to Enchanted Estates' status as a third-party beneficiary to the contract. The trial court granted Timberlake's motion for summary judgment. Enchanted Estates now appeals the granting of the summary judgment and contends that there are issues of material fact with respect to: (1) whether Enchanted Estates is a third-party beneficiary of the contract; (2) whether appellant is the legal successor to Enchanted Development; and (3) whether Timberlake is estopped from claiming that Enchanted Estates has no right or standing to bring suit to enforce the contract.

Standard of review

Under TEX.R.CIV.P. 166a(c), a summary judgment is proper only when a movant establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Swilley v. Hughes, 488 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex.1972); Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds, 761 S.W.2d 788, 793-94 (Tex.App.--Beaumont 1988, writ denied). In a summary judgment proceeding, the burden of proof is on the movant, and all doubts about the existence of a genuine issue of fact are resolved against the movant. Roskey v. Texas Health Facilities Comm'n, 639 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex.1982); Rogers, 761 S.W.2d at 795.

Summary judgment is proper for a defendant if its summary judgment proof establishes, as a matter of law, that there exists no genuine issue of material fact concerning one or more of the essential elements of the plaintiff's cause of action. Gray v. Betrand, 723 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Tex.1987); Goldberg v. United States Shoe Corp., 775 S.W.2d 751, 752 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied). A summary judgment for the defendant disposing of the entire case is proper only if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not succeed upon any theories pleaded. Delgado v. Burns, 656 S.W.2d 428, 428 (Tex.1983); Haven v. Tomball Community Hosp., 793 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied).

In reviewing the granting of a motion for summary judgment, this Court will take all evidence favorable to the nonmovant as true. MMP, Ltd. v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex.1986); Goldberg, 775 S.W.2d at 752. Every reasonable inference will be indulged in favor of the nonmovant, and any reasonable doubt will be resolved in its favor. Continental Casing Corp. v. Samedan Oil Corp., 751 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Tex.1988); Goldberg, 775 S.W.2d at 752.

Standing to sue under the contract

In its first and second points of error, Enchanted Estates argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Timberlake because there are issues of material fact with respect to its status as a third-party beneficiary to the contract and as the legal successor to Enchanted Development. We will first address Enchanted Estates' point of error number two wherein it asserts that the trial court erred in failing to find a fact issue as to appellant's status as legal successor.

Is Enchanted Estates a successor in interest?

To support its claim that it is the legal successor to Enchanted Development, Enchanted Estates relies solely on...