Endurance Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. United Constr. Eng'g, Inc.
Decision Date | 25 October 2018 |
Docket Number | Case No. 17-61589-CIV-WILLIAMS |
Citation | 343 F.Supp.3d 1274 |
Parties | ENDURANCE AM. SPECIALTY INS. CO., Plaintiff, v. UNITED CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING, INC., et al. Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Alicia O. Valle's Report and Recommendation (DE 43) (the "Report") regarding Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (DE 24). The Report recommends that Plaintiff's motion be granted. Defendants filed objections to the Report. (DE 44; DE 45). The Court has independently reviewed the Report, Defendants' objections, the record, and applicable case law.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Report is AFFIRMED and the analysis contained in the Report is ADOPTED and incorporated herein by reference. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (DE 24) is GRANTED for the reasons set forth in the Report.
Having granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that this case is DISMISSED. All pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT. All hearings, trial settings, and deadlines are CANCELED. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
DONE AND ORDERED in chambers in Miami, Florida, this 25th day of October, 2018.
THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Plaintiff Endurance American Specialty Insurance Company's ("Plaintiff") Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Motion"). (ECF No. 24). United States District Judge Kathleen Williams has referred the Motion to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 36); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636. The Court has reviewed the Motion, the record, all supporting and opposing filings, the exhibits attached thereto, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the Motion be GRANTED .
This is a declaratory judgment action stemming from an insurance coverage dispute. See (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff seeks interpretation of an insurance policy that it issued to Defendant United Construction Engineering, Inc. ("UCE").1 Id. More specifically, Plaintiff seeks a judgment declaring that it has no duty to defend or indemnify UCE in a personal injury lawsuit filed against it in state court by Defendant Carlos Marroquin Lopez ("Lopez"). Id. Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment, arguing that Lopez's state-court lawsuit is barred by the Policy's Workers' Compensation and Employer's Liability exclusions. (ECF No. 24). Defendants have responded to the Motion, and it is ripe for adjudication. See (ECF Nos. 30 and 33-40).
AC1 Supply executed a contract with UCE whereby UCE agreed to perform roof repairs at a warehouse in Miami, Florida. (ECF Nos. 25 ¶ 2; 30 ¶ 2; 35 ¶ 2); see also (ECF No. 30-3 at 2-3). UCE subcontracted with Enzo Enrique Moreno Castellanos ("Subcontractor") to perform the roof repairs.2 (ECF No. 25 ¶ 3; 35 ¶ 3).
Thereafter, Subcontractor hired Lopez as a roofer to perform the work at the warehouse. (ECF No. 25 ¶ 4; 30 ¶ 4; 35 ¶ 4). Lopez estimated that the roof work would take at least one week to complete, and Subcontractor agreed to pay Lopez $120 per day for his work. (ECF Nos. 25 ¶ 5; 30 ¶ 5; 35 ¶ 5). Lopez began working on December 20, 2016. (ECF Nos. 25 ¶ 6; 30 ¶ 6; 35 ¶ 6). The next day, Lopez was injured when he slipped and fell into a pool of hot tar while working at the warehouse. Id. Neither UCE nor Subcontractor carried workers' compensation insurance for its employees at the time of the accident. (ECF Nos. 25 ¶ 8; 30 ¶ 8; 35 ¶ 8).
A party is entitled to summary judgment when the party can show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The movant shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Shiver v. Chertoff , 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2008). Once the movant satisfies this burden, "the burden shift[s] to the non-moving party to demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment." Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc. , 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991).
" Rule 56 requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Arpin & Sons, LLC , 261 F.Supp.3d 1245, 1249-50 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ). "Thus, the nonmoving party ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ " Id. at 1250 (citing Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ).
The Court must consider all inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolve all reasonable doubts against the moving party. Stanley Indus., Inc. v. W.M. Barr & Co. , 784 F.Supp. 1570, 1572 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) ). The Court is not, however, required to accept all of the non-movant's factual characterizations and legal arguments. Beal v. Paramount Pictures Corp. , 20 F.3d 454, 458-59 (11th Cir. 1994). If a genuine issue of fact exists for trial, summary judgment should not be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(a).
Under Florida law, an insurance provider's duty to defend an insured "depends solely on the facts and legal theories alleged in the pleadings and claims against the insured." Stephens v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co. , 749 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). The duty to defend arises when the relevant pleadings allege facts that "fairly and potentially bring the suit within policy coverage." Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. JDC (America) Corp. , 52 F.3d 1575, 1580 (11th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). The actual facts of the case are not determinative. Id. (citing Baron Oil Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. , 470 So.2d 810 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) ). However, "if the pleadings show that there is no coverage or that a policy exclusion applies to bar coverage, the insurer has no duty to defend." Arpin & Sons, LLC , 261 F.Supp.3d at 1252 (citation omitted). Furthermore, the duty to defend is not indefinite and "ceases when it is shown that there is no potential for coverage, i.e., when there is no duty to indemnify." Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. GFM Operations, Inc. , 789 F.Supp.2d 1278, 1284 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (citations omitted).
Unlike the duty to defend, the duty to indemnify "is narrower and is determined by the underlying facts adduced at trial or developed through discovery during litigation." Stephens , 749 F.3d at 1324 (quoting U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hayden Bonded Storage Co. , 930 So.2d 686, 691 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) ); see also Victoria Select Ins. Co. v. Vrchota Corp. , 805 F.Supp.2d 1337, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (). In order for the duty to indemnify to arise, the insurance policy must cover the alleged incident. Stephens , 749 F.3d at 1324. An insurer alleging non-coverage based on an exclusion bears the burden of establishing that the exclusion applies. Underwriters at Lloyds London v. STD Enterprises, Inc. , 395 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1147 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (citing LaFarge v. Travelers Indem. Co. , 118 F.3d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir.1997) ).
Plaintiff argues that the Workers' Compensation Exclusion bars coverage of Lopez's lawsuit because the Policy specifically excludes "[a]ny obligation of the insured under a workers' compensation ... law." (ECF No. 24). In response, UCE argues that coverage exists because Lopez is a "temporary worker" and that the Policy is ambiguous regarding an exclusion for "statutory employees." (ECF No. 34). Similarly, Lopez argues that coverage exists because he is a "temporary worker" under the Policy and a "casual worker" under the Workers' Compensation Law.3 (ECF No. 33). The Court finds Defendants' arguments unpersuasive.
In Florida, workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy available to an injured employee for the negligence of his employer if the employer has not engaged in any act intended to result in injury or death.4
Eller v. Shova , 630 So.2d 537, 539 (Fla. 1993) ; see also Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. Williams , 998 So.2d 677, 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). Under Florida's Workers' Compensation Law, an "employee" is any person who receives remuneration from an employer for the performance of any work or service. See Fla. Stat. § 440.02(15)(a) (2018) ( ). A contractor who sublets work to a subcontractor becomes liable for the payment of compensation to the subcontractor's employees if the subcontractor fails to secure worker's compensation insurance. Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, Inc. v. Revoredo , 698 So.2d 890, 890-92 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (citing Fla. Stat. § 440.10(1)(b) ). In that scenario, the contractor becomes the statutory employer of the subcontractor's employees. Id. at 892 (citation omitted) (Workers' Compensation Law) that a subcontractor's employees are employees of a contractor and are protected by the . Notably, the statutory relationship is not contingent upon the employer securing workers' compensation insurance, and an employer's failure to do so...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
James River Ins. Co. v. Rich Bon Corp.
...insurance policies. Federal courts routinely answer questions like these. See, e.g. , Endurance Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. United Constr. Eng'g, Inc ., 343 F. Supp. 3d 1274, 1280, 1287–88 (S.D. Fla. 2018), aff'd , 786 F. Appx 195 (11th Cir. 2019) (employer's liability exclusion and worker's ......
-
Southern-Owners Ins. Co. v. Galati Yacht Sales, LLC
...payment of compensation to the subcontractor's employees if the subcontractor fails to secure worker's compensation insurance. Endurance, 343 F.Supp.3d at 1279. In scenario, the contractor becomes the “statutory employer” of the subcontractor's employees. Id. And such “statutory employees” ......