Enfield v. Certain-Teed Products Co.

• Decision Date: 18 November 1930
• Docket Number: 40559
• Citation: 233 N.W. 141,211 Iowa 1004
• Parties: C. W. ENFIELD, Appellee, v. THE CERTAIN-TEED PRODUCTS COMPANY et al., Appellants
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

233 N.W. 141

211 Iowa 1004

C. W. ENFIELD, Appellee, v. THE CERTAIN-TEED PRODUCTS COMPANY et al., Appellants

No. 40559

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

November 18, 1930

REHEARING DENIED FEBRUARY 12, 1931.

Appeal from Webster District Court.--H. E. FRY, Judge.

This was a proceeding instituted by the claimant to obtain compensation from the employer and the insurer for injuries received while working for the employer. On June 18, 1929 the matter was heard by a board of arbitration, consisting of the Honorable Ralph Young, deputy Iowa industrial commissioner, E. E. Cavanaugh, and R. F. Mitchell. That board denied compensation, and an appeal was taken by the claimant to the industrial commissioner of Iowa, who affirmed the action of the board. From that action of the industrial commissioner's, an appeal was taken to the Webster County district court, where the industrial commissioner's action was reversed, and compensation allowed. The matter now before this court is presented through an appeal by the employer and insurer from the Webster County district court.

Reversed.

Havner Flick, Huebner & Powers, for appellants.

John E. Mulroney and Richard F. Mitchell, for appellee.

KINDIG, J. MORLING, C. J., and EVANS, FAVILLE, and GRIMM, JJ., concur.

OPINION

KINDIG, J.

There is presented on this appeal but one fundamental question, and that is whether the claimant-appellee's injury arose in the course of his employment with appellant The Certain-teed Products Company. While thus employed, the claimant, who worked in the capacity of chief engineer, was injured, April 23, 1929, when moving an electric motor "from the first to the second floor" of a building belonging to the employer. The motor needed repairs, and in order to make them, the claimant and his helper were transporting it from the first to the second floor, as above stated. In so doing, these men loaded the motor on a truck, and then moved the same onto an elevator "located in the central part of" the building. Thereupon, contrary to the employer's instructions, the claimant and his helper got upon the elevator, and started upward to the electric shop on the second floor. When arriving at the proper floor, claimant, in attempting to stop the elevator, injured his right hand, as it came in contact with the "cable and sheave wheel of the elevator." Hence he now makes claim against the employer for compensation, under Chapter 70, Title V, of the 1927 Code.

Before and at the time of the injury, the appellant American Mutual Liability Insurance Company carried the compensation insurance for the employer. It is claimed by the insurer and the employer that the accident in question did not arise in the course of the employment, because the claimant, at the time thereof, was not doing what a man so employed "might reasonably do;" nor was he at a place where he "might reasonably be," under his contract of employment. This conclusion by the employer and the insurer is based upon the thought that the claimant had been warned not to ride, and was prohibited from riding, upon the elevator. A suitable stairway was available for claimant's use, and he could start the elevator from the outside, and it would automatically stop itself at the proper floor. Furthermore, it is said by the employer and the insurer that no necessity existed for disobeying the foregoing rule of employment.

Upon the consideration of this controversy by the state industrial commissioner, he made at least seven findings of fact. These findings were not itemized by the commissioner. For convenience, the employer has segregated and itemized those findings of the commissioner's. Chronologically stated, in the language of the employer, the commissioner's findings are as follows:

"First: In riding on the elevator at the time he sustained said injury, the claimant conspicuously violated a rule of his employer, prohibiting all persons from riding on said elevator.

"Second: Prior to sustaining said injury, the claimant had observed the warning placards prohibiting all persons to ride on said elevator, and he knew it was against the rule of his employer for him to ride on said elevator.

"Third: Said rule prohibiting the claimant and all persons to ride on said elevator was well observed for years, and consistently enforced.

"Fourth: The claimant arbitrarily and unjustifiably violated the orders of his employer in riding in said elevator on the occasion when he was injured.

"Fifth: The time saved by riding the elevator instead of going up the stairs was so slight as not to justify the claimant's arbitrary conduct in violating said orders of his employer.

"Sixth: The motor could have been made secure on the truck, and it was not reasonable nor necessary for the claimant to violate said rule of his employer by accompanying the motor up the elevator to keep it in place.

"Seventh: The claimant's injury did not arise in the course of his employment."

Although the industrial commissioner made the foregoing findings of fact, the claimant contends that the district court had the right to review the same because there was no conflict in the evidence before the industrial commissioner. Without such conflict, the claimant urges, the courts are not bound by the industrial commissioner's conclusion.

Claimant's theory of the case is that he was doing the employer's work, and used the elevator in order to keep the motor from upsetting, there being no convenient way of fastening the same to the truck and the elevator platform. Haste was necessary, claimant maintains, in order to repair the motor, so that it could be installed in running order not later than 7 o'clock P.M. So, the claimant concludes, his action in the premises, even if wrongful, amounted only to contributory negligence, and therefore is no bar to his recovery of compensation.

I. Under the circumstances, did the district court properly say that the injury to claimant arose in the course of his employment? That is the question. If the injury did not arise in the course of the claimant's employment, compensation cannot be allowed. Section 1377 of the 1927 Code; Jones v. Eppley Hotels Co., 208 Iowa 1281, 227 N.W. 153; Sparks v. Consolidated Ind. Coal Co., 195 Iowa 334, 190 N.W. 593.

The burden of proof is upon the claimant to show that his injury did arise in the course of his employment. Jones v. Eppley Hotels Co. (208 Iowa 1281, 227 N.W. 153), supra; Griffith v. Cole Bros., 183 Iowa 415, 165 N.W. 577; Norman v. City of Chariton, 206 Iowa 790, 221 N.W. 481. Such are the essential prerequisites underlying claimant's right of recovery. Who is to determine those essentials? Manifestly, under the Iowa statutes, it is for the industrial commissioner to say whether the claimant has carried the burden thus cast upon him.

"The duty of determining where the preponderance of evidence lies, under the records in cases of this kind, is the task imposed by statute upon the state industrial commissioner. If there is no fraud, and that official acts with power, and not in excess thereof, and his findings support the order and decree, it cannot be interfered with on appeal to the district court unless 'there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the order or decision.' Section 1453, 1927 Code; Flint v. City of Eldon (191 Iowa 845, 183 N.W. 344), supra; Hinrichs v. Davenport Locomotive Works, 203 Iowa 1395, 214 N.W. 585." Jones v. Eppley Hotels Co. (208 Iowa 1281, 227 N.W. 153), supra.

While acting within the limits of his jurisdiction, the industrial commissioner cannot be interfered with by the district court or this tribunal. See authorities above cited. Interference by the courts with the state industrial commissioner under those circumstances amounts to the usurpation of power. Flint v. City of Eldon, 191 Iowa 845, 183 N.W. 344; Jones v. Eppley Hotels Co. (208 Iowa 1281, 227 N.W. 153), supra. On the other hand, if there are not sufficient facts in the record to support the findings of the industrial commissioner, the courts may review and set aside his action. Section 1453 of the 1927 Code; Rish v. Iowa Portland Cement Co., 186 Iowa 443, 170 N.W. 532; Reid v. Automatic Elec. Wash. Co., 189 Iowa 964, 179 N.W. 323; Guthrie v. Iowa Gas & Elec. Co., 200 Iowa 150, 204 N.W. 225. Obviously, the absence of a conflict in the evidence is not enough to give the courts jurisdiction in the premises. Perhaps a given record might not contain conflicting evidence, yet the proof, although one-sided, may be amply sufficient to support the commissioner's finding. Consequently, claimant has not met the requirements to set aside the commissioner's finding by merely alleging that there is no conflict in the evidence. No doubt some of the items contained in the court's finding are without material conflict, yet others of them are in dispute, under the evidence disclosed by the record. Those items concerning which there is no dispute in the evidence are, nevertheless, fully sustained by the record. As a result, the commissioner had before him substantial evidence upon which to base his findings, and consequently, under those circumstances, that official's conclusions are binding on the courts. Norton v. Day Coal Co., 192 Iowa 160, 180 N.W. 905; Sparks v. Consolidated Ind. Coal Co. (195 Iowa 334, 190 N.W. 593), supra; Heinen v. Motor Inn Corp., 202 Iowa 67, 209 N.W. 415; Hinrichs v. Davenport Locomotive Works, 203 Iowa 1395, 214 N.W. 585; Herbig v. Walton Auto Co., 191 Iowa 394, 182 N.W. 204; Flint v. City of Eldon (191 Iowa 845, 183 N.W. 344), supra. Not only is the commissioner's finding aided by the direct evidence in the record, but the same may find support from reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. See cases last above cited.

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