Flint v. City of Eldon, 33958.

• Decision Date: 25 June 1921
• Docket Number: No. 33958.,33958.
• Parties: FLINT v. CITY OF ELDON ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

191 Iowa 845

183 N.W. 344

FLINT

v.CITY OF ELDON ET AL.

No. 33958.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 25, 1921.

Appeal from District Court, Wapello County; Francis M. Hunter, Judge.

Action was instituted under the Workmen's Compensation Law of Iowa (Code Supp. 1913, §§ 2477m to 2477m51) by the dependent widow of Chas. A. Flint against his employer, the city of Eldon, and the Continental Casualty Company, its insurance carrier, to recover compensation for his death on February 3, 1919, resulting from injuries received as alleged on October 30, 1918. Application for arbitration was filed in the office of the Iowa Industrial Commissioner at Des Moines, and a hearing was had before an Arbitration Committee on October 30, 1919. An award was filed by said committee November 1, 1919, granting to the widow the statutory compensation. On November 5, 1919, notice was given of defendants' election to appeal from said decision, and a petition for review, stating the grounds of appeal, was filed in the office of the Commissioner. On December 15, 1919, the cause came on for a hearing on review before Hon. A. B. Funk, Industrial Commissioner of Iowa, and on January 15, 1920, his decision was entered, reversing the findings of the Arbitration Committee. An appeal was taken from his findings to the district court of Wapello county, and on July 23, 1920, the said court reversed the findings of the Industrial Commissioner, and confirmed the findings of the committee of arbitration, and entered judgment accordingly. From the judgment and decree of the court so entered defendants appeal. Reversed and remanded, with directions.George C. Bliss, of Chicago, Ill., and McNett & McNett, of Ottumwa, for appellants.

Roberts & Webber, of Ottumwa, for appellee.

DE GRAFF, J.

This appeal primarily involves the right of the district court to reverse the findings of fact made and entered by the Industrial Commissioner under the Iowa Compensation Law.

It is unnecessary to set out in extenso the statutory provisions governing the instant case. Sufficient to state that sections 2477m29, 2477m32, and 2477m33, Code Supp. 1913, and the judicial interpretations heretofore given these sections, are controlling. The purpose, intent, and scheme of workmen's compensation legislation is well understood, and its historical significance has been frequently expressed in decisions.

The fundamental reason for the enactment of this legislation is to avoid litigation, lessen the expense incident thereto, minimize appeals, and afford an efficient and speedy tribunal to determine and award compensation under the terms of this act.

“It was the purpose of the Legislature to create a tribunal to do rough justice--speedy, summary, informal, untechnical. With this scheme of the Legislature we must not interfere; for, if we trench in the slightest degree upon the prerogatives of the Commission, one encroachment will breed another, until finally simplicity will give way to complexity, and informality to technicality.” Rhyner v. Hueber Bldg. Co., 171 App. Div. 56, 156 N. Y. Supp. 903.

See, also, Milwaukee v. Ind. Com., 160 Wis. 238, 151 N. W. 247.

[1] It is not within the legislative scheme to make a court the reviewer of the facts, and it has been repeatedly held that the court is forbidden to trespass upon the defined jurisdiction of the Commissioner, the latter being the sole judge and the final judge of the facts. No order or decree of the Industrial Commissioner under our law shall be set aside by the court except in the following cases: (1) That the Industrial Commissioner acted without or in excess of his powers; (2) that the order or decree was procured by fraud; (3) that the facts found by the Industrial Commissioner do not support the order or decree; (4) that there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the Industrial Commissioner in making the order or decree complained of. It is further provided that the findings of fact made by the Industrial Commissioner within his power shall, in the absence of fraud, be conclusive. Section 2477m33, Code Supp. 1913.

Upon the reading of the entire record in this case we have no hesitation in saying that no jurisdictional fact is involved; no fraud, actual or constructive, is established; and the facts found by the Industrial Commissioner are sufficient to sustain his order or decree.

In Rish v. Iowa Portland Cement Co., 186 Iowa, 443, 170 N. W. 532, we said:

“The finding of the commissioner upon questions of fact is made conclusive and binding upon the court by the statute; but, if the facts found do not support the order, or if there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the Industrial Commissioner in making same, such order may be set aside by the court.”

Therefore as to disputed facts, which do not go to the jurisdiction, a court is bound by the finding of the Commissioner. Bidwell Coal Co. v. Davidson, 187 Iowa, 809, 174 N. W. 592, 8 A. L. R. 1058;Pierce v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 185 Iowa, 1346, 172 N. W. 191;Pace v. Appanoose County, 184 Iowa, 498, 168 N. W. 916.

Such findings stand upon the same footing as the finding of a judge or a verdict of a jury. It is not to be set aside if there is any evidence upon which it can rest. In re Pigeon's Case, 216 Mass. 51. In the absence of fraud, an appellate court is not at liberty to interfere, if the facts proven are capable of sustaining the inferences of fact drawn from them. Pappinaw v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 189 Mich. 441, 155 N. W. 545.

[2] If the evidence in the case supports the finding of fact it may not be said that the Commissioner acted...