Eng. Technicians Assn., Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp.

• Decision Date: 10 January 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90AP-703,90AP-703
• Citation: 72 Ohio App.3d 106,593 N.E.2d 472
• Parties: ENGINEERING TECHNICIANS ASSOCIATION, INC. et al., Appellants, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION et al., Appellees. *
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 106

72 Ohio App.3d 106

593 N.E.2d 472

ENGINEERING TECHNICIANS ASSOCIATION, INC. et al., Appellants, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION et al., Appellees. ^*

No. 90AP-703.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

Decided Jan. 10, 1991.

Lucas, Prendergast, Albright, Gibson & Newman, Rankin Gibson and James E. Melle, for appellants.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., Lorraine Nestor, Richard A. Szilagyi and Ronald H. Snyder, for appellees.

PEGGY L. BRYANT, Judge.

Plaintiffs-appellants, Charles C. Cornell, C. Melvin Smith, James R. Williams, and Engineering Technicians Association, Inc. ("ETA"), appeal an order of the Franklin County Common Pleas Court dismissing their claims for declaratory judgment, preliminary and permanent injunctions, and a writ of mandamus for lack of standing.

Cornell, Smith, and Williams are employees of defendant-appellee, Ohio Department of Transportation ("ODOT") and work in its Bureau of Location and Design, Plan Review Section. None of them has a certificate of registration as a professional engineer pursuant to R.C. 4733.02. Cornell and Smith are members of ETA, a nonprofit corporation that asserts the interests of its members as to matters not covered by a collective bargaining agreement. ODOT posted a notice of vacancy for a non-union Design Engineer 3 position. The qualifications for the job, as listed in the job specifications established by defendant-appellee, Ohio Department of Administrative Services ("ODAS"), included a certificate of registration as a professional engineer. ODAS, at the request of ODOT, had recently modified the qualifications for this job classification. Effectively, ODAS split the former Design Engineer 3 classification into two classifications: the new Design Engineer 3 classification which required an engineering registration, and a Design Specialist 4 classification with similar duties but no registration requirement. A number of other engineer classifications were similarly split. The new Design Engineer 3 classifications were promulgated by rule pursuant to R.C. 124.14(A).

Cornell, Smith, and defendant-appellee, David Devakul, applied for the posted Design Engineer 3 position. Devakul, a registered professional engineer, was ultimately awarded the position; Cornell and Smith were not considered for the position because they were not registered professional engineers.

Plaintiffs brought suit on February 28, 1990, seeking a declaratory judgment that the engineering registration requirement was invalid and that ODOT was required to use a competitive examination to fill the position permanently, a preliminary and permanent injunction seeking to remove Devakul from the position and prevent him from completing his probationary period, and a writ of mandamus to compel ODAS to remove Devakul from the position and administer the competitive examination.

The trial court referred the matter to a referee, who conducted a full evidentiary hearing on the preliminary injunction issue on April 12 and 13, 1990, and issued his report on April 16, 1990. The referee's report, which contained findings of fact and conclusions of law, recommended that all of plaintiffs' claims be dismissed for lack of standing. On May 18, 1990, the trial court entered an order adopting the referee's report and granting defendants' motion to dismiss all of the claims.

Plaintiffs appeal therefrom, assigning the following errors:

"I. The common pleas court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint for lack of standing because appellants had standing to obtain a declaratory judgment, preliminary and permanent injunctions and a writ of mandamus.

"II. The common pleas court erred in upholding the engineering license qualification in the design engineer 3 classification specification and as it was applied as a qualification for the job in question because:

"a. The qualification for this non-bargaining unit job was negotiated between appellees and the union in violation of Article XV Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 4117.08(B) and (C); [and]

"b. The duties and responsibilities of the job and the classifications do not include responsible charge of engineering work, and DAS did not evaluate that job or classification for exemption under R.C. 4733.18(B)(1).

"III. The common pleas court erred in allowing appellee Devakul to remain in the position without ordering a civil service examination because a provisional appointee may only serve in the position for six months during which time a civil service examination must be prepared and administered.

"IV. The common pleas court erred in failing to remove appellee Devakul from his job because he was not entitled to the benefits or protections of the civil service laws because he has not taken a civil service examination."

Preliminarily we note that, unlike many of our cases involving job classification disputes, this case does not involve an appeal under R.C. Chapter 119. Thus, we uphold the trial court's findings if they are supported by competent, credible evidence in the record, Shear v. West American Ins. Co. (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 162, 165, 11 OBR 478, 481, 464 N.E.2d 545, 548, rather than the abuse of discretion standard applicable to R.C. Chapter 119 appeals, Angelkovski v. Buckeye Potato Chips Co. (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 159, 161-162, 11 OBR 242, 244, 463 N.E.2d 1280, 1283.

Plaintiffs' first assignment of error asserts that the common pleas court erred in dismissing their complaint for lack of standing. Plaintiffs argue that they have standing because defendant's classification forecloses promotional opportunities for design specialists who lack an engineering certificate. Defendants respond that plaintiffs have no standing to challenge the lack of a promotional exam and the retention of Devakul as a Design Engineer 3; and that plaintiffs' union grievance procedure provides the sole means by which they may challenge the job classification.

An individual plaintiff has standing to sue only if he has a sufficient stake in the outcome of a justiciable controversy. Racing Guild of Ohio, Local 304 v. Ohio State Racing Comm. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 317, 321, 28 OBR 386, 389, 503 N.E.2d 1025, 1029; State, ex rel. Consumers League of Ohio, v. Ratchford (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 420, 424, 8 OBR 544, 548, 457 N.E.2d 878, 883. The individual plaintiffs have a sufficient stake in the outcome of the controversy if they can demonstrate injury in fact, which requires showing that they have suffered or will suffer a specific injury as a result of the challenged action and that the court can redress such injury. Id.

Plaintiffs allege that they will be denied promotional opportunities as a result of the classification. Specifically, Cornell and Smith demonstrated that they were not considered for the position now held by Devakul because they are not registered engineers; and Williams asserts that classifications requiring an engineering certificate limit his opportunities for advancement even though he did not apply for the Design Engineer 3 position now held by Devakul. Plaintiffs further contend that this injury is likely to be redressed if this court invalidates the Design Engineer 3 classification. Given the foregoing, plaintiffs have demonstrated injury in fact, not only as to the classification, but also as to the lack of a promotional examination and the retention of Devakul as a Design Engineer 3. As a result, plaintiffs have a sufficient stake in the controversy to confer standing to challenge the classification.

An association has standing only if at least one of its members would otherwise have standing to sue in his own right. State, ex rel. Connors, v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 44, 47, 8 OBR 47, 50, 455 N.E.2d 1331, 1334. Cornell and Smith are members of ETA; each has standing to sue in his own right. Thus, the association also has standing to assert the interests of its members.

ODOT's argument that the dispute resolution procedure established by the collective bargaining agreement provides the sole means for challenging the classification does not alter the standing analysis. The collective bargaining agreement's dispute resolution mechanism applies only to classifications within the bargaining unit; thus, it does not preclude plaintiffs from challenging a classification outside the bargaining unit by other means. Since neither party disputes that the Design Engineer 3 classification is outside the collective bargaining unit, the terms of the collective bargaining agreement do not render the controversy nonjusticiable.

Accordingly, plaintiffs' first assignment of error is well taken.

Although the trial court dismissed the entire action for lack of standing, the court nevertheless considered and decided the merits of the action. By adopting the findings of the referee which upheld the job classification, the court declared the rights of the parties as to the validity of the classification, and this declaration necessarily determined plaintiffs' remaining claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and a writ of mandamus. Thus, the trial court's dismissal for lack of standing did not prejudice plaintiffs. Civ.R. 61; e.g., Smith v. Flesher (1967), 12 Ohio St.2d 107, 41 O.O.2d 412, 233 N.E.2d 137, paragraph one of the syllabus; McQueen v. Goldey (1984), 20 Ohio App.3d 41 44, 20 OBR 44, 47, 484 N.E.2d 712, 716. Accordingly, we overrule the first assignment of error because we find no prejudice to plaintiffs herein; and we review the trial court's declaration of the rights of the parties and denial of plaintiffs' remaining claims.

Plaintiffs' second assignment of error asserts that the common pleas court erred in upholding the engineering registration qualification in the Design Engineer 3 classification. Plaintiffs first dispute the validity of the classification...