ENGESSER v. ENGESSER
Decision Date | 26 August 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 5D09-871.,5D09-871. |
Citation | 42 So.3d 249 |
Parties | David ENGESSER, Appellant, v. Tanya ENGESSER, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.
Lora S. Scott, Orlando, for Appellant.
Tanya Engesser, El Cajon, pro se alimony award is not facially erroneous, we affirm that award without further discussion.
The court also awarded bridge-the-gap alimony. While section 61.08, Florida Statutes (2009), does not specifically provide for this form of alimony, every district court of appeal in Florida, except for this Court, has expressly recognized it. See Price v. Price, 951 So.2d 55, 59-60 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (listing case examples). Notwithstanding the prevailing view, in Martin v. Martin, 582 So.2d 784, 786 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), this Court rejected bridge-the-gap alimony, concluding that "[t]here is no support in law or logic for such an award...." Some years later, a panel of this Court signaled the Court's willingness to reconsider Martin in an appropriate case. See Alpha v. Alpha, 885 So.2d 1023, 1031-32 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). And more recently, in Price, this Court again expressed its willingness to recede from Martin and join the other districts in recognizing bridge-the-gap alimony. Price, 951 So.2d at 60 nn. 2-3.
In Price, Judge Lawson, writing for the Court, concisely set forth the legal theories that support bridge-the-gap alimony:
As for the legal authority to make a "bridge-the-gap" temporary alimony award, we see at least three compelling arguments for reading section 61.08 as providing trial judges with discretion to make such an award in appropriate cases. The first is the broader view of "rehabilitative alimony" adopted by the First, Third and Fourth district courts. These courts do not view rehabilitation narrowly to include only those circumstances in which one spouse needs education or training to secure appropriate employment, and has presented evidence of a plan to acquire the needed skills or degree. The second argument is set forth by Judge Altenbernd in his well-reasoned opinion in Borchard [v. Borchard, 730 So.2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)]. In summary, Borchard explains why it is clear that lump-sum alimony can be ordered in "installments, to help one spouse adjust financially to life after marriage." 730 So.2d at 749. The third argument, though not as precise, is just as compelling. In section 61.08, Florida Statutes, the Legislature has expressly directed trial courts to consider all factors necessary to do "equity and justice between the parties." It would be contrary to this language to hold that in a short-term marriage where one spouse has the ability to pay and the other has a compelling need for short-term support to transition into single life, section 61.08 must be construed narrowly as depriving the trial court of authority to make the needed short-term award.
951 So.2d at 60. While each of these views has its merits, we need not determine which view should prevail. We need only conclude that "section 61.08 is properly read as granting trial courts the discretion to award a short-term alimony award ... when such an award is necessary to do equity and justice between the parties." Id.
Bridge-the-gap alimony is intended to smooth the transition of a spouse from married to single life. See Bryan v. Bryan, 765 So.2d 829, 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Vanbrussel v. Vanbrussel, 710 So.2d 170, 171 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Green v. Green, 672 So.2d 49, 51 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); see also Landow v. Landow, 824 So.2d 278, 279 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) ( ). Courts have awarded bridge-the-gap alimony to ease from the standard of living the parties had together to the standard that a spouse can provide for himself or herself. See Robbie v. Robbie, 726 So.2d 817, 820 n. 2 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
In the case before us, the former wife has adequate employment skills and an exemplary employment record. There is nothing to indicate that at the conclusion of the twelve-month period of bridge-the-gap alimony, the former wife will not be able to sustain the standard of living that the parties established during the marriage. See, e.g., Borchard v. Borchard, 730 So.2d 748, 753 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) ( ).
Because there is no error apparent on the face of the final judgment that demonstrates that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding a nominal amount of permanent periodic alimony to the former wife as well as bridge-the-gap alimony, we affirm the judgment. We also recede from our prior opinions that fail to recognize bridge-the-gap alimony as a tool available to the trial courts. See Price, 951 So.2d at 60 n. 2.
AFFIRMED.
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