England v. White
| Decision Date | 11 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:06-CV-091-TBR-LLK |
| Parties | STEVIE LYN ENGLAND, PETITIONER v. RANDY WHITE, WARDEN, RESPONDENT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Stevie Lynn England's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, [R. 1], and Amended Petition, [R. 47]. The Magistrate Judge filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Recommendation. [R. 94.] England filed objections thereto. [R. 95.] Having conducted a de novo review of the portions of the Magistrate Judge's report to which Potter objected,1 the Court ADOPTS the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as set forth in the report submitted by the Magistrate Judge, [R. 94]. For the reasons stated herein, England's objections, [R.95], are DENIED. The Court will enter a separate Order and Judgment consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.
On May 19, 2005, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Stevie Lyn England of complicity to murder Lisa Halvorson. See England v. Commonwealth, No. 2003-SC-0328-MR, 2005 WL 1185204, at *1 . England and his co-defendant, Tyrone McCary, were originally indicted of capital murder and tried separately. [R. 94 at 1 ().] McCary was Halvorson's ex-boyfriend. [Id. at 2.] At England's trial before the Graves Circuit Court, the Commonwealth introduced evidence showing that Halvorson obtained an emergency protective order (EPO) against McCary shortly before her death, and her affidavit in support of the EPO claimed that McCary threatened to kill her or have someone kill her for him. [Id.] Also, Cori Poindexter, Halvorson's friend and the last person to see her alive, testified at trial that she was present when McCary called Halvorson and heard Halvorson's side of the conversation. [Id.] Poindexter testified that, while Halvorson was on the phone with McCary, Halvorson told Poindexter that McCary said that if he could not have her, nobody would. [Id.]
During the trial, the Commonwealth's theory of the case was that England was present at the scene and assisted McCary in committing the murder. [Id.] The Magistrate Judge summarized the Commonwealth's theory as follows:
McCary and/or Petitioner devised a plan to make it appear that Lisa was accidentally run over by her own truck while exiting her garage. McCary and/or Petitioner: drove to Lisa's house; knocked her to the ground in or near the garage; beat her severely; accelerated the truck backward out of the garage, causing Lisa's face to be caught in the right bumper and spinning her into the wheel well; got on top of her and broke her windpipe, resulting in death by asphyxia.
[Id. (citing Audio-video of trial, Day 1 (January 8, 2003), 3:13:00).] England and McCary were originally implicated in the crime by the testimony of Karl Woodfork. According to Woodfork, McCary described various plots to him and England for murdering Halvorson and making it appear like an accident. [Id. (citing Audio-video of trial, Day 4 (January 14, 2003), 11:07:00).] Furthermore, Woodfork testified that McCary paid both him and England an initial payment of $1,000.00, with a promise of an additional payment of $10,000.00 (each) after the murder. [Id.]
Before the trial, Woodfork agreed to be wired for sound, and the police secretly recorded conversations between Woodfork and England, in which England complained about McCaryowing him money. After informing England of these recordings during an interrogation at the police station, England admitted to being present at the murder scene with McCary but insisted that he only punched Halvorson in the jaw one time—to "soften her up"—causing her to fall to the ground. [Id. at 3.] Furthermore, England claimed that he attempted to dissuade McCary from committing the other terrible acts, and he also claimed Halvorson was alive when he and McCary left the scene. [Id.]
After the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed England's conviction, England filed a Motion to Vacate pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42, containing ten claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. [Id.] It was denied by the trial court. [Id.] Upon appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the rejection of all claims except for one, which was remanded for an evidentiary hearing. [Id.] However, this evidentiary hearing was rendered moot when England agreed to a sentence of life imprisonment. [Id. at 3-4 (citing R. 47-1 at 25).]
Subsequently, England filed a Habeas Corpus Petition, [R. 1], and an Amended Petition, [R. 47], consisting of twenty-six claims. On March 6, 2017, the Magistrate Judge entered a Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation, recommending that the Habeas Corpus Petition and the Amended Petition be denied. [R. 94 at 1.] On March 24, 2017, England filed an Objection to the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation, [R. 95], which involved seventeen of the twenty-six previous claims. The matter came before the undersigned when this case was reassigned to this Court on April 25, 2018, [R. 96].
"Under the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), federal habeas relief may not be granted unless the state court decision at issue: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resultedin a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Coleman v. Bergh, 804 F.3d 816, 819 n. 1 (6th Cir. 2015).
"Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law, or if the state court reaches a decision different from that of the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Trimble v. Bobby, 804 F.3d 767, 773 (6th Cir. 2015). "Under the 'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the petitioner's case." Id. "For factual matters, a district court may not grant a habeas petition unless the state court's adjudication "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)).
"To obtain habeas relief, 'a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.'" Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). This standard is "difficult to meet." White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (citation omitted).
In his Objection, England lists many arguments regarding seventeen of the claims from his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Amended Petition. The Court will address each in turn.
The first ground raised under England's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was that England's Fifth Amendment right to counsel during custodial interrogation was violated when England's alleged request for an attorney was ignored by police. [R. 95 at 38 (England Objection).] Specifically, England argues that the following statement qualified as an unequivocal request for an attorney: [R. 94 at 5-6 (quoting England, Nos. 2003-SC-0328-MR, 2005 WL 1185204, at *2; R. 95 at 38.] After further questioning, England said, [R. 94 at 5-6 (quoting England, Nos. 2003-SC-0328-MR, 2005 WL 1185204, at *2).] The Magistrate Judge held that this statement did not invoke the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, citing the finding of the Supreme Court in Davis v. United States, in which the Supreme Court found that the words "maybe I should talk to a lawyer" are equivocal. [Id. at 6 (citing Davis, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).]2 Furthermore, the Magistrate Judge found that the Kentucky Supreme Court's holding that England's statement did not amount to a request for an attorney was not contrary to the United States Supreme Court's precedent. [R. 94 at 6.]
In his Objection to the Magistrate Judge's findings, England argues that his statement was an "unequivocal request for an attorney" under Supreme Court precedent3 and questioning by police should have ceased at that time. [R. 95 at 38-39.] Furthermore, England contends that the Kentucky Supreme Court, which the Magistrate Judge quoted in his findings, cited to inapplicable case law in its opinion. [R. Id. at 39.]
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's findings and denies England's objection. First, the Court finds that England's statements did not constitute an unambiguous request for counsel. The Sixth Circuit has succinctly summarized the requirements of the Supreme Court for such a situation as follows:
A suspect subject to custodial interrogation has the right to consult with an attorney and to have counsel present during questioning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). If the suspect invokes that right, police must stop questioning him until his attorney arrives or the suspect reinitiates discussion. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). In determining whether a suspect has invoked his right to counsel, we...
To continue reading
Request your trial