English v. Ryland Mortg. Co.
| Decision Date | 11 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: GJH-16-3675 |
| Parties | DERRICK ENGLISH Plaintiff, v. RYLAND MORTGAGE COMPANY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Plaintiff Derrick English ("Plaintiff") brings this pro se action against Defendants Ryland Mortgage Company ("Ryland"); U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for the Holders of the GSAA Home Equity Trust 2007-1 ("U.S. Bank"), Wells Fargo Bank, National Association ("Wells Fargo"), and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"); Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company and GS Mortgage Securities Corp. (collectively, "Goldman Defendants"); and "Does 1 through 100," asserting a multitude of state law claims and alleged violations of the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., relating to Plaintiff's mortgage loan.1 The Court previously denied Plaintiff's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. ECF Nos. 20 and 21. Now pending before the Court is Defendant Ryland's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 13, Defendants U.S. Bank, Wells Fargo, and MERS's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 16, and the Goldman Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 17. A hearing is unnecessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md.). For the following reasons, the Motions to Dismiss are granted.
The Court derives the following facts from Plaintiff's Complaint, ECF No. 2, and public land records and court records, of which the Court takes judicial notice.2 On September 13, 2006, Plaintiff, as Borrower, executed a Deed of Trust and obtained a $263,950.00 mortgage loan ("the Loan") secured by the property located at 12234 Open View Lane, #803, Upper Marlboro, Maryland 20774 ("the Property"). See ECF No. 2 ¶ 29; ECF No. 3-1.3 The Deed of Trust named Defendant Ryland as Lender and Defendant MERS as "nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns" and the beneficiary under the Deed of Trust. ECF No. 3-1 at 1-2. The Deed of Trust includes a provision stating that for purposes of "repayment of the Loan" and the "performance of Borrower's covenants and agreements under this Security Instrument and the Note," "Borrower irrevocably grants and conveys to Trustees, in trust, with power of sale [of the Property]." ECF No. 3-1 at 3.
When Plaintiff closed on the Property, "the original lender," presumably Ryland, allegedly "signed a PSA [Pooling and Servicing Agreement] that governed plaintiff's particular mortgage note." ECF No. 2 ¶ 21. Ryland subsequently sold the Loan to a securitized pool of loans described in the Complaint as "TRUST 2007-1 Trust." See id. ¶ 39. On September 21, 2011, MERS assigned its interest in the Deed of Trust to Bank of America, National Association ("Bank of America"). See ECF No. 16-2 at 2. On January 13, 2013, Bank of America assigned the Deed of Trust to U.S. Bank. See ECF No. 16-3 at 2.
On July 11, 2014, following the apparent default of the Loan, the Substitute Trustees initiated a foreclosure action against English. See BHL v. English, CAEF14-17893 (Cir. Ct. Prince George's Cty. July 11, 2014).4 The Circuit Court denied English's Motion to Stay Foreclosure Sale on March 9, 2015, Dk. 019, and also denied English's Motion to Dismiss on February 16, 2016, Dk. 030. English filed a line suggesting bankruptcy on February 3, 2016, which automatically stayed the foreclosure action. See Dk. 031. The bankruptcy stay was lifted on September 27, 2016. Dk. 032. The most recent docket entry in the foreclosure action was entered on February 17, 2017, and the matter remains active. See Dk. 040.
English filed a Complaint to quiet title against the Substitute Trustees and Defendants in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland on October 3, 2016. English v. Ryland Mortg. Co., CAE16-38008 (Cir. Ct. Prince George's Cty. October 3, 2016).5 Defendants removed the action to this Court on November 9, 2016. See ECF No. 1. In the Complaint under review, Plaintiff English alleges ten counts against Defendants: (1) Lack of Standing to Foreclose, (2) Fraud in the Concealment, (3) Fraud in the Inducement, (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, (5) Quiet Title, (6) Slander of Title, (7) Declaratory Relief, (8) Violations of the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), (9) Violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"), and (10) Rescission. ECF No. 2 at 1. Plaintiff seeks damages, restitution, injunctive and declaratory relief. Motions to Dismiss have been filed by Defendants Ryland, see ECF No. 13, U.S. Bank, Wells Fargo, and MERS, see ECF No. 16, and the Goldman Defendants, see ECF No. 17. Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motions. ECF No. 26. Havingreviewed the parties' briefs, the appropriate records, and relevant authorities, the Court now grants the Motions to Dismiss.6
Defendants may "test the adequacy of a complaint by way of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)." Prelich v. Med. Res., Inc., 813 F. Supp. 2d 654, 660 (D. Md. 2011) (citing German v. Fox, 267 F. App'x 231, 233 (4th Cir. 2008)). Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim do "not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Prelich, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 660 (citing Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). The court should not grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief unless "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." GE Inv. Private Placement Partners II v. Parker, 247 F.3d 543, 548 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249-50) (1989)). To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must allege enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible when "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In evaluating the sufficiency of the Plaintiff's claims, the Court accepts factual allegations in the complaint as true and construes the factual allegations in the light mostfavorable to the Plaintiff. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson Cty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005). However, the complaint must contain more than "legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) provides that "[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Although "no technical forms of pleading are required, a complaint must 'give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the ground upon which it rests.'" Engle v. United States, 736 F. Supp. 670, 671 (D. Md. 1989), aff'd, 902 F.2d 28 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957)). The Court is not obligated to accept unsupported legal allegations, Revene v. Charles County Commissioners, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989), legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979).
In Count One, English contends that Defendants "do not have the right to foreclose on the Property because Defendants . . . have failed to perfect any security interest in the Property, or cannot prove to the court they have a valid interest as a real party in interest to foreclose." ECF No. 2 at 13. Thus, he claims, "the purported power of sale . . . no longer applies." Id. Plaintiff submits that the only parties who have standing to foreclose are the "holders of the Note," whom he alleges are "the certificate holders of the securitized trust because they are the end users and pay taxes on their interest gains." Id. English further claims that Defendant MERS lacksauthority under its corporate charter "to foreclose a mortgage or to own or transfer an interest in a securitized mortgage," and seeks to invalidate the transfer of the Mortgage/Deed of Trust to U.S. Bank because the transferor allegedly never "physically deliver[ed]" the Note. Id. at 13-14. Plaintiff argues that "[t]he Promissory Note and Mortgage/Deed of Trust are inseparable," and therefore the transfer of the Deed of Trust alone is a nullity. Id. at 15. He requests that the Court "restrain" and "enjoin" Defendants from foreclosing upon the Property. Id. at 16. Plaintiff's claim fails for several reasons.
Courts in this jurisdiction and elsewhere have "routinely rejected challenges to loan securitization7 and assignments executed through the MERS system." Parker v. Am. Brokers Conduit, 179 F. Supp. 3d 509, 516-17 (D. Md. 2016) (); Reed v. PNC Mortg., Civ. No. AW-13-1536, 2013 WL 3364372, at *3 (D. Md. July 2, 2013) (); Suss v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Civ. No. WMN-09-1627, 2010 WL 2733097, at *5 (D. Md. July 9, 2010) (); Ruggia v. Wash. Mut., 719 F. Supp.2d 642, 647 (E.D....
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