English v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union
| Decision Date | 30 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 18 C 5272,18 C 5272 |
| Citation | 458 F.Supp.3d 948 |
| Parties | Willie ENGLISH, Remzi Jaos, Ricardo Loza, Brenda Woodall, Bashir B. Nuruddin, Tom Haley, and Leonard Simpson, Plaintiffs, v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 73, and Denise Poloyac, individually and as former Trustee of SEIU, Local 73, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Kelsey Antoinette Zubkoff, Glen Joseph Dunn, Jr, Glen J. Dunn & Associates, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.
Abigail V. Carter, Leon Dayan, Pro Hac Vice, Bredhoff & Kaiser, PLLC, Washington, DC, Barry M. Bennett, George A. Luscombe, III, Dowd, Bloch, Bennett, Cervone, Auerbach & Yokich, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
Plaintiffs, Willie English, Remzi Jaos, Ricardo Loza, Brenda Woodall, Bashir B. Nuruddin, Tom Haley, and Leonard Simpson, have filed an amended complaint against their former employer and labor union, Service Employees International Union ("SEIU") Local 73, and Denise Poloyac, formerly one of the trustees in charge of SEIU Local 73. Plaintiffs claim that they were terminated in violation of their rights under their collective bargaining agreement, SEIU's constitution and bylaws, and the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq . Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the motion is granted.
In August 2016, SEIU Local 73, headquartered in Chicago, Illinois, was taken into trusteeship by SEIU, its international parent union. (See Am. Compl., Ex. B, SEIU Const. and Bylaws, Art. VIII, Sec. 7, ECF No. 67-1 at 50.) Plaintiffs were all employees—and members—of Local 73. They were also members of the Service Employees Staff Union ("SESU"), the exclusive collective bargaining representative of Local 73 employees. Some of the plaintiffs held elective office in SESU.
Plaintiffs disagreed with the policies, direction, and management of Local 73 under Poloyac's trusteeship. While the trusteeship was still in place, plaintiffs independently formed a slate of candidates to campaign for election to leadership positions in the next Local 73 election. Jaos began to publicly discuss the campaign, known as "Members Leading Members" ("MLM"), in March 2017. Poloyac threatened to terminate his employment unless he desisted and supported the trusteeship. In June 2017, Jaos was terminated.
In January 2018, the MLM campaign published its slate of candidates, which included plaintiffs, and their positions on a website. Within the month, English, Woodall, Loza, Nuruddin, Haley, and Simpson were all suspended and then terminated. Their termination letters specifically cited their involvement in the MLM campaign as the reason for their termination.
Plaintiffs immediately filed grievances contesting their suspensions and subsequent terminations, but Local 73 denied them. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 82.) SESU declined to pursue the grievances in arbitration, except in Simpson's case. However, in July 2018, after Simpson testified against SEIU in another lawsuit, SESU President Trumaine Reeves informed Simpson that it would no longer seek a hearing on his grievance.
Plaintiffs filed this suit in August 2018, asserting claims for violation of their rights under the LMRDA and their collective bargaining agreement. The Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but gave plaintiffs leave to re-plead the breach of collective bargaining agreement claim. (See Sep. 27, 2019 Mem. Op. & Order, ECF No. 56.) Plaintiffs filed the present amended complaint, and defendants have moved to dismiss.
"A motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted." Richards v. Mitcheff , 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The short and plain statement under Rule 8(a)(2) must " ‘give the defendant fair notice of what...the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ " Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) ).
Under federal notice-pleading standards, a plaintiff's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. Stated differently, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility standard, [courts must] accept the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true, but [they] ‘need[ ] not accept as true legal conclusions, or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.’ " Alam v. Miller Brewing Co. , 709 F.3d 662, 665-66 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Brooks v. Ross , 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) ).
In their four-count amended complaint, plaintiffs claim that defendants violated their rights under (1) Articles 11 and 12 of the collective bargaining agreement between Local 73 and SESU by terminating plaintiffs without just cause or due process; (2) the SEIU constitution and bylaws by failing to give plaintiffs a full hearing on their grievances or an opportunity to appeal to SEIU's International Executive Board; (3) the Local 73 constitution and bylaws by denying plaintiffs their right to a hearing in accord with the procedures of the SEIU constitution, as well as their right to vote, express opinions, participate in meetings, and otherwise freely exercise the rights guaranteed by the SEIU Constitution; and (4) the LMRDA by terminating plaintiffs even though, at the time the trusteeship was imposed, Jaos was an elected official whose term was not due to expire until after the trusteeship was expected to end and the other plaintiffs (apart from Simpson) were elected officials of SESU.
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), "provides for federal subject-matter jurisdiction over ‘[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization,’ " including collective bargaining agreements.
Lippert Tile Co. v. Int'l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen, Dist. Council of Wis. & Its Local 5 , 724 F.3d 939, 944 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) ). Plaintiffs assert that Local 73 terminated them without just cause and without performing its obligations during the grievance process, in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. As in their earlier motion to dismiss, defendants argue that plaintiffs have not pleaded sufficient facts to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that SESU breached its duty to fairly represent plaintiffs, a prerequisite of any union member's claim that his employer breached a collective bargaining agreement. See Yeftich v. Navistar, Inc. , 722 F.3d 911, 914 (7th Cir. 2013) ().
"To balance the power bestowed upon a union to exclusively represent all employees in employment disputes, a concomitant duty of fair representation is owed by the union to each of its members." Nemsky v. ConocoPhillips Co. , 574 F.3d 859, 865 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The duty extends not only to collective bargaining with an employer but also to " ‘enforcement of the resulting collective bargaining agreement,’ " Rupcich v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union , 833 F.3d 847, 853 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Vaca v. Sipes , 386 U.S. 171, 177, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967) ), including " ‘provisions for processing grievances,’ " Rupcich , 833 F.3d at 853 (quoting NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. , 388 U.S. 175, 180, 87 S.Ct. 2001, 18 L.Ed.2d 1123 (1967) ).
Courts afford unions "considerable discretion in dealing with grievance matters," and unions may "consider the interests of all [their] members when deciding whether or not to press the claims of an individual employee." Garcia v. Zenith Elecs. Corp. , 58 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). By their nature, unions "represent[ ] all the employees acting as a unit by majority vote," and "majority rule is an important characteristic" of the "collective action" unions take to benefit their members. Id. at 1175-76. Therefore, "[t]he interests of individual employees sometimes may be compromised for the sake of the larger bargaining collective." Id. at 1176. "The union may also consider the merits of the case or the effect on the larger collective bargaining unit in making various strategic decisions during the grievance procedure." Id. at 1176. "Thus even during an individual grievance procedure, the union's own credibility, its integrity as a bargaining agent and the interests of all its members may be at stake," so "[t]he union is...entitled to enjoy a somewhat different perspective than the individual employee it represents in a grievance matter.’ Id.
But the union's discretion is not unlimited, and it breaches its duty of fair representation "if its actions are (1) arbitrary, (2) discriminatory, or (3) made in bad faith." Bishop v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l , 900 F.3d...
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