Enlow v. Fire Protection Systems, Inc.

• Citation: 803 S.W.2d 148
• Decision Date: 22 January 1991
• Docket Number: No. 57776,57776
• Parties: 13 Employee Benefits Cas. 1472 Debra Graves ENLOW, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS, INC. and Anna Marie Enlow, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

Page 148

803 S.W.2d 148

13 Employee Benefits Cas. 1472

Debra Graves ENLOW, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS, INC. and Anna Marie Enlow Defendants-Appellants.

No. 57776.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Eastern District,

Division Three.

Jan. 22, 1991.

David Alan Horwitz, Louis S. Czech, Clayton, for defendants-appellants.

Eric Taylor, Elliott I. Goldberger, Daniel M. Roddy, St. Louis, for plaintiff-respondent.

STEPHAN, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment in a court-tried case. Respondent, Debra Graves Enlow, brought this action to recover benefits as the surviving spouse of Michael Enlow. Appellant, Anna Marie Enlow, was Michael's mother. She and Michael's employer, Fire Protection Systems, Inc., argued that Anna Marie Enlow was the designated beneficiary under the Fire Protection Systems, Inc. Employees Retirement Plan (the "Plan"). They further argued that respondent was not legally married to the deceased, or, in the alternative, they had not been married for the one year period required by the Plan. The trial court found that the marriage was valid and that respondent automatically became Michael's beneficiary at the time they married. From this judgment appellants brought their appeal.

Michael was a full-time employee of Fire Protection Systems, Inc. As a result of his employment he was eligible to participate in the Plan. At the time of his death, Michael was fully vested and entitled to benefits totalling $21,988.93. On August 4, 1981, Michael designated his mother as his beneficiary on a form provided by the Plan for that purpose.

On July 4, 1988 Michael and respondent were married, before witnesses, in Montego Bay, in the Country of the Island of Jamaica. On August 20, 1988, and while still in the employ of Fire Protection Systems, Michael was killed in a motorcycle accident.

Respondent made a claim for benefits with Fire Protection Systems. She told them that she was entitled to the death benefits provided by the Plan because she was Michael's surviving spouse. When payment was not forthcoming, respondent filed suit in St. Louis County. Her first petition was subsequently amended. Appellants answered and alleged that Anna Marie Enlow was the designated beneficiary under the Plan, and she was entitled to the death benefits.

Respondent's evidence showed that she and Michael were married on July 4, 1988 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. She testified that they both signed a marriage register and that the ceremony was performed before witnesses and a minister. She further testified that she and Michael lived together as husband and wife. Witnesses of the wedding ceremony also testified at trial.

Appellants produced the testimony of an expert witness, Joseph Tolan, who worked for Compensation Management, Inc., the Administrator of the Plan. Mr. Tolan testified that Anna Marie Enlow was the decedent's beneficiary pursuant to the designation form on file, and, according to the terms of the Plan, the marriage did not automatically change the designated beneficiary because of its short duration. Other facts will be adduced as they become necessary.

Our standard of review in this court-tried action is pursuant to the oft cited rule in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976). We will not reverse the trial court's judgment unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence or unless it erroneously applies the law. Id. at 32.

We first consider a motion taken with the case. Appellants' legal file includes a document entitled "To Whom It May Concern" which sets out the procedures one must follow in order to obtain a valid marriage in the Country of the Island of Jamaica. Respondent filed a motion to strike this document because it was not before the trial court.

We reviewed the entire record including the transcript and were unable to find any reference to this document. It was not filed as an exhibit at trial. Appellants did not reply to respondent's motion so there is no indication of when or where the trial court might have considered it. We, therefore, agree with respondent and order that the document be stricken from the record on appeal.

In their first point, appellants allege that the trial court erred in finding the marriage between respondent and Michael was valid. This argument was not contained in appellants' answers or counterclaims. It was, however, contained in the motion for new trial and, apparently, was considered by the trial court. We may review the argument.

Appellants' arguments are predicated on the fact that respondent was attempting to prove a common law marriage. Pursuant to statute, common law marriages are null and void in the State of Missouri. Section 451.040.5, RSMo 1986. The policy behind this legislative declaration is to require some amount of solemnity and reliability in establishing the marriage of those domiciled in and residing in Missouri. Hesington v. Estate of Hesington, 640 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Mo.App.1982). Missouri will not recognize a common law marriage between Missouri residents even if the marriage occurs in a state which recognizes common law marriage. Stein v. Stein, 641 S.W.2d 856, 857 (Mo.App.1982).

Appellants have correctly stated the law governing common law marriage in this state. We hold, however, that the evidence supported the trial court's finding of a ceremonial marriage, not a common law marriage.

It is the public policy of this state to allow the fact of marriage to be proven by evidence of cohabitation and general repute, and by the declarations and conduct of the parties. In re Estate of Tomlinson, 493 S.W.2d 402, 403 (Mo.App.1973). Such evidence constitutes primary, strong and convincing proof of marriage and, if not rebutted, creates a presumption of marriage. Id. The burden of proving the invalidity of a marriage rests upon the party asserting the invalidity, and a marriage will not be declared invalid except upon clear, cogent and convincing evidence. In re Marriage of Burnside, 777 S.W.2d 660, 664 (Mo.App.1989).

Respondent's evidence indicated that a ceremonial marriage took place in Montego Bay, Jamaica, on July 4, 1988. She testified that she and Michael signed a marriage register and that a ceremony was performed by a minister, before witnesses. One of the witnesses, Mack Clay, testified that he was present at the ceremony and that he signed the marriage register as a witness. He further testified that he spent time with the couple in Jamaica after the ceremony and that, during this time, they generally presented themselves as newlyweds.

After returning to St. Louis, respondent and Michael lived together as husband and wife. They opened a joint checking account in the names of Michael T. or Debra J. Enlow. Michael sent respondent an anniversary card one month after the wedding. Various exhibits were presented at trial which named respondent as Michael's surviving spouse. These included the obituary notices in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and the County-Star Journal, and the death certificate.

The fact of a marriage may be proved by direct, circumstantial or presumptive evidence and by documentary or parol evidence. Thomson v. Thomson, 236 Mo.App. 1223, 163 S.W.2d 792, 796 (1942). Direct testimony of one of the parties may serve as proof of the existence of marriage. Vanderson v. Vanderson, 668 S.W.2d 167, 171 (Mo.App.1984).

Appellants argue that the copy of the marriage register, which came from Jamaica, contained errors. This, in and of itself, is insufficient to overcome the presumption of marriage. See, Thomson, 163 S.W.2d at 796. It would hardly be prudent to require that a marriage could only be proved by the issuance of a document. To do so could make it nearly impossible for some couples to prove the legality of their marriage. Tomlinson, 493 S.W.2d at 405.

Appellants did not present any evidence which would rise to the level of clear, cogent and convincing. There is strong circumstantial, presumptive, and parol evidence supporting the fact of a marriage between respondent and Michael. The trial court did not err in finding a valid marriage. Point I is denied.

In their second point, appellants argue that the trial court erred in finding that the respondent was automatically entitled to Michael's death benefits. They argue that the Plan and federal law both require that a spouse be married to the participant for a one year period. Respondent argues that, even though Anna Marie was designated beneficiary, the terms of the Plan and the terms of the beneficiary designation provide that a spouse is automatically designated beneficiary upon marriage.

Neither party saw fit to brief the question of federal preemption: whether the Plan was governed by the exclusive provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq, although both sides agree that the Plan is within the scope of ERISA. As the question addresses our subject matter jurisdiction, we decide it sua sponte.

ERISA was established to "protect ... the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts." 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b). Congress also provided that ERISA should have a preemptive effect, by providing, "[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). ¹

The Supreme Court has noted that the phrase ...