Ennenga v. State

Citation812 N.W.2d 696
Decision Date04 May 2012
Docket NumberNo. 10–1911.,10–1911.
PartiesRoger B. ENNENGA, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Iowa

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Gary D. Dickey of Dickey & Campbell Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kyle P. Hanson, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Jaki L. Livingston, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

ZAGER, Justice.

In this case, we must interpret a rule of criminal procedure which implements the speedy trial guarantees found in both the State and Federal Constitutions. If a defendant does not waive these rights, then Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33 requires the court dismiss a prosecution if an indictment or trial information is not “found” within forty-five days of the defendant's arrest, unless the State can show good cause for its failure. The State inexplicably failed to file a trial information within forty-five days, and Ennenga's counsel did not file a motion to dismiss. Thereafter, Ennenga's counsel allowed him to plead guilty. We must determine whether an indictment must be filed in order to be “found” and whether failing to ensure an indictment is timely filed amounts to the breach of an essential duty by an accused's counsel. We find that counsel breached an essential duty in failing to file a motion to dismiss the untimely trial information. This resulted in prejudice to Ennenga by his plea of guilty. We vacate the decision of the court of appeals, and the district court judgment is reversed and remanded.

I. Background Facts.

On December 22, 2005, Roger Ennenga failed to stop his vehicle when police attempted to pull him over. Police were ultimately able to apprehend Ennenga. While taking him into custody, officers discovered a pack of cigarettes containing methamphetamine in his shirt pocket. A criminal complaint was filed on December 23 charging him with felony eluding and possession of a controlled substance—methamphetamine.1 After an initial appearance, Ennenga was released on bond that same day and was ordered to appear on January 3, 2006. Later on December 23, the district court determined that Ennenga's bond was insufficient, increased the bond amount, and issued a warrant for Ennenga's arrest. Ennenga did not appear as ordered on January 3, 2006. Ennenga was rearrested on January 10, and his initial appearance occurred on January 11. At that time, the court scheduled Ennenga's preliminary hearing for January 20.

On January 20, the State presented Ennenga and the court with a trial information. The trial information was signed by the district court, but it does not show that it was filed with the clerk of court. The trial information charged Ennenga with one count of eluding a law enforcement vehicle in violation of Iowa Code section 321.279(3)( b) (2005), and one count of possession of a controlled substance in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5).2 Ennenga's attorney also signed the trial information at that time acknowledging receipt of the trial information with the minutes of testimony attached. Ennenga claimed he received an unsigned copy of the trial information as well but denied receiving the minutes of testimony. The court proceeded with the arraignment at that time instead of the scheduled preliminary hearing, and Ennenga entered pleas of not guilty.3 A pretrial conference was set for February 16, and trial was set for March 15. The arraignment order had a line which read, “On __________ a Trial Information was Filed.” This blank was not filled in, indicating that at the time of Ennenga's arraignment, the State had not yet filed a trial information.

A pretrial conference was conducted on February 16. According to the pretrial conference order, Ennenga had not waived his speedy trial rights. However, the State offered to allow Ennenga to plead to the eluding charge in exchange for dismissing the possession charge. Trial remained set for March 15. The trial information was filed with the clerk of court the following day, on February 17, fifty-six days after Ennenga's arrest. On March 2, the district court approved a supplemental trial information where the State gave notice that it was charging Ennenga as an habitual offender under the provisions found in Iowa Code section 902.8. The supplemental trial information was signed by the court and filed with the clerk of court that same day. The next day, Ennenga pled guilty to the eluding charge. The possession charge and the habitual offender enhancement were dismissed. Ennenga elected to proceed to immediate sentencing, and the district court sentenced him to up to five years imprisonment, which the district court ordered be served consecutive with the sentence imposed in an unrelated case.

Ennenga filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence on May 24. Ennenga included a copy of the January 20 trial information that was not signed by the prosecutor, the court, or his attorney, and that was stamped “For Defendant or Attorney.” He also included a copy that was signed by the State, the court, and his attorney. Ennenga believed this second copy was filed stamped January 17 and that the difference between the two trial informations meant that his sentence was illegal. The motion was denied June 21.

Ennenga filed a second pro se motion for correction of an illegal sentence on October 19. He claimed he was denied the right to a preliminary hearing. He noted that rule 2.5(4) requires a trial information be “promptly filed” after it is approved by the court and that the trial information was not promptly filed. The motion went on to claim that the evidence in the trial information should therefore have been inadmissible. The district court denied this motion on October 23.

Ennenga filed a number of additional pro se motions attacking what he believed was an illegal sentence. All of these motions were denied by the court. On April 5, 2007, Ennenga filed a notice of appeal. The appeal was dismissed on February 14, 2008, and procedendo was issued on February 25.

Meanwhile, on February 19, 2007, Ennenga requested assistance of counsel for the preparation of an application for postconviction relief (PCR). On December 21, 2007, Ennenga filed an application for appointment of PCR counsel. Counsel was appointed January 16, 2008.

Ennenga filed an application for PCR on September 4, 2009, and counsel filed an amended application on November 23.4 He alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective because he allowed Ennenga to plead guilty on March 3, 2006, rather than filing a motion to dismiss the charges based on the State's failure to file the trial information within forty-five days as required by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2). The State conceded Ennenga was arrested on December 23, 2005, the speedy indictment deadline ran on February 6, 2006, and the trial information was filed on February 17. However, the State noted the presiding judge approved the trial information on January 20, and Ennenga and his counsel were provided with a copy of the trial information that same day. Accordingly, the purpose of the speedy indictment rule was served, and the failure to file was merely “a clerical error, nothing more.”

The district court found

Ennenga's failure to appear and second arrest provide good cause for the delay in having the trial information signed within forty-five days of his first arrest. This is particularly true where Ennenga received a copy of the signed trial information setting out the charges against him within the forty-five days of his first arrest, and where he was afforded a speedy trial, which he waived by pleading guilty. This good cause excuses the technical failure to file the trial information within forty-five days of Ennenga's first arrest and thus cannot give rise to the basis for ineffective assistance of counsel.

The district court then dismissed Ennenga's application for PCR. Ennenga timely appealed. We transferred the case to the court of appeals which affirmed the district court. Ennenga applied for further review, which we granted.

II. Standard of Review.

Under both the State and Federal Constitutions, ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are reviewed de novo. State v. Bearse, 748 N.W.2d 211, 214 (Iowa 2008); Hannan v. State, 732 N.W.2d 45, 50 (Iowa 2007). Though rulings on postconviction relief are usually reviewed for a correction of errors at law, when an applicant asserts a constitutional claim as the basis for postconviction relief, we review that claim de novo. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001).

III. Discussion.

We have summarized the applicant's burden when making an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in the PCR context as follows:

“To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must show that (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) prejudice resulted.” There is a presumption the attorney acted competently, and prejudice will not be found unless there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Hannan, 732 N.W.2d at 50 (citations omitted). Ennenga must prove both the “essential duty” and “prejudice” elements by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Utter, 803 N.W.2d 647, 652 (Iowa 2011).

A. Failure to Perform an Essential Duty: Counsel's Failure to Protect Ennenga's Speedy Trial Rights. The Iowa Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a speedy trial. Iowa Const. art. I, § 10. Since 1851, the legislature has implemented this guarantee by requiring the court to dismiss a criminal prosecution when the State fails to indict an accused in a timely manner, unless the State can show good cause for that failure. Iowa Code § 3248 (1851). The legislature reaffirmed its commitment to this principle in 1976, which was the same year the legislature authorized this court to promulgate changes to the rules of criminal procedure. See 1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1245(2),...

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