Enriquez v. Villanueva
| Decision Date | 29 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-17-00719-CV,04-17-00719-CV |
| Parties | Juan ENRIQUEZ, Appellant v. Dwayne VILLANUEVA, Karnes County Sheriff, Individually and in his Official Capacity, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
From the 81st Judicial District Court, Karnes County, Texas
Honorable Russell Wilson, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
AFFIRMED
In this inmate litigation, Appellant complains that venue was not proper in Karnes County. He appeals the order granting Appellee's plea to the jurisdiction, based on qualified and official immunity, and dismissing Appellant's claims as frivolous. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.002, .003, .006 (West 2017). We affirm the trial court's order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant Juan Enriquez is an inmate confined by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Institutional Division at the Terrell Unit in Brazoria County, Texas. At the time he filed suit, Enriquez was serving a life sentence for murder. At all times during the pendency of this lawsuit and this appeal, Enriquez appeared pro se. He sued Appellee Dwayne Villanueva, individually and in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Karnes County, Texas.
In his original petition against Sheriff Villanueva, Enriquez alleges that in 1966, he was convicted in Karnes County of capital murder and was subsequently placed in prison on a death warrant to await execution. Enriquez's sentence was later commuted by the governor to a life sentence. In 2016, Enriquez filed in Karnes County a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
In January 2017, the trial court appointed counsel for Enriquez, set the habeas proceeding for a hearing, and issued a bench warrant compelling Enriquez's presence at the hearing. The bench warrant directed Sheriff Villanueva as follows:
"[Y]ou, the said DWAYNE VILLANUEVA, Sheriff of KARNES County, Texas are hereby directed to call upon the proper authorities of the TEXAS DEPARTMENT CRIMINAL JUSTICE, for permission to take the body of said JUAN ENRIQUEZ and to safely convey him to the County Jail of KARNES County, Texas in KARNES CITY, Texas, to answer the State of Texas as a Defendant, and that you safely keep him in said jail until further orders of this Court are made and entered.
Sheriff Villanueva executed the bench warrant and retrieved Enriquez from the Terrell Unit, but not before agreeing with the Terrell Unit warden to return Enriquez to the "TDCJ after completing the demands of the Bench Warrant/Federal Writ Court Order."
The trial court continued the January hearing and Enriquez was transferred back to the Brazoria County penitentiary pursuant to the agreement between Sheriff Villanueva and the warden.
On May 12, 2017, Enriquez filed a lawsuit in Nueces County seeking damages against Sheriff Villanueva, in his personal and official capacities, on the grounds that Sheriff Villanueva should not have returned him to the penitentiary. Enriquez sued Sheriff Villanueva for falseimprisonment and cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and prayed for actual, exemplary, and nominal damages of over $10 million.
Enriquez also asserted that venue in Nueces County was proper because he was a resident of Nueces County. In later pleadings, Enriquez declared he was born in Nueces County, where he had lived his entire life, and he intended to return to Nueces County when released from prison. At the time Enriquez filed his lawsuit against Sheriff Villanueva, Enriquez was serving his sentence at the Terrell Unit in Brazoria County.
Villanueva filed a timely motion to transfer venue to Karnes County asserting that venue was mandatory in that county under Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 15.015. Subject to the motion to transfer venue, Villanueva also filed a plea to the jurisdiction, a motion to dismiss, and his answer. In his answer, Villanueva asserted the affirmative defenses of qualified and official immunity.
After the venue hearing, the Nueces County trial court agreed that venue was proper in Karnes County, and the case was transferred to Karnes County. In Karnes County, the trial court granted Villanueva's plea to the jurisdiction based on the defenses of qualified and official immunity, and it dismissed Enriquez's claims as frivolous.
This appeal followed.
PRO SE PARTIES
Enriquez appeared pro se before the trial court and is also representing himself before this court. "We construe liberally pro se pleadings and briefs; however, we hold pro se litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure." Washington v. Bank of N.Y., 362 S.W.3d 853, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.); In re N.E.B., 251 S.W.3d 211, 211-12 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (citing Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 18.1, 184-85 (Tex. 1978)). "To do [otherwise] would give a prose litigant an unfair advantage over a litigant who is represented by counsel." Shull v. United Parcel Serv., 4 S.W.3d 46, 53 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).
VENUE
In his first issue, Enriquez argues that Nueces County is a proper venue for his suit against Sheriff Villanueva because Enriquez resides in that county or intends to reside in that county when he is released from the State penitentiary.
Villanueva argues that, because the mandatory venue provision under section 15.015 applies and he was sued in his official capacity, Karnes County is the proper venue.
Our review of an order granting a motion to transfer venue is de novo and governed by section 15.064(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which provides as follows:
On appeal from the trial on the merits, if venue was improper it shall in no event be harmless error and shall be reversible error. In determining whether venue was or was not proper, the appellate court shall consider the entire record, including the trial on the merits.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(b); see Wilson v. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep't, 886 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex. 1994) (); In re A.D.P., 281 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, no pet.).
"If there is any probative evidence in the entire record that venue was proper, we must uphold the trial court's determination on the matter of venue." Bonham State Bank v. Beadle, 907 S.W.2d 465, 471 (Tex. 1995) .
When a lawsuit is filed, the plaintiff is generally afforded the first right to choose venue.
Venue selection presupposes that the parties to the lawsuit have choices and preferences about where their case will be tried. Venue may be proper in many counties under general, mandatory, or permissive venue rules. The plaintiff is given the first choice in the filing of the lawsuit. If the plaintiff's venue choice is not properly challenged through a motion to transfer venue, the propriety of venue is fixed in the county chosen by the plaintiff. If a defendant objects to the plaintiff's venue choice and properly challenges that choice through a motion to transfer venue, the question of proper venue is raised.
Rosales v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 905 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, writ denied) (quoting Wilson, 886 S.W.2d at 260 (citations and footnotes omitted)). Under the venue statutory scheme, the party who seeks to maintain venue in a particular county bears the burden to prove "that venue is maintainable in the county of suit." TEX. R. CIV. P. 87-2(a); Wilson, 886 S.W.2d at 260.
A mandatory venue provision such as section 15.015 mandates venue in a specific county. Wichita Cty., Tex. v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Tex. 1996). When section 15.015 applies, this section takes precedence over other mandatory or permissive venue provisions. Randall Cty. v. Todd, 542 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1976, no writ).
When a defendant seeks to transfer venue under a mandatory venue provision, that defendant has the burden to prove "that venue is maintainable in the county to which the transfer is sought by virtue of one or more mandatory venue exceptions." TEX. R. CIV. P. 87-2(a); see In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1999). "If the plaintiff files suit in an impermissible county, he waives his option of where to file suit and the defendant may have the suit transferred to another county, as long as venue is proper in that other county." Maranatha Temple, Inc. v. Enter. Prods. Co., 833 S.W.2d 736, 741 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
On the other hand, if the plaintiff files suit in a permissible county, a defendant may still request a transfer of venue to a mandatory venue. When the defendant meets the burden of proof that suit is proper under a mandatory venue provision, the trial court must grant the motion. In re Fisher, 433 S.W.3d 523, 534 (Tex. 2014) (citing Wichita Cty. v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Tex. 1996)).
At the time Enriquez filed his suit in Nueces County against Sheriff Villanueva, Enriquez was housed at the Terrell Unit in Brazoria County.1
In his petition, Enriquez only alleged that venue was proper in Nueces County "because Petitioner is a resident of Nueces County." Throughout his petition, however, Enriquez admits being incarcerated in Brazoria County. Indeed, in his response to Sheriff Villanueva's motion to transfer venue, Enriquez declared under penalty of perjury that he denied pleading a cause of action against Karnes County and that he "identified Defendant Villanueva in his official capacity only to comply with the 'under color of law' requirement of 42 U.S.C. [§] 183." Enriquez also declared...
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