Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 September 1993
• Docket Number: No. D-1903,D-1903
• Citation: 868 S.W.2d 752
• Parties: Javier RUIZ, Petitioner, v. CONOCO, INC., Respondent.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 752

868 S.W.2d 752

Javier RUIZ, Petitioner, v. CONOCO, INC., Respondent.

No. D-1903.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Sept. 29, 1993.

Supplemental Appendix by Justice Hecht

Feb. 9, 1994.

.Dissenting Opinion of Justice Doggett

on Motion for Rehearing Feb. 9, 1994.

Anthony F. Constant, Kimberley Hall Seger, Russell H. McMains, Corpus Christi, for petitioner.

Darrell L. Barger, Carlos Villarreal, Corpus Christi, Marina K. Pita, W. James Kronzer, Jr., Leslie C. Taylor, Houston, for respondent.

OPINION ON REHEARING

HECHT, Justice.

The motion for rehearing of Conoco, Inc. is granted, and our prior opinion is withdrawn. This is now the opinion of the Court.

This case presents four principal questions: (1) is limitations tolled on a cause of action of a person of unsound mind during the pendency of a lawsuit brought on his behalf? (2) does the involuntary dismissal of an action for want of prosecution while a motion to transfer venue to another county is pending fix venue in that other county? (3) is appellate review of a venue determination limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on the motion to transfer, or does it extend to whether the venue issue was in fact properly decided based upon the entire record in the trial court? and (4) for a foreign corporation to be sued in a county where it has an agent or representative, must that person have broad discretionary authority to act for the corporation? The trial court held that this action is not barred by limitations, and that venue was proper in Starr County. The court of appeals affirmed as to limitations but reversed as to venue. 818 S.W.2d 118 (1991). We affirm.

I

Javier Ruiz, a resident of Hidalgo County, sustained severe and permanent head injuries in Webb County while working for Cameron Iron Works, Inc. on an oil well owned by Conoco, Inc. Ruiz and his wife filed suit in Harris County against Cameron, which immediately joined Conoco as a third-party defendant. Ruiz and his wife later sued Conoco in Zapata County. Both suits were dismissed, the former for discovery abuse and the latter for want of prosecution. Thereafter, suit was filed in Hidalgo County for an adjudication that Ruiz was mentally incompetent, no such action having previously been filed. Ruiz was adjudged incompetent from the date of his accident, and his wife was appointed guardian of his estate and person. Ruiz then sued Conoco in Starr County through his wife as his newly appointed guardian. The present appeal arises out of this third lawsuit.

Conoco moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the Starr County action is barred by limitations. The dates of the events just described, important to the limitations issue, are as follows:

1/24/84 Ruiz injured

1/13/86 Ruiz sued Cameron in Harris County eleven days before the expiration

of two years from the date of his accident

1/26/87 Ruiz sued Conoco in Zapata County more than three years after his

accident

4/21/87 Zapata County suit dismissed after it had been pending less than three

months

4/29/88 Harris County suit dismissed after it had been pending more than

twenty-five months

1/6/89 Ruiz adjudicated mentally incompetent from the date of his accident

9/22/89 Ruiz sued Conoco in Starr County through his newly appointed guardian

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The trial court denied Conoco's motion for summary judgment, holding that Ruiz' legal disability tolled the running of limitations.

Conoco also moved to transfer venue of Ruiz' action from Starr County to Harris County. Conoco is a Delaware corporation with its principal office in Harris County. In the Zapata County suit, Conoco moved to transfer venue to Harris County, and that motion remained pending when the action was dismissed for want of prosecution. Conoco contends that the pendency of its motion to transfer at the time of dismissal fixed venue in Harris County. Conoco also contends that venue was improper in Starr County because it had no "agency or representative" there. The trial court rejected both contentions and denied Conoco's motion.

Midway through the trial the parties reached an agreement with the trial court's approval pursuant to which the evidence was closed, the jury was discharged, the trial court rendered judgment against Conoco for $4.5 million, and Conoco paid Ruiz' wife, children and attorneys $450,000. Conoco did not agree to the judgment but simply did not object to its rendition, preserving its right of appeal, but agreeing to limit that appeal to two issues, limitations and venue. The parties expressly contemplated that if Conoco ultimately prevailed on either issue, the Starr County judgment would be reversed; that if it prevailed on the limitations issue, judgment would be rendered that Ruiz recover nothing; and that if Conoco prevailed on the venue issue, the case would be remanded and transferred to a district court in Harris County for further proceedings. ¹

The court of appeals held that Ruiz' suit was not barred by limitations, but that venue was not proper in Starr County. Consequently, the court of appeals reversed and remanded, ordering that the case be transferred to Harris County. 818 S.W.2d 118. Both Ruiz and Conoco appeal.

II

By prescription of the applicable statute of limitations, Ruiz' action must be brought within two years of the date it accrued. TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE § 16.003 (1986). Since Ruiz' action accrued on the date of his injury, and the present action was not filed until well over five years later, the action is barred unless the running of the limitations period was tolled. Ruiz claims that the limitations period in section 16.003 was tolled by his mental incompetency according to the provisions of section 16.001 of the same subchapter, which states in pertinent part:

(a) For the purposes of this subchapter, a person is under a legal disability if the person is:

(1) younger than 18 years of age, regardless of whether the person is married; or

(2) of unsound mind.

(b) If a person entitled to bring a personal action is under a legal disability Conoco concedes that Ruiz was under a legal disability--mental incompetency--from the date of his accident, but argues that limitations should have been tolled only during periods when Ruiz did not have access to the courts to assert his rights. Specifically, Conoco argues that limitations was not tolled while the Harris County and Zapata County suits were pending, a period exceeding two years. Thus, Conoco contends, Ruiz' action is barred by limitations.

when the cause of action accrues, the time of the disability is not included in a limitations period.

Texas courts have had only limited opportunities to consider the effect of the tolling provision now codified as section 16.001. Its general purpose has been stated as follows:

[T]o protect a legally disabled party who has no access to the courts, and to insure that his right to bring suit will not be precluded by the running of a limitations statute prior to the removal of his disability.

Johnson v. McLean, 630 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ) (emphasis added); see also Smith v. Erhard, 715 S.W.2d 707, 708 (Tex.App.--Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Adler v. Beverly Hills Hosp., 594 S.W.2d 153, 158 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1980, no writ). Conoco focuses on the "no access to the courts" language of Johnson, arguing that Ruiz did in fact have such access and therefore the purpose for tolling limitations was served. We do not construe the tolling provision so narrowly.

In Johnson, a prisoner sued his former attorney but did not exercise due diligence in serving him with process. The trial court held that Johnson's action was barred by limitations. Johnson argued that the tolling provision relieved him of the requirement of due diligence in prosecuting and pursuing his claim as long as he was incarcerated. At the time, imprisonment was included as a legal disability under the statute. ² The court of appeals agreed with the trial court, holding that "inasmuch as appellant timely filed his lawsuit during his period of legal disability, the protective provisions of [the tolling statute] do not apply." 630 S.W.2d at 793 (emphasis added).

The reasoning in Johnson--that access in fact to the courts suspends a legal disability--has not been utilized in cases involving minors. See Greathouse v. Fort Worth & Denver City Ry., 65 S.W.2d 762, 765 (Tex.Comm'n App.1933, holding approved); Hopkins v. Spring Indep.Sch.Dist., 706 S.W.2d 325, 326 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist] 1986), aff'd, 736 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.1987); Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Washington, 25 Tex.Civ.App. 600, 63 S.W. 538 (1901, no writ). We have compared the legal disabilities of minority status and mental incapacity:

It is impossible to avoid the analogy between the situation of the child plaintiff ... and the arguably incompetent plaintiff in this case. Traditionally the interests of minors, incompetents, and other helpless persons are viewed in law as substantially similar, and both the substantive law and the rules of procedure accord them comparable treatment. In many respects, mentally incompetent persons present a more compelling case for legal protection. They are frequently less communicative, more vulnerable and dependent than children.... The mentally incompetent are less likely than children to have someone intimately interested in their welfare and inclined to act in their behalf.

Tinkle v. Henderson, 730 S.W.2d 163, 166 (Tex.App.--Tyler 1987, writ ref'd). Access to the courts does not alone provide a legally incapacitated person a viable opportunity to protect his legal rights. The disability of a person of unsound mind is not only the lack of access to the courts, but also the inability to participate in, control, or even understand the progression and disposition of their lawsuit. Whatever validity may remain in Johnson as it applies to prisoners, the purpose and scope of the tolling provision, as applied to...