A & E Enterprises, Inc. v. Clairsin, Inc., ED 85614.
| Citation | 169 S.W.3d 884 |
| Decision Date | 30 August 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. ED 85614.,ED 85614. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
| Parties | A & E ENTERPRISES, INC., Appellant, v. CLAIRSIN, INC., Respondent, and Missouri Highways and Transportation Commission, Defendant. |
Andrew R. Kasnetz, St. Louis, MO, for Appellant.
Joseph Vincent Keady, Jr., Clayton, Philip E. Morgan, Jr., Chesterfield, MO, for Respondent.
A & E Enterprises, Inc. (A & E) appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Clairsin, Inc. (Clairsin) in A & E's action to set aside a conveyance of real property from the Missouri Highways and Transportation Commission (MHTC) to Clairsin. A & E contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in Clairsin's favor because MHTC exceeded its authority under Section 227.290, RSMo 2000,1 by failing to provide A & E with notice of its intention to sell the property and thereby rendering the conveyance to Clairsin void. Because we find there was no genuine issue of material fact and Clairsin was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, we affirm.
On March 6, 1964, MHTC obtained two tracts of land (Property) owned in fee simple absolute by Earnest, Josephine, Arthur, and Esther Dohacks (collectively referred to as the Dohacks). MHTC acquired the land by condemnation in connection with its construction and operation of the highways located in southern St. Louis County. The Dohacks remained the owners of other parcels of land adjoining the Property on the north and northeast sides. In August of 1978, the Dohacks formed a corporation, A & E, and the title to the adjacent parcels of land was transferred to A & E by quitclaim deed. The Dohacks are the principals and sole shareholders of A & E. Beginning in 1996, A & E leased the adjacent parcel on the north side to Dave Sinclair Ford, Inc., a.k.a. Clairsin.
On September 1, 2000, MHTC conveyed the Property in a quitclaim deed to Clairsin in exchange for $128,000. The quitclaim deed was prepared by employees of the Missouri Department of Transportation (MoDOT) and signed by MHTC Vice Chairman, Edward Douglas, and attested by Mary Ann Winters, Secretary to the MHTC.
Thereafter, on November 7, 2002, A & E filed a petition to set aside the conveyance and for damages naming Clairsin and MHTC as defendants. MHTC filed a cross-claim for declaratory judgment against Clairsin alleging the quitclaim deed was not authorized by MHTC and was therefore void. Clairsin subsequently filed a cross-claim against MHTC requesting a declaratory judgment that it was a bona fide purchaser of the Property and that MHTC authorized the conveyance.2 A & E, MHTC, and Clairsin each filed motions for summary judgment. A & E and MHTC both asserted in their motions for summary judgment that they were entitled to summary judgment because neither MHTC nor MoDOT gave notice of the sale to the Dohacks or A & E as required by Section 227.290, and, therefore, the conveyance was void. In its motion for summary judgment, Clairsin contended A & E was not the grantor nor in possession of the adjoining land under Section 227.290 and therefore, MHTC was not required to give notice. The trial court subsequently entered summary judgment in favor of Clairsin. A & E now appeals.
In its sole point, A & E contends the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Clairsin. A & E argues MHTC exceeded its authority pursuant to Section 227.290 by failing to provide A & E with notice of its intention to sell the Property, and therefore, the conveyance to Clairsin is void. We disagree.
Appellate review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is essentially de novo. ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). We will review the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered. Id. Facts set forth by affidavit or otherwise in support of a party's motion are taken as true unless contradicted by the non-moving party's response to the summary judgment motion. Id. We accord the non-movant the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record. Id.
The criteria on appeal for testing the propriety of summary judgment are no different from those which should be employed by the trial court to determine the propriety of sustaining the motion initially. Id. The propriety of summary judgment is purely an issue of law. Id. Summary judgment is proper when there are no genuine issues of material facts and ...
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