Epps v. US

Decision Date04 October 1994
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 0:91-1027-19.
Citation862 F. Supp. 1460
PartiesLillie L. EPPS, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

Melvin Lee Roberts, of Melvin L. Roberts & Associates, York, SC, for plaintiff.

Marvin J. Caughman, and John Berkley Grimball, Asst. U.S. Attys., Columbia, SC, for defendant.

ORDER

SHEDD, District Judge.

Plaintiff has brought this negligence action pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80, seeking to recover damages for injuries she sustained as a result of an incident in which she fell on a public sidewalk which abuts the former United States Post Office ("post office") in Fort Mill, South Carolina. On August 10 and 12, 1994, the Court tried this action without a jury.1 After carefully reviewing the record and the controlling legal authorities, the Court concludes that defendant is entitled to judgment. The following findings of fact and conclusions of law, made pursuant to Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, detail the basis for the Court's conclusion.2

I. Findings Of Fact

On August 30, 1989, at approximately 9:00 p.m., plaintiff went to the post office, which was located on the corner of Spring Street and Tom Hall Street in the town of Fort Mill to check her post office box. At that time, the post office was closed, but the area in which the post office boxes were located was open for the convenience of persons to whom the boxes were leased. After parking her car on Spring Street, just north of the post office entrance, plaintiff exited her car, stepped up onto the curb, and started walking on a public sidewalk which abuts the post office. As plaintiff was walking on the sidewalk towards the entrance of the post office, she stepped on a clear plastic band which caught her feet and caused her to fall.

The location of plaintiff's fall is on a public sidewalk, approximately three feet off of the premises leased by the post office.3 Defendant does not control this area. On the night of plaintiff's fall, the area around the entrance of the post office was illuminated by light shining from the post office lobby, a spotlight on the front left corner of the post office building, and a streetlight across the street.

The clear plastic band which caused plaintiff to fall is the type of band which was used to bundle mail that was delivered to the post office. At the time of plaintiff's fall, it was post office procedure to take mail that had been delivered to the post office to a distribution and work area in a back room, separate from the customer area of the post office, where postal employees cut the plastic bands and sorted the mail. Because postal employees knew that the plastic bands, when uncut and not around mail, were a trip hazard, it was post office policy to discipline employees if they failed to cut the plastic bands when removing mail therefrom.4 One exception to this mail sorting procedure was for "firm mail," which is mail addressed to recipients of large amounts of mail. With regard to firm mail, postal employees left the mail bound in the plastic bands and allowed couriers to take it out of the back door of the post office. However, postal employees did not allow mail bound in plastic bands to be taken out the front door of the post office, and they did not place mail bound in plastic bands in any of the individual post office boxes. While there is no evidence to establish how the clear plastic band which caused plaintiff's fall came to be upon the sidewalk, the Court finds that it did come from the post office.

The Postmaster of the Fort Mill Post Office at the time of plaintiff's accident, John Harrison, was responsible for ensuring that all areas outside and inside the premises of the post office were inspected and kept clean. Mr. Harrison's daily routine was to inspect the premises when he came on duty in the morning and again at approximately 6:00 p.m., when he left for the day. Mr. Harrison followed this routine on the day plaintiff fell. While Mr. Harrison never found any uncut plastic bands on or around the premises prior to plaintiff's fall, he occasionally found cut bands near a trash dumpster behind the post office, and he found other debris outside the post office. Mr. Harrison knew of no other accidents or falls on or near the premises of the post office prior to the plaintiff's fall.

As a result of her fall, plaintiff sustained injuries and incurred medical expenses in the amount of $7,533.25. Prior to commencing this action, plaintiff filed an administrative claim with the United States Postal Service, which denied her claim on April 11, 1990. Plaintiff thereafter filed this action alleging that defendant was negligent in: (1) failing to provide adequate lighting at or near the entrance to the post office premises; (2) allowing plastic bands to litter the entrance of the post office; (3) failing to remove the plastic band from the entrance to the post office premises; (4) failing to instruct and train postal employees to keep the plastic bands in work areas in the post office; (5) failing to use safeguards to prevent the plastic bands from being left at the entrance to the post office; and (6) failing to keep the post office premises clear of plastic bands and otherwise safe.

II. Conclusions Of Law

The FTCA provides inter alia that "the United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages." 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Plaintiff has properly exhausted her administrative remedies under the FTCA; see 28 U.S.C. § 2675; and the Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). Because plaintiff's injury occurred in South Carolina, the Court must apply South Carolina law in this case. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674.

Under South Carolina law, negligence is defined as "the failure to use due care; that degree of care which a person of ordinary prudence and reason would exercise under the same circumstances." Hart v. Doe, 261 S.C. 116, 198 S.E.2d 526, 529 (1973). In order to prevail on her claim of negligence, plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) the existence of a legal duty of care on the part of defendant to protect her; (2) defendant's failure to discharge that duty; and (3) injury proximately resulting from defendant's failure to perform its duty. South Carolina State Ports Auth. v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 289 S.C. 373, 346 S.E.2d 324, 325 (1986). "The absence of any one of these elements renders the cause of action insufficient." Id.

The initial inquiry in any negligence case is whether the defendant owed a legal duty of care to protect the plaintiff. "A legal duty is that which the law requires to be done or forborne with respect to a particular individual or the public at large." Byerly v. Connor, 307 S.C. 441, 415 S.E.2d 796, 798 (1992). "It embodies the principle that the plaintiff should not be called to suffer a harm to his person or property which is foreseeable and which can be avoided by the defendant's exercise of reasonable care." Snow v. City of Columbia, 305 S.C. 544, 409 S.E.2d 797, 803 (S.C.App.1991), cert. denied (S.C.1992). "Generally, there is no common law duty to act," Jensen v. Anderson County D.S.S., 304 S.C. 195, 403 S.E.2d 615, 617 (1991); and, therefore, a duty normally arises by statute, contract, relationship, status, property interest, or other special circumstances. Byerly, 415 S.E.2d at 798.

Plaintiff's allegations of negligence can be pared down to two issues. First, plaintiff contends that defendant negligently failed to maintain the safety of the sidewalk by not properly lighting it and by not removing the plastic band upon which she fell from the sidewalk. Second, plaintiff contends that defendant negligently allowed the uncut plastic band upon which she fell to leave the work areas of the post office. The former issue presupposes that defendant had a legal duty to maintain the safety of the sidewalk, while the latter issue presupposes that defendant had a legal duty to keep all uncut plastic bands from leaving the post office work areas. As set forth below, the Court finds that neither of these alleged legal duties existed and, therefore, plaintiff's claims must fail as a matter of law.

A.

The Court will first address plaintiff's claim that defendant had a legal duty to maintain the safety of the public sidewalk abutting the post office premises. Initially, the Court notes that under South Carolina law, a public sidewalk is considered to be part of the street or highway, see S.C.Code Ann. § 56-5-480; Burke v. Davidson, 298 S.C. 370, 380 S.E.2d 839, 840 (S.C.App.1989); and the General Assembly of South Carolina has imposed upon towns and municipalities a duty to keep all public streets, ways, and bridges within the limits therein in good repair. S.C.Code Ann. §§ 5-27-110, -120. Additionally, the state supreme court has held that pedestrians have the right to assume that public sidewalks are maintained by the appropriate governmental entity in reasonably safe condition for public use, Kelley v. City of Aiken, 245 S.C. 503, 141 S.E.2d 651, 653 (1965); and that court has recognized that:

"The general rule in this country is that municipalities which have full and complete control over the streets and highways within their corporate limits are liable in damages for injuries sustained in consequence of their failure to use reasonable care to keep them in a reasonably safe condition for public travel."

Terrell v. City of Orangeburg, 176 S.C. 518, 180 S.E. 670, 672 (1935) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by McCall v. Batson, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741, 744 (1985) (abolishing sovereign immunity). Thus, there was clearly a legal duty on the part of the ...

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