Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. HP Pelzer Auto. Sys.
| Decision Date | 02 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | No.: 1:17-CV-31-TAV-CHS,: 1:17-CV-31-TAV-CHS |
| Parties | EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, and ESTELA BLACK, Intervening Plaintiff, v. HP PELZER AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
Defendant has litigated and defeated plaintiffs' retaliation suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Now, by pursuing attorney fees and costs, it seeks to punish plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") for a suit defendant believes was frivolously brought, unreasonably continued, and litigated in bad faith. Unfortunately for defendant, while the jury returned a verdict in its favor, this Court has already ruled three (3) times that this suit was not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless—twice before the trial and once after hearing all the evidence. The Court will therefore ADOPT IN WHOLE the magistrate judge's report and recommendation ("R&R") [Doc. 221] and incorporate it into this memorandum opinion denying defendant's motion for attorney fees and costs [Doc. 213].
The EEOC brought—and plaintiff Estela Black intervened in—a Title VII suit alleging defendant HP Pelzer Automotive Systems, Inc. ("defendant") fired Black, one of its employees, for complaining of sexual harassment [Doc. 1; see also Doc. 106 p. 1-3]. Prior to trial, the Court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment and motion for Rule 11 sanctions [Doc. 92] and later denied defendant's motion to alter or amend the order denying summary judgment [Doc. 106]. At the close of the evidence, the Court orally denied defendant's renewed motion for a directed verdict. After the jury returned a verdict in defendant's favor [Doc. 204], defendant moved [Doc. 213] for attorney fees and costs from plaintiff EEOC pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The Court referred the motion to Magistrate Judge Christopher H. Steger [Doc. 217], who filed a report and recommendation recommending denial of defendant's motion [Doc. 221].
Judge Steger describes defendant's motion as an attempt to "relitigate the summary judgment motion in its motion for attorney fees in order to show that [p]laintiff's retaliation was frivolous; that summary judgment was 'improperly denied'; and that HP Pelzer is, therefore, entitled to attorney fees from the EEOC" [Doc. 221 p. 4]. Noting that a motion for attorney fees is not the proper vehicle to challenge a prior decision denying summary judgment, Judge Steger reasons that "[a] case substantive enough to submit to a jury is not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation," and he declines to engage in "post hoc reasoning to conclude that Black's claim lacked all merit" [Id.]. This case, Judge Stegerfinds, does not represent the "extreme, egregious situation contemplated by the Supreme Court in Christiansburg[, 434 U.S. 412 (1978)]" that would justify the award of attorney fees to a defendant in a civil rights action [Doc. 221 p. 4-5]. Accordingly, he recommends this Court deny defendant's motion for attorney fees [Id. at 5].
Defendant filed an objection to the R&R [Doc. 222], and the EEOC responded [Doc. 223]. Defendant raised four objections: (1) the R&R is contrary to law because it recommends denial of defendant's motion because defendant did not prevail in its summary judgment motion; (2) the R&R is clearly erroneous because it "fails to include the fact that the EEOC dismissed the plaintiff's charge of sex discrimination and then brought this frivolous lawsuit with no evidence of bad faith on the part of defendant"; (3) the R&R is contrary to law because it "fail[s] to address the EEOC's reprehensible behavior throughout the litigation"; and (4) the R&R "fails to follow the law where it fails to award defendant its attorneys' fees and costs [when] the EEOC filed and pursued a frivolous retaliation case" [Doc. 222 p. v-vi]. The EEOC contends that the R&R rests on well-settled case law, that plaintiffs' claim was not contingent on the actionability of Black's alleged sexual harassment, and that the EEOC did not litigate in bad faith or act unreasonably [Doc. 223 p. 2-3].
This Court reviews de novo those portions of a magistrate judge's report and recommendation to which a party objects, unless the objections are frivolous, conclusive, or general. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n ofTeachers, Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987); Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986).1 "The parties have 'the duty to pinpoint those portions of the magistrate's report that the district court must specially consider.'" Mira, 806 F.2d at 637 (quoting Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 (5th Cir. 1982)). "[A]bsent compelling reasons," parties may not "raise at the district court stage new arguments or issues that were not presented to the magistrate." Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d 895, 902 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Waters, 158 F.3d 933, 936 (6th Cir. 1998)); see also Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426-27 (10th Cir. 1996) (). The Court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations" of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Defendant's fourth objection is conclusory and general and thus does not require de novo review, but its first three objections do merit de novo review. Finding that defendant's second objection overlaps with its first objection, the Court will discuss them together before turning to the third objection. The Court finds that the relevant statutorylanguage and case law support the magistrate judge's denial of defendant's motion for attorney fees and costs.
Generally, the "American Rule" governs disputes over attorney fees, providing that each party, including the prevailing party, bears his or her own attorney fees. Riddle v. Egensperger, 266 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2001). However, certain statutes provide for the award of attorney fees to the winner. Id. Defendant in this case moves for attorney fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), which enables a court to award the prevailing party in a Title VII action "a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees)" and states that the EEOC "shall be liable for costs the same as a private person."
"An award of attorney fees against a losing plaintiff in a civil rights action 'is an extreme sanction, and must be limited to truly egregious cases of misconduct.'" Riddle, 266 F.3d at 547 (quoting Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1232 (6th Cir. 1986)). "[A] prevailing defendant should only recover upon a finding by the district court that 'the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.'" Wayne v. Village of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 530 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)). However, "if a plaintiff is found to have brought or continued such a claim in bad faith, there will be an even stronger basis for charging him with the attorney fees incurred by the defense." Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422.
"The Supreme Court has instructed district courts considering prevailing defendants' applications for attorney fees to 'resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation.'" Wayne, 36 F.3d at 530 (quoting Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22). The Sixth Circuit has clarified that "a plaintiff may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit even when the law or facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset" and that a court should not award fees unless the court finds that the claim was "groundless at the outset or 'that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.'" Smith v. Smythe-Cramer Co., 754 F.2d 180, 183 (6th Cir. 1985) (quoting Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422).
The R&R recommends denial of defendant's motion for attorney fees because this Court denied summary judgment and "[a] case substantive enough to submit to a jury is not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation" [Doc. 221 p. 4]; defendant argues this conclusion is contrary to law. While the R&R's statement of the law may arguably be viewed as too unequivocal, it is nonetheless true that it is unusual for a court to find that a case was "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation" where it survived a summary judgment motion. Against that backdrop, and as the ensuing discussion demonstrates, the magistrate judge's conclusions are certainly not, despite defendant's assertions, contrary to law.
In support of its contention that a court may award fees and costs, even after denying summary judgment, defendant principally cites decisions rendered outside the Sixth Circuit [Doc. 222 p. 4-7]. Only two of these appear to have involved courts granting motions for attorney fees under the Christiansburg standard after deciding the case had sufficient substance to survive a summary judgment motion [Id. ()].
The dearth of case law supporting defendant's position should not surprise considering the distinction between cases where the court was presented with a motion for summary judgment and those where it was not. Summary judgment permits the court to "pierce any boilerplate in the pleadings and assess the parties' substantive proof." 2 Moore's Federal Practice and...
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