Eric J., In re

• Decision Date: 17 November 1978
• Citation: 150 Cal.Rptr. 299,86 Cal.App.3d 513
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re ERIC J., a person coming under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, Eric J., Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 18082.

Page 299

150 Cal.Rptr. 299

86 Cal.App.3d 513

In re ERIC J., a person coming under the Juvenile Court Law THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, Eric J., Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 18082.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Nov. 17, 1978.

As Modified Dec. 5, 1978.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 6, 1978.

Hearing Granted Jan. 17, 1979.

Appellate Defenders, Inc. by Handy Horiye, Staff Atty., San Diego, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Daniel J. Kremer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jay M. Bloom and Lillian Lim Quon, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

WIENER, Associate Justice.

Eric Craig J., a minor, was declared a ward of the juvenile court following a finding he fell within Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. After a true finding was made at the jurisdictional hearing that Eric had committed a burglary (Pen.Code, § 459), he was committed to the California Youth Authority (CYA) for the maximum term of confinement permitted by law. He appeals from the dispositional order (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 800).

For the reasons which we will discuss, we have concluded that (1) his commitment for the upper term without the need of a finding

of aggravation nor the possibility of presenting circumstances in mitigation as accorded adults convicted of identical offenses (Pen.Code, § 1170(b)) denied him equal protection of the laws; (2) the determination of his maximum term was erroneous; and (3) the court failed to credit him for pre-sentence time. We reverse the order.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

About a month after nine pairs of roller skates were stolen from the Sweetwater Roller Rink in National City, Midge Rhoda, a professional skating teacher, contacted the owner. She explained that Eric was at the Palisades Gardens Skating Rink attempting to sell roller skates and they might be those which were taken. The police were informed. Police Officer Davis, in response to the call, went to the Sweetwater Rink.

Officer Davis was advised by the manager of the identity of the juvenile and his employment at the Sweetwater Rink. The officer had a copy of the police report involving the burglary. The uniformed officer then drove the manager to the Palisades Gardens, where they contacted Rhoda and arranged to meet Eric in Rhoda's office. During questioning by the manager for approximately 45 minutes to an hour, Eric confessed to the burglary, implicated his brother as his accomplice, indicated he had sold some of the skates to individuals still at the rink, and noted the remainder of the skates were at his home. On two separate occasions during the discussion, Eric left the office and returned with the individuals to whom he had sold the skates.

Officer Davis drove the manager and Eric to the latter's home and recovered the rest of the skates. During the retrieval, the officer remained in the marked police car while the other two parties went into the house. Eric was not advised of his constitutional rights as outlined in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, until after he was taken to the police station.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE COMMITMENT OF A JUVENILE FOR THE UPPER TERM WITHOUT THE NEED OF A FINDING OF AGGRAVATION NOR THE POSSIBILITY OF PRESENTING MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES AS ACCORDED ADULTS CONVICTED OF IDENTICAL OFFENSES

Welfare and Institutions Code sections 726 and 731 ¹ provide that a juvenile properly committed to the CYA may not be confined by the Youth Authority longer than We do not face this issue as an original problem unfettered by judicial or legislative comment. The juvenile law has undergone dramatic changes in recent years. It is no longer a simple and informal system. It has become an interesting mix of formal due process requirements along with the informal procedures developed in the effort to achieve rehabilitation for those involved by dealing promptly and directly with youths during their formative years. The series of trade-offs impacting the traditional procedure in juvenile law has been the result of balancing the constitutional safeguards to which children are entitled against the potential benefits derived from the traditional approach. With only the exception of McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971) 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647, in which it was held the Fourteenth Amendment did not mandate the right to trial by jury in an adjudicative phrase of a state juvenile court proceeding, the United States Supreme Court has responded consistently by requiring the application of constitutional safeguards in juvenile proceedings. (See In re Gault (1976) 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527; In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368; Breed v. Jones (1975) 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346.) Our approach, however, cannot be a doctrinaire assumption that it is essential to engraft each aspect of the adult penal system on the juvenile law. There are circumstances which legitimately warrant the rejection of judicial surgery. (See, e. g., Alex T. v. Superior Court (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 24, 140 Cal.Rptr. 17.)

an adult could be imprisoned for the commission of the same offense. The maximum term of possible confinement for a juvenile is defined in section 726 as being the longest of the three possible terms imposable for the offense under the Determinate Sentencing Law without the opportunity of showing aggravation or mitigation. Defendant contends this statutory scheme providing for the commitment of the upper term without a finding of aggravation, as well as depriving a juvenile of the opportunity of presenting circumstances in mitigation, as accorded adults convicted of identical offenses, denies him equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the United States Constitution, Amendment XIV and the California Constitution, Article 1, section 7(a).

Our analysis of the issue presented in this appeal is also guided by the decision of our Supreme Court in People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236, 131 Cal.Rptr. 55, 551 P.2d 375. ² Olivas, an adult, was tried and convicted in an adult court of misdemeanor assault pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 1731.5. He was ordered committed to the Youth Authority. Had Olivas been sentenced for his crime under the Penal Code, his maximum term of confinement would have been six months in the county jail (Pen.Code, § 241) whereas his Youth Authority commitment carried a possible confinement period extending until his 23rd birthday, or in excess of three years. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 726.) The court held Olivas was similarly situated with any other adult who had been convicted of the same crime but sentenced to jail or state prison. (Id. at p. 242, 131 Cal.Rptr. 55, 551 P.2d 375.) It concluded his interest was one of "personal liberty," a Fundamental interest. The state was required to show not only there was a compelling interest which justified the law, but also the distinctions drawn by the law were necessary to further its purpose. (Id. at p. 243 and p. 251, 131 Cal.Rptr. 55, 551 P.2d 375.) The court concluded the disparity of confinement periods violated Olivas' constitutional right to equal protection, since the state could not show the disparity was necessary to further a compelling state interest. It held section 1770 of the Welfare and Institutions Code unconstitutional insofar as it authorized the The declared purpose behind adult incarceration is punishment. (Pen.Code, § 1170(a)(1).) The declared purposes behind juvenile commitment are treatment and rehabilitation (In re Aline D. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 557, 567, 121 Cal.Rptr. 816, 536 P.2d 65) which are implemented by "methods of training and treatment directed toward the correction and rehabilitation of young persons found guilty of public offenses. . . ." (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 1700.) An additional element was added to the purpose of the juvenile law in the amendment to Welfare & Institutions Code section 202 (Stats.1976, ch. 1068, § 1.5; Stats.1977, ch. 910, § 1) to admit the purpose was also "to protect the public from criminal conduct by minors." Placement in the CYA is a last resort after all other efforts permitted by the applicable provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code have failed. (In re Aline D., supra, 14 Cal.3d 557, 564, 121 Cal.Rptr. 816, 536 P.2d 65.) "Within the Youth Authority system, there is gathered from throughout the State the most severely delinquent youths which have exhausted local programs." (Id. at p. 564, 121 Cal.Rptr. at p. 821, 536 P.2d at p. 69, quoting from California Youth Authority, Criteria and Procedure for Referral of Juvenile Court Cases to the Youth Authority (1971) p. 1.)

Youth Authority to maintain control over misdemeanants committed to its care for any period of time in excess of the maximum jail term permitted by the statute for the offense or offenses committed. (People v. Olivas, supra, 17 Cal.3d 236, at p. 257, 131 Cal.Rptr. 55, 551 P.2d 375.) Olivas specifically reserved the issue presented in the case at bench, i. e., whether equal protection requires the same procedure used in the criminal courts for adults at the time of sentencing In a situation in which a juvenile is adjudged under the Juvenile Court Law as a juvenile. (See Olivas, supra, at p. 243, fn. 11, 131 Cal.Rptr. 55, 551 P.2d 375.)

"Commitment in an institution of the Youth Authority can be described in many ways and can encompass a wide range of controls. However, the key factor common to all such descriptions is the physical restraint of the ward's person. While wards confined in institutions of the Youth Authority may often experience greater freedom within the institution than individuals confined in state prisons or mental hospitals (citation), they are nevertheless incarcerated against their will, a most basic form of personal liberty deprivation." (People v. Olivas, supra, 17 Cal.3d 236, 244-245, 131 Cal.Rptr. 55, 60, 551...